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  Studies on Platonic ‘Theoria motus abstracti’ are often focused on dynamics rather than 
kinematics, in particular on psychic self-motion. This state of affairs is, of course, far from 
being a bland academic accident: according to Plato, dynamics is the higher science while 
kinematics is lower on the ‘scientific’ spectrum1. Furthermore, when scholars investigate 
Platonic abstract kinematics, in front of them there is a very limited set of texts2. Among 
them, one of the most interesting undoubtedly remains a passage of Parmenides in which 
Plato challenges the puzzle of the ‘instant of change’, namely the famous text about the 
‘sudden’ (τὸ ἐξαίφνης). 
  Plato’s ἐξαίφνης actually is a terminus technicus and a terminus mysticus at once3, in 
such a way that from Antiquity until today this Platonic concept has been interpreted in 
very different fashions, either in a physical fashion or in a mystical one. Nevertheless, it 
has not been analysed how those two directions have been already followed by the Platonic 
Tradition. So, the aim of this paper is to provide some acquaintance with the exegetical 
history of ἐξαίφνης inside the Platonic Tradition, from Plato to Marsilio Ficino, by way of 
Middle Platonism and Greek Neoplatonism. 
  After exposing Plato’s argument of Parm, 156c-157b and its various interpretations (1), 
I shall investigate the ways by which Middle Platonists (especially Taurus) and Early 
Neoplatonists as Plotinus and Iamblichus have understood Plato’s use of ἐξαίφνης (2), and 
finally how this notion had been transferred from kinematics to dynamics in Later 
Neoplatonism (3). 
 
 
 1. PLATO’S PARM, 156C-157B: THE PUZZLE OF THE ‘INSTANT OF CHANGE’ 
 
  1.1. The Text: Parmenides, 156c1-157b5 
  Plato’s treatment of the ἐξαίφνης appears at the end of the Second Hypothesis of 
Parmenides, in a passage which is interpreted by some Platonists to be a genuine 
Hypothesis (so, the Third) but which likely is a kind of corollary or an appendix, linked 
to the Second Hypothesis4. Of course, other texts can be found in which Plato uses the 
word ἐξαίφνης, but that is in Parmenides wherein it seems to have a very technical 
meaning5 (notably because that is the only text in which ἐξαίφνης is used as a substantive 
and not as an adverb). It is why I am firstly focusing on this passage. 
 
1 J. VUILLEMIN, “The Systems of Plato and Aristotle Compared as to their Contribution to 
Physics”, in W. SPOHN, B. C. VAN FRAASSEN, B. SKYRMS (eds.), Existence and 
Explanation. Essays presented in Honor of Karel Lambert, Springer, 1991, p. 197-201 
2 PLATO, Laws, X 893b-898c 
3 N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space 
and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 20 
4 F. M. CORNFORD, Plato and Parmenides, Kegan Paul, 1939, p. 194, p. 202; F. 
NIEWOEHNER, Dialog und Dialektik in Platons ‘Parmenides’, Meisenheim, 1971, p. 280; 
S. SCOLNICOV (ed.), Plato’s Parmenides, University of California Press, 2003, p. 134 and 
M. DIXSAUT, “Le temps qui s’avance et l’instant du changement (Timée, 37c-39e, 
Parménide, 140e-141e, 151e-155E)”, in Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 101, 2003-2, p. 
260 
5 All Plato’s and Plotinus’ uses of ἐξαίφνης are so-called ‘analysed’ in a recent monography 
which can only be credited to have enumerated these texts: J. CIMAKASKY, The Role of 
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Ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἵστηται καὶ ὅταν ἑστὸς 
ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δήπου αὐτό γε 
μηδ’ ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. – Πῶς δή; – Ἑστός τε 
πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον 
κινούμενον ὕστερον ἑστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ 
μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν. 
– Πῶς γάρ; – Χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ 
τι οἷόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἑστάναι. – 
Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. – Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ 
τοῦ μεταβάλλειν. – Οὐκ εἰκός. – Πότ’ οὖν 
μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἑστὸς ὂν οὔτε 
κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν. – 
Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. – Ἆρ’ οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, 
ἐν ᾧ τότ’ ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει; – Τὸ ποῖον 
δή; – Τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι 
ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς 
ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἑστάναι ἑστῶτος 
ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως 
κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης 
αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς 
κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ 
οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε 
κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ 
ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι. – Κινδυνεύει. – Καὶ τὸ 
ἓν δή, εἴπερ ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι 
ἂν ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα – μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως 
ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ – μεταβάλλον δ’ ἐξαίφνης 
μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ 
χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινοῖτ’ ἂν τότε, οὐδ’ ἂν 
σταίη. – Οὐ γάρ. – Ἆρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς 
ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ 
ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς 
τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται 
κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε 
οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; – 
Ἔοικε γοῦν. – Κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ 
ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ’ ἓν οὔτε 
ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε 
συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ 
ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὅμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε 
ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε 
ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ 
ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν 
οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε 
φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν. – Οὐκ ἔοικε. – 
Ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ’ ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἕν, 
εἰ ἔστιν. – Πῶς δ’ οὔ; 
“And when being in motion it comes to rest, 
and when being at rest it changes to motion, it 
must itself be in no time at all.” “How is that?” 
“It is impossible for it to be previously at rest 
and afterwards in motion, or previously in 
motion and afterwards at rest, without 
changing.” “Of course.” “And there is no time 
in which anything can be at once neither in 
motion nor at rest.” “No, there is none.” “And 
certainly it cannot change without changing.” 
“I should say not.” “Then when does it change? 
For it does not change when it is at rest or when 
it is in motion or when it is in time.” “No, it 
does not.” “Does this strange thing, then, exist, 
in which it would be at the moment when it 
changes?” “What sort of thing is that?” “The 
sudden. For the sudden seems to indicate a 
something from which there is a change in one 
direction or the other. For it does not change 
from rest while it is still at rest, nor from 
motion while it is still moving; but there is this 
strange instantaneous nature, something 
interposed between motion and rest, not 
existing at any time, and into this and out from 
this that which is in motion changes into rest 
and that which is at rest changes into motion.” 
“Yes, that must be so.” “Then the one, if it is at 
rest and in motion, must change in each 
direction; for that is the only way in which it 
can do both. But in changing, it changes 
instantaneously, and when it changes it can be 
in no time, and at that sudden it will be neither 
in motion nor at rest.” “No.” “And will the case 
not be the same in relation to other changes?” 
“When it changes from being to destruction or 
from not being to becoming, does it not pass 
into an intermediate stage between certain 
forms of motion and rest, so that it neither is 
nor is not, neither comes into being nor is 
destroyed?” “Yes, so it appears.” “And on the 
same principle, when it passes from one to 
many or from many to one, it is neither one nor 
many, is neither in a process of separation nor 
in one of combination. And in passing from 
like to unlike or from unlike to like, it is neither 
like nor unlike, neither in a process of 
assimilation nor in one of dissimilation; and in 
passing from small to great and to equal and 
vice versa, it is neither small nor great nor 
equal, neither in a process of increase, nor of 
diminution, nor of equality.” “Apparently not.” 
 
Exaíphnes in Early Greek Literature. Philosophical Transformation in Plato’s Dialogues 
and Beyond, Lexington Books, 2017 
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“All this, then, would happen to the one, if the 
one exists.” “Yes, certainly.”6 
 
 1.2. The Puzzle of the ‘Instant of Change’: A Very Brief Summary 
  Plato is usually credited to be the first to have challenged the Puzzle of the ‘Instant of 
Change’. Nonetheless, as Strobach has recently suggested, a passage of Aristophanes’ 
Comedy The Clouds may be the first occurrence of the problem7. Anyway, the point 
remains that the puzzle has a long history, from Antiquity to today, by way of medieval 
instances and Leibniz’ reflections. 
  The puzzle can be shortly summarized as follows: let a continuous change between two 
states, which state obtains at the temporal limit between the old state and the new? In fact, 
this puzzle accurately is the temporal equivalent of the topological ‘Diodorean-test’8: the 
first asks ‘when?’ change is occurring, the second ‘where?’. 
  Philosophical Tradition offers us several illustrations to this, haphazardly: the passage 
between the old and the new day9, the death of Socrates or Dion, the whiteness of Socrates, 
etc. In Antiquity, the most famous incontestably was the instant of death10 either of 
Socrates11, or, in a more Stoic way, of Dion12 (‘when Socrates is dying? Is it when he is 
still alive or when he is already dead?’), while, in Middle-Age scholarship, the whiteness 
of Socrates (inspired by Phys, 8.8) became fashionable, notably at Merton College13. Yet, 
more often, these examples are understood as solely seemingly different, namely as 
referring to a same and more general puzzle. For instance, when Simplicius gives a 
commentary on a passage of the Physics in which Aristotle discusses the last instant of 
change14, he immediately draws a parallel with Plato’s ἐξαίφνης and the Hellenistic 
enigma of the death of Dion, notably by exposing Alexander’s solution15. However, as 
 
6 English translation (modified): H. N. FOWLER (ed.), Plato. Cratylus. Parmenides. Greater 
Hippias. Lesser Hippias, Harvard University Press, 1926, p. 299-301 
7 N. STROBACH, “Indivisible Temporal Boundaries from Aristophanes until Today”, in 
Vivarium, 55, 2017, p. 9-21 
8 “Diodorus Kronus on Motion against Aristotle’s Kinematics: a crypto-defence of Plato’s 
Dynamics?”, 2017. This paper has been partially presented in Dublin: “Diodorus Kronus on 
Motion against Aristotle’s Kinematics”, First Dublin Graduate Conference in Ancient 
Philosophy. Physis and Psychê in Ancient Philosophy: Causes, Generation, and Change, 
University College Dublin/Trinity College Dublin, 31st March 2017. On the ‘Diodorean-
test’, see: SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, PH, II, 242-243, 245, III, 71-76, AM, I, 309-312, X, 85-120, 
142-143, 344-347. On this argument, see: R. J. HANKINSON, “Motion: M 10.37-168”, in K. 
ALGRA, K. IERODIAKONOU (eds.), Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, p. 234-246 and M. J. WHITE, “The Spatial Arrow Paradox”, in 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68-1, 1987, p. 71-77 
9 ARISTOPHANES, The Clouds, 1178-1201 
10 Diodorus Kronus: SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, AM, I 309-312; Epicureanism: DIOGENUS 
LAËRTIUS, 10.124-126, 139 and LUCRETIUS, De rerum natura, III 830-911; Early 
Christianism: AUGUSTINE, De Civitate Dei, 13.9-11 (see also: G. W. LEIBNIZ, Pacidius 
Philalethi (1676), in L. COUTURAT (ed.), Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz, Olms, 
1961, p. 599-600 (= Akademie Ausgabe, series 6, vol. 3, Berlin, 1980, p. 535-536) and L. 
WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 6.4311) 
11 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, AM, IX 269, 344-50, PH III 110-114 
12 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 982.1-984.2, 1299.36-1300.36 
13 See: N. KRETZMANN, “Socrates is Whiter than Plato begins to be White”, in Noûs, 11-
1, 1977, p. 3-15 and E. D. SYLLA, “The Oxford Calculators”, in N. KRETZMANN, A. 
KENNY, J. PINBORG, E. STUMP (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 
Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholaticism 1100-
1600, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 540-563 
14 ARISTOTLE, Phys, 6.5 235b32-236a7 
15 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 982.1-984.2 
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Sorabji has demonstrated16, the case of the transition between moving and resting is quite 
different to the precedents, in a sense more problematic because this case challenges with 
the ideas of changing at an instant and of instantaneous velocity. But, here, the difference 
can be laid aside because, unlike Aristotle17, Plato was not aware of this subtlety (the 
opposition between motion and rest is presented as an opposition amongst others18). 
  I shall explain in detail neither the deep meaning of the puzzle, nor weigh up the pros 
and cons of its various readings19; I shall just present in few words the possible answers. 
  Obviously, there are only four possibilities to conceive the description of the ‘instant of 
change’. Given a change between A and ¬A, either the instant of change i? belongs to only 
a ‘side’ (1 and 2), or neither (3), or both (4): 
 
…iA...iA…iA…iA…iA…i? i¬A… i¬A … i¬A … i¬A… 
_______A_______½_______¬A_______ 
 
1. i? = iA 3. i? = i¬AÙ¬¬A 
2. i? = i¬A 4. i? = iAÙ¬A 
 
  Not surprisingly, all of these four answers had been – and are again –, supported, even if 
3 and 4 seems to infringe some logical laws, respectively, of Excluded Middle and of 
Contradiction20. By virtue of this possible unfortunate consequence, the either/or-option 
(namely solutions 1 and 2) has been preferred for a long time, notably by Aristotle 
(solution 2) whose authority was followed by the majority of Medieval thinkers21, 
sometimes, of course, with great amendments. 
  More interesting, each of the four answers have been sustained in very various ways. For 
instance, Stoicism sustained a kind of Both-states-option by analysing tensed complex 
propositions which can modify their truth-value according to the circumstances (ἀξιώματα 
ἃ μεταπίπτοντά τινες λέγουσιν ἀπεριγράφως)22, Medieval theologians – as Henry of 
Ghent23, John Baconthorpe, Hugh of Novocastro and Landolfo Caracciolo – by having 
recourse to the very Scotist distinction between ‘instant (or signs) of nature’ and ‘instant 
 
16 R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 403-421 
17 See: R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 409-415 
18 PLATO, Parmenides, 156a-c, 156e-157b. However, for a precision on this Platonic 
indifference which is in fact highly sustained by the distinction between several levels of 
processes, namely one for the becoming taken as a whole, and another for the motions and 
rests of the particular items, see the footnote 407. 
19 For a detailed survey, see the excellent: N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A 
Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and Time, Springer, 1998 
20 M. J. WHITE, “The Foundations of the Calculus and the Conceptual Analysis of Motion: 
The Case of the Early Leibniz (1670-1676)”, in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 73, 1992, 
p. 287 
21 For instance: Albert the Great, William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain, Walter Burley, 
William of Ockham, Thomas Bradwardine, Richard Kilvington, William Heytesbury, John 
of Holland, and Paul of Venice, etc. For an overview of the puzzle in Medieval thought, see: 
N. KRETZMANN, “Incipit/Desinit”, in P. K. MACHAMER, R. G. TURNBULL (eds.), Motion 
and Time, Space and Matter. Interrelations in the History of Philosophy and Science, Ohio 
State University Press, 1976, p. 101-136 and N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A 
Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 84-110 
22 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 1299.36-1300.36. See: M. RASHED (ed.), Alexandre d’Aphrodise, 
Commentaire perdu à la Physique d’Aristote (livres IV-VIII). Les scholies byzantines, de 
Gruyter, 2011, p. 109-112, p. 610-613 and B. MATES, Stoic Logic, University of California 
Press, 1961, p. 36 
23 See: S. KNUUTTILA, “Change and Contradiction in Henry of Ghent”, in Vivarium, 55, 
2017, p. 22-35 
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of time’24, and modern Hegelianism as Graham Priest’s dialetheism by elaborating a 
paraconsistent logic25. It must be remarked that only the later supports the Both-states-
option in its strongest fashion according to which motion involves the rejection of the 
logical law of Contradiction, so that this principle is sometimes, in very circumscribed 
cases, irrelevant (of course, dialetheism does not imply the ex falso quodlibet). 
  It was happened that these answers had been simultaneously supported by rival schools, 
notably in Hellenistic period in which the Both-states-option was espoused by Stoicism, a 
kind of either/or-option by Aristotelianism, and, as I shall argue, a neither/nor-option by 
Platonism. There is, of course, a great absent in this Hellenistic overview. Indeed, 
Epicureanism, by denying one premiss of the puzzle, must not select an answer or another: 
given that its atomism involves the rejection of the continuum, so of the continuity of 
motion, then there is simply not a weird stuff like an ‘instant of change’, in such a way 
that a moving item actually progress by discontinuous leaps26, as the pictures inside a 
cinematograph. Leibniz’ solution is very similar: during the four seasons of 1676, he 
swops his old conatus-continuism in favour of contiguity, avoiding the puzzle of the 
‘instant of change’27. 
 
 1.3. Plato’s Solution and Its Various Interpretations 
  Parm, 156c-157b has been interpreted by modern scholars in various ways. Notably, it 
had been manipulated by them in their debates about a so-called time-atomism in Plato’s 
thought28, or for sustaining their own views on the philosophical tradition to which Plato 
belongs29. 
  Even if Plato would have admitted a kind of time-atoms (as Strang, Iamblichus and 
Damascius have argued in their commentaries), the discussion on the ‘instant of change’ 
shows enough that he would consider that those time-atoms must come one after one by a 
continuous chain and surely not by a contiguous one: insofar as the transition from motion 
 
24 See: S. KNUUTTILA, A. I. LEHTINEN, “Change and Contradiction: A Fourteenth-Century 
Controversy”, in Synthese, 40, 1979, p. 189-207; N. KRETZMANN, “Continuity, 
Contrariety, Contradiction, and Change”, in N. KRETZMANN (ed.), Infinity and Continuity 
in Ancient and Medieval Thought, Cornell University Press, 1982, p. 270-296; P. V. SPADE, 
“Quasi-Aristotelianism”, in N. KRETZMANN (ed.), Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and 
Medieval Thought, Cornell University Press, 1982, p. 297-307 and W. O. DUBA, “Quasi-
Aristotelians and Proto-Scotists”, in Vivarium, 55, 2017, p. 60-84 
25 G. PRIEST, In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent, Oxford Clarendon Press, 
2006, p. 159-181, “Inconsistencies in Motion”, in American Philosophical Quarterly, 22-4, 
1985, p. 339-346, “Contradiction and the Instant of Change Revisited”, in Vivarium, 55, 
2017, p. 217-226. Priest comments on 156c-157b from a dialetheist point of view in: G. 
PRIEST, One. Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the 
Singular Object which is Nothingless, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 134-137 
26 See: M. RASHED (ed.), Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la Physique 
d’Aristote (livres IV-VIII). Les scholies byzantines, de Gruyter, 2011, p. 109-112 
27 The history of this Leibnizian evolution from Hypothesis Physica Nova (1671) to Pacidius 
Philalethi (1676) and beyond is admirably traced with the texts available in: R. T. W. 
ARTHUR (ed.), The Labyrinth of the Continuum. G. W. Leibniz, Writings on the Continuum 
Problem 1672-1686, Yale University Press, 2001 (see also: Ph. BEELEY, Kontinuität und 
Mechanismus. Zur Philosophie des Jungen Leibniz in ihrem Ideengeschichtlichen Kontext, 
Studia Leibnitiana Suppl. 30, Stuttgart, 1996) 
28 The Strang-Mills Debate: C. STRANG, K. W. MILLS, “Plato and the Instant”, in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 48, 1974, p. 63-96. Briefly 
summarized in: R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 359-
361. Strang argues that Plato had embraced the idea of time-atoms by analysing Parm, 152b-
d. So, in fact, Strang just follows Damascius’ interpretation of this passage (the ‘now’ 
understood as a ‘indivisible-and-divisible leap’). 
29 See: F. M. CORNFORD, Plato and Parmenides, Kegan Paul, 1939, p. 202-203 
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to rest does not occur at any time-atom, but at a durationless ‘sudden’, time-atoms must 
constitute together a continuum30. At any rate, since the puzzle of the ‘instant of change’ 
mainly is a continuum-problem31, Plato’s ἐξαίφνης should be described according to one 
of the four possibilities introduced above. 
  Unfortunately, Plato’s text is maybe not very clear-cut, notably on the ontological and 
logical status of the ἐξαίφνης. By virtue of this relative obscurity, scholars have more or 
less explicitly provided no fewer than three kinds of solutions. 
  1. The ἐξαίφνης is a kind of proto-Hegelian Aufhebung-item, namely the ‘sudden’ is 
beyond the time and ‘puts aside/away’32 (namely ‘destroyed-and-preserved’) both the 
earlier and later states33. This solution entails a rejection of the logical laws of 
Contradiction and Excluded Middle at once. 
  2. The ἐξαίφνης is outside of time, and is neither in the earlier state, nor in the later34. 
  3. The ἐξαίφνης is apart from time, because, strictly speaking, time is not composed out 
of durationless instants, and is neither in the earlier state, nor in the later, in such a way 
that Plato would have supported a variant of the Neutral-Instant Analysis35. This 
interpretation seems to involve a local rejection of the law of Excluded Middle, since it is 
false that at any instant an item must be either in A or in ¬A36. 
  Deciding between these interpretations requires to come back to Parm, 156c-157b. It is 
astonishingly not very difficult to find a lot of textual evidences sustaining the view 
according to which the ‘sudden’ firstly is apart from time, and secondly is neither in A-
state nor in ¬A-state. 
 
The ‘sudden’ is apart from time The ‘sudden’ is neither in A nor in ¬A 
156c1-3: Ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἵστηται καὶ 
ὅταν ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ 
δήπου αὐτό γε μηδ’ ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. 
 
156c6-7: Χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι 
οἷόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἑστάναι. 
 
 
30 R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 361 
31 As Natorp has perfectly noted: P. NATORP, Platos Ideelehre. Eine Einführung in den 
Idealismus, Leipzig, 1921, p. 261-263. Following some suggestions of Natorp, Cherniss 
interprets the ἐξαίφηνς in a very simulating mathematical way, namely as a kind of 
infinitesimal: H. F. CHERNISS, “Parmenides and the Parmenides of Plato”, in The American 
Journal of Philology, 53-2, 1932, p. 132 n. 25 
32 To use the English translation of Aufheben employed by British idealism. ‘put aside’ in 
W. T. STACE, The Philosophy of Hegel, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1924, p. 106 and ‘put 
away’ in B. BOSANQUET, “The Aesthetic Theory of Ugliness”, in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 1-3, 1889/1900, p. 39 
33 J. WAHL, Etude sur le Parménide de Platon, F. Rieder, 1926, p. 167-172; W. 
BEIERWALTES, “Exaiphnês oder: die Paradoxie des Augenblicks”, Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch, 74, 1966/1967, p. 271-283 and L. BRISSON, “L’instant, le temps, et l’éternité 
dans le Parménide (155e-157b) de Platon”, in Dialogue, 9, 1970-3, p. 389-396 
34 D. BOSTOCK, “Plato on Change and Time in the ‘Parmenides’”, in Phronesis, 23-3, 1978, 
p. 229-242 
35 P. NATORP, Platos Ideelehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus, Leipzig, 1921, p. 261-
263; S. KNUUTTILA, “Remarks on the Background of the Fourteenth-Century Limit 
Decision Controversies”, in M. ASZTALOS (ed.), The Editing of Theological and 
Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1986, p. 247 and R. 
SORABJI, Time, creation and the continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 408. On the Neutral-
Instant Analysis, see: N. KRETZMANN, “Incipit/Desinit”, in P. K. MACHAMER, R. G. 
TURNBULL (eds.), Motion and Time, Space and Matter. Interrelations in the History of 
Philosophy and Science, Ohio State University Press, 1976, p. 101-136 
36 This local rejection seems to be accepted by Owen: G. E. L. OWEN, “Notes on Ryle’s 
Plato”, in O. P. WOOD, G. PITCHER (eds.), Ryle, MacMillan, 1970, p. 358-359 
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156c6-7: Χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι 
οἷόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἑστάναι. 
 
156c8-d1: Πότ’ οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ 
ἑστὸς ὂν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν 
χρόνῳ ὄν. 
 
156d6-e1: ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός 
τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ 
στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα 
 
156e5-6: μεταβάλλον δ’ ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, 
καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη 
156c8-d1: Πότ’ οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ 
ἑστὸς ὂν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν 
χρόνῳ ὄν. 
 
156d4-5: οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἑστάναι ἑστῶτος ἔτι 
μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης 
ἔτι μεταβάλλει 
 
156e5-7: καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ 
ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινοῖτ’ ἂν τότε, οὐδ’ ἂν σταίη 
 
157a2-3: καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, 
οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; 
 
157a4-b2: κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς 
ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ’ ἓν οὔτε ἕν 
ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε 
συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ 
ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὅμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε 
ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε 
ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ 
ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν 
οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε 
φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν 
 
  Yet, the question is: what is the meaning of the two theses? Indeed, claiming that the 
‘sudden’ is apart from time is very underdetermined. Albeit the text explicitly draws a 
clear opposition between χρόνος and ἐξαίφνης, Plato makes such a distinction without 
explaining this in detail. Likewise, asserting that the ‘sudden’ is neither in A-state nor in 
¬A-state which can involve different logical status for the ‘sudden’. 
  Now, I shall follow the great lines of Strobach’s analysis of the passage37, in my view 
Strobach had wonderfully and completely summarized and challenged all the logical 
twists and turns of Plato’s text. 
  The difference between χρόνος and ἐξαίφνης, and the thesis according to which the 
‘sudden’ is apart from time can be understood as the ‘sudden’ is not an entity belonging 
to the set of χρόνοι but remains a kind of temporal-entity, since saying ‘a thing is changing 
suddenly’ apparently constitutes a relevant answer to the question ‘when a thing is 
moving?’, in such a way that χρόνοι and ἐξαίφνης are two mutually exclusive subsets of 
the higher set of temporal-entities. Thus, a χρόνος could be conceived as a period or as a 
phase, namely a temporal stretch with duration, whereas an ἐξαίφνης could be a 
durationless item like an instant or moment which would be a kind of limit between two 
χρόνοι38. Such a very common interpretation, which entailing that Plato’s ἐξαίφνης is very 
 
37 N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space 
and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 7-8, p. 20-46 (with fewer amendments) 
38 P. NATORP, Platos Ideelehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus, Leipzig, 1921, p. 261-
263; C. STRANG, “Plato and the Instant”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volumes, 48, 1974, p. 68, p. 71-73; K. W. MILLS, “Plato and the Instant”, in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 48, 1974, p. 88 and N. 
STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and 
Time, Springer, 1998, p. 35-41 
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harmonized with Aristotle’s νῦν39, was explicitly favoured by Simplicius when he was 
commenting the Physics40. 
  Notwithstanding, ‘apart from time’ might also mean ‘beyond the time’ or ‘outside of 
time’41, in such a way that the ‘sudden’ would not be a temporal-entity but something else 
which rather belongs to an everlasting realm42. According to such an interpretation, χρόνος 
would not be just a period but more generally any temporal-entity, that is to say χρόνος is 
equivalent of ‘time’ with all its various meanings. In this case, of course, how the ‘sudden’ 
can remain a relevant answer to the question when (πότε) an object is changing? Well, 
Plato has precisely introduced the ‘sudden’ to answer this issue: 
 
156c8-d1: Πότ’ οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἑστὸς ὂν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν 
χρόνῳ ὄν. 
 
  Furthermore, what is the meaning of an eternal switch occurring beyond time? What is 
an extratemporal event? Unless arguing that Plato was a pioneer for Loop Gravity 
Theory43, that makes utterly no sense. Those who support this view seem in fact either 
banishing the idea of switching from ἐξαίφνης, in such a way that the ‘sudden’ becomes 
merely a changeless entity, or sustaining that the ‘sudden’ is both a stuff in which a change 
is occurring and in which it does not occur on the one hand, and a stuff in which a change 
neither occurs nor does not occur on the other, because the ‘sudden’ ‘puts away’ motion 
and rest, eternity and time. But scholars44 who claiming such a proto-Hegelian 
interpretation were doing bad poetry45 rather than challenging seriously Plato’s argument. 
Contrary to them, as we will see, Damascius had rigorously elaborated this kind of 
interpretation in his commentary on Parmenides. Indeed, he did it in a very specific and, 
above all, Platonistic framework, sustaining his very original view notably by taking 
account of the intermediary and very uncatchable nature of soul46. 
 
39 ARISTOTLE, Phys, 4.11, 13 
40 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 982.6 (see also, for an opposition between durationless change 
(whose Simplicius says it happens ἐξαίφνης) and change with duration: In De Caelo, 119.28-
121.4) 
41 D. BOSTOCK, “Plato on Change and Time in the ‘Parmenides’”, in Phronesis, 23-3, 1978, 
p. 236-238 and N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the 
Philosophy of Space and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 33-35 
42 So, the ‘sudden’ may be understood as a gate through which the ideas or forms could 
somehow penetrate the sensible realm: W. BEIERWALTES, “Exaiphnês oder: die Paradoxie 
des Augenblicks”, Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 74, 1966/1967, p. 271-283 and L. BRISSON, 
“L’instant, le temps, et l’éternité dans le Parménide (155e-157b) de Platon”, in Dialogue, 9, 
1970-3, p. 389-396 (such a reading obviously interprets Parm, 156c-e in the light of 
Symposium and Seventh Letter). See also: H. HÖFFDING, Bemerkungen über den 
Platonischen Dialog Parmenides, Simion, 1921, p. 34-35 
43 C. ROVELLI, F. VIDOTTO, Covariant Loop Quantum Gravity. An Elementary 
Introduction to Quantum Gravity and Spinfoam Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 
p. 30-57 
44 The most recent is: J. CIMAKASKY, The Role of Exaíphnes in Early Greek Literature. 
Philosophical Transformation in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond, Lexington Books, 2017, p. 
56 n. 10 based on K. M. SAYRE, Parmenides’ Lesson. Translation and Explication of 
Plato’s Parmenides, University of Notre Dame Press, 1996, p. 248 
45 For instance, Brisson writes: “L’instant est la fissure par laquelle l’éternité permet le 
déploiement du temps. C’est la chaîne d’or qui rattache le temps à ce point immuable qu’est 
l’éternité. Bref, cette explosion figée et continue qu’est l’éternité n’apparaît dans le temps 
que comme un crépitement incessant d’instants discrets. L’éternité est l’instant absolu ; le 
temps, l’instant toujours remis en cause” (p. 394). I have a preference for Novalis. 
46 C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, 
Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 89-92 
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  Nonetheless, the first interpretation should not be favoured only for its conceptual 
consistency, since there are other Platonic texts in which χρόνος and ἐξαίφηνς play the 
same role of mutual exclusive subsets of temporal-entities. Remarkably those texts are all 
present in the last Plato’s dialogue, namely the Laws. For instance, when Plato was 
discussing the moral condition of men during the Great Period of Disasters47, he has 
consciously built an opposition between a moral evolution without any duration and a 
moral evolution which requires duration, for concluding that the advancement toward the 
moral condition typical of 4th-Century BC must have been being progressive and step by 
step48: 
 
ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν προϊόντος μὲν τοῦ χρόνου, 
πληθύοντος δ’ ἡμῶν τοῦ γένους, εἰς πάντα τὰ 
νῦν καθεστηκότα προελήλυθεν πάντα;  
ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα. 
ΑΘ. Οὐκ ἐξαίφνης γε, ὡς εἰκός, κατὰ σμικρὸν 
δὲ ἐν παμπόλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ. 
ΚΛ. Καὶ μάλα πρέπει τοῦθ’ οὕτως. 
ATH. As time went on and our race multiplied, 
all things advanced – did they not? – to the 
condition which now exists. 
CLIN. Exactly. 
ATH. But, in all probability, they advanced, not 
suddenly <all at once>, but by small degrees, 
in the course of an immense period of time. 
CLIN. Yes, that is most likely.49 
 
Further, even if the link with Parmenides is less obvious, Plato drew a distinction between 
two kinds of crimes of passion, one which occurs ‘suddenly’ without any premeditation 
and another which occurs with a period of premeditation50. Thus, it appears that the Laws 
keeps a record of the kinematic lessons of Parmenides, in such a way that the last dialogue 
of Plato sustains the view according to which the ‘sudden’ is ‘apart from time’ inasmuch 
as it is a durationless temporal-entity and in no way a kind of everlasting entity beyond 
the γένεσις-realm. 
  I shall now follow Strobach logical analysis of the text51 to clarify the logical status of 
the ‘sudden’. Let Ma (from μεταβάλλει) as being a statement which must be read as ‘the 
item a is changing at…’. Aa means ‘the item a is in A-state’, while ¬Aa means ‘the item 
a is in ¬A-state’. Π (from πότε) is the set of relevant things wherein an item can be and 
satisfying the question ‘when?’. One subset of Π is Χ (from χρόνος) – namely the subset 
of all temporal items which have duration – and another is E (from ἐξαίφνης)52. The 
logical structure of Parm, 155e-156e may be reconstructed as follows: 
 
155e4-9 ¬$x¬$y[(x Î Π)Ù(y Î Π)]Ù[(((Aa(x)Ù¬Aa(y))Ú(¬Aa(x)ÙAa(y)))Ù(x=y))] Law of Contradiction 
155e10-11 "x"y[(x Î X)Ù(y Î X)]Ù[(Aa(x)Ù¬Aa(y)) Þ (x¹y)] Law of Contradiction for χρόνοι 
 "x(x Î Π)Ù[Ma(x) Þ (¬Aa(x)Ù¬¬Aa(x))] Plato’s Premiss 
156c1-7 ¬$x(x Î X)Ù[(¬Aa(x)Ù¬¬Aa(x)] Law of Excluded Middle for χρόνοι 
156c8-d1 ¬$x(x Î X)ÙMa(x) Negative thesis 
156d1-e3 "x(x Î Π)Ù[Ma(x) Þ (x Î E)] Positive thesis 
156e3-6 $x(x Î E)ÙMa(x) Existence claim for ἐξαίφνης 
156e6-7 $x(x Î E)Ù[(¬Aa(x)Ù¬¬Aa(x)] Logical status of ἐξαίφνης 
 
 
47 PLATO, Laws, III 677a-681b 
48 PLATO, Laws, III 678b5-c1 
49 English translation (modified): R. G. BURY (ed.), Plato in Twelve Volumes, Harvard 
University Press, vol. 10, 1926, p. 171 
50 PLATO, Laws, IX 866d-872c (the word ἐξαίφνης appears in 866d7, 867a3 and 867b6) 
51 N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space 
and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 22-32 (with some fewer amendments) 
52 N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space 
and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 26-28 
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  The logical conclusion of Plato’s argument is quite questionable. Perhaps, it is possible 
to infer from ¬Aa(x)Ù¬¬Aa(x) that Plato infringes the laws of Contradiction and of 
Excluded Middle at once, namely that ¬Aa(x)Ù¬¬Aa(x) necessarily involves both 
Aa(x)Ù¬Aa(x) and ¬(Aa(x)Ú¬Aa(x))53. But it is in fact more complex, because 
Aa(x)Ù¬Aa(x) is produced by applying a rule of double-negation (namely: ¬¬A Þ A), 
while ¬(Aa(x)Ú¬Aa(x)) is obtained by applying one of De Morgan’s Laws (namely: 
¬AÙ¬¬A Þ ¬(AÚ¬A)). Yet, and that is the point, Intuitionism is precisely characterized 
by the rejection of the universality of the Law of Excluded Middle (notably in the case of 
infinite collections)54 and some rules of double-negation at once, but does not deny the 
validity of all De Morgan’s Laws55. In fact, the most fundamental rule denied by 
intuitionism precisely is ¬¬A Þ A, viz. the logical fact that two negations cancel each 
other, involving a reduction from double negation to assertion. 
 
Intuitionistic Logic 
Valid Theorems Non-Valid Theorems 
A Þ ¬¬A 
¬AÙ¬B Û ¬(AÚB) 
¬AÚ¬B Þ ¬(AÙB) 
¬¬A Þ A 
 
¬(AÙB) Þ ¬AÚ¬B 
 
Thus, an Intuitionist, who is interpreting Plato’s argument, would conclude that it involves 
only the rejection of the Law of Excluded Middle without denying the Law of 
Contradiction. He might justify his claim by distinguishing the ‘empirically accessibility’ 
of χρόνοι, namely the fact that it is possible to discriminate by experience whether or not 
something is the case at a χρόνος which has duration, and the ‘empirically inaccessibility’ 
of durationless ἐξαίφνης – in such a way that this ‘empirically verifiability’ plays the same 
role as the ‘provability’ in Intuitionistic Mathematics56. 
 
 
 
 
53 N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space 
and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 28. In his dialetheist reading of the Parmenides, Graham Priest 
sustains that the Platonic ἐξαίφνης necessarily infringes the Law of Contradiction: G. 
PRIEST, One. Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the 
Singular Object which is Nothingless, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 134-137. But, from 
a logical point of view, his justification is too naive (and very partial) in comparaison with 
the one of Strobach. 
54 A. HEYTING, Intuitionism. An Introduction, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1971, 
p. 1-2; M. DUMMETT, Elements of Intuitionism, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1977, p. 11-13, p. 
61-62 
55 A. HEYTING, Intuitionism. An Introduction, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1971, 
p. 17-18, p. 103-105; M. DUMMETT, Elements of Intuitionism, Oxford Clarendon Press, 
1977, p. 17-18 
56 N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space 
and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 28-29 (Furthermore, Strobach pertinently remarks that if 
¬Aa(x) is substituted by Aa(x), then T1 becomes Aa(x)Ù¬Aa(x) which infringes the Law of 
Contradiction. In fact, strictly speaking, as AÚ¬A, ¬(AÚ¬A) is not an Intuitionistic thesis, 
contrary to ¬¬(AÚ¬A). But, of course ¬¬(AÚ¬A) is intuitionistically not equivalent to 
AÚ¬A, see: A. HEYTING, Intuitionism. An Introduction, North-Holland Publishing 
Company, 1971, p. 105 and J. FISHER, On the Philosophy of Logic, Thomson Wadsworth, 
2008, p. 126-128. Sustaining desperately the view presented above, I may note that the 
distinction between negation – understood as a logical functor – and rejection – understood 
as a theoretical belief, so as a metalogical act – is perhaps not as well clear-cut as expected, 
especially in an un-formalized logical context as it is obviously the case in Parmenides) 
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Intuitionistic Logic 
Valid Inference Non-Valid Inference 
T1. ¬Aa(x)Ù¬¬Aa(x) 
T2. ¬(Aa(x)Ú¬Aa(x)) 
Rule: 
¬AÙ¬B Û ¬(AÚB) 
 
T1. ¬Aa(x)Ù¬¬Aa(x) 
T2. Aa(x)Ù¬Aa(x) 
Rule: 
¬¬A Þ A 
Conclusion: 
Negation of the Law of Excluded Middle 
Conclusion: 
Negation of the Law of Contradiction 
 
Perhaps Plato had in mind a kind of intuitionistic reasoning when he is asserting that in 
the ‘sudden’, an item holds neither the A-state, nor its negation, but without holding both 
A-state and its negation. However, Plato was probably not as well accommodating with 
Intuitionistic Logic as Anaxagoras57 or Epicurus58 who denied together the universal 
validity of the Excluded Middle and, at least for Epicurus, elaborated an Intuitionistic 
epistemology. 
  That is why it is surely better to take account of the following textual fact59: Plato has 
only written that at a χρόνος any thing must be either in A-state or in ¬A-state (156c1-7), 
in such a way that the Excluded Middle must be applied for χρόνοι but not necessarily for 
ἐξαίφνης, in the same way as every surface should be coloured but the lines should not. In 
other words, the ‘sudden’ is simply not an item for which A-state or ¬A-state must 
necessarily be used60. So, strictly speaking, Plato had infringed neither the Law of 
Contradiction nor the Law of Excluded Middle which are logical principles explicitly held 
by him elsewhere61. Here, however, Plato was not as well clear-sighted as Aristotle62. 
Indeed, if at each ‘sudden’, by its very nature, a thing can be either moving or resting or 
neither-moving-nor-resting, what is the meaning of moving at a ‘sudden’? And whether at 
each ‘sudden’, by its very nature, a thing cannot be either in A-state or ¬A-state but can 
be only neither-in A-state-nor-in ¬A-state, what is the difference between any ‘sudden’ 
and the ‘instant of change’? 
  Of course, according to this last reading, the nature of ἐξαίφνης is negatively exhibited 
by contrast with χρόνος rather than positively clarified in itself. So, its φύσις remains very 
ἄτοπον (156d6-7). Yet, Plato did not look to be burdened with such a weirdness, inasmuch 
as he did not return further or elsewhere on the ‘sudden’ to shedding light on its odd nature 
 
57 ARISTOTLE, Met, Γ 7, de Interp, 9 18b16-25. On Anaxagoras and Intuitionism, see: J. 
VUILLEMIN, Necessity or Contigency. The Master Argument, CSLI Publications, 1996, p. 
140 n.11, p. 174 
58 CICERO, De fato, 12.28, 16.37, Lucullus, 30.97, De Natura deorum, I, 25; PLUTARCH, 
De Pythiae Oraculis, 398f-399a. See also: “Neglected Evidence for Epicurus on the 
Excluded Middle: The Logical Background of Seneca’s De Tranquillitate Animi”, 2017. On 
Epicurean Intuitionism, see: J. VUILLEMIN, Necessity or Contigency. The Master 
Argument, CSLI Publications, 1996, p. 169-187 
59 To be exhaustive, Strobach provides another possible logical interpretation, according to 
which Plato may have elaborated a kind of three-valued logic (true, false, neither-true-nor-
false), but that sounds very odd. See: N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic 
History in the Philosophy of Space and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 29-30 
60 Here, I cease to closely follow Strobach for supporting a view more ‘Hamblinian’. See: 
N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space 
and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 30-32, p. 36 (however, Strobach is aware of the likeness 
between Plato and Hamblin, see: p. 171-182) and Ch. L. HAMBLIN, “Instants and Intervals”, 
in Studium Generale, 24, 1971, p. 127-134 
61 For instance, see: PLATO, Republic, IV 436b, d-e (Plato sustains his view by a spinning-
top which is not simultaneously moving and resting in the same regard) 
62 Aristotle treats the very special case of moving/resting at an instant in: ARISTOTLE, Phys, 
6.3. 234a24-b9, 8 239a10-b4 (see: R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the continuum, 
Duckworth, 1983, p. 409-415) 
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– quite the reverse of his best pupil who shall deploy a wealth of subtleties to catch the 
very nature of the νῦν63. 
 
1.4. The Irreducible Weirdness of ἐξαίφνης: Platonism and Aristotelianism on the 
Status of Physical Sciences 
  Actually, such a state of affairs is far from being an accidental failure. The weirdness of 
ἐξαίφνης is in fact just a consequence of Plato’s flimsy esteem for kinematics, by contrast 
with the very importance of dynamics64. In other words, as Vuillemin had brilliantly 
argued65, that is a consequence of Platonic hierarchy of physical sciences resulting from 
Plato’s multi-layered vertical ontology. 
  For Platonism, sensible motion and its trajectory resort to the calculations of more or less 
perfect souls, in such a way that the more perfect soul is, the more circular trajectory is66. 
By its self-motion, the dynamic principle – viz. the soul67 – communicates motion into 
sensible realm, without being itself extended or locomotive. Hence, Platonism draws a 
strong division between two kinds of processes belonging to two separated ontological 
levels: from one perspective, there is a purely spiritual process without relation to place 
or extension which is the psychic self-motion; and from another, there are sensible motions 
proceeding from place to place and having quantifiable extension which are corporeal 
movements. 
  By virtue of this separation between dynamics’ and kinematics’ realms, namely between 
the psychic and the corporeal levels, the puzzles about motion objected by Zeno and 
Diodorus Kronus are less offensive for Platonism, because they deal only with sensible 
and extended motion. Here, Platonism seems to have the advantage over rival Hellenistic 
physics68. Indeed, Plato does not consider every motion results from the affection of a 
sensible moved by a sensible mover, but rather from a production of a sensible and 
communicated motion by an intelligible and non-extended self-mover. Consequently, 
given that Zeno’s and Diodorus’ puzzles are purely kinematic (in the sense according to 
which they fall under metrical or topological considerations), and since spiritual dynamics 
is not in the least degree dependent on kinematics (that is quite the reverse), an orthodox 
Platonist can ignore those arguments without threatening his theory of self-motion. In 
contrast to Platonism, for Aristotelianism, kinematics is the condition of dynamics, 
because all movers are subject to the laws of kinematics69, in such a way that Zeno’s and 
Diodorus’ puzzles must be neutralized in one way or another. 
  Moreover, this Platonic distinction between dynamics and kinematics goes with a strong 
epistemological and ontological thesis, namely that there is always an irrational residue of 
approximation in all sensible facts. Indeed, Platonism does not split sensible realm into 
 
63 ARISTOTLE, Phys, 4.11, 13 
64 For instance, all the kinematic development in Laws, X 893b-898c aims at the self-motion 
of the dynamic principle. 
65 J. VUILLEMIN, “The Systems of Plato and Aristotle Compared as to their Contribution to 
Physics”, in W. SPOHN, B. C. VAN FRAASSEN, B. SKYRMS (eds.), Existence and 
Explanation. Essays presented in Honor of Karel Lambert, Springer, 1991, p. 197-206 
66 PLATO, Laws, X 893b-899b (see also: PLOTINUS, Enneads, II 2 [14], 1, 2-19; 39-51; 2, 
5-27 and, on this text: M. RASHED, “Contre le mouvement rectiligne naturel: trois 
adversaires (Xénarque, Ptolémée, Plotin) pour une thèse”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. 
TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, 
p. 34-41) 
67 PLATO, Phaedrus, 245c-e, Laws, X 894b, 895c, 895e-896a 
68 M. RASHED (ed.), Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la Physique d’Aristote 
(livres IV-VIII). Les scholies byzantines, de Gruyter, 2011, p. 83-92, p. 105-113 
69 J. VUILLEMIN, “The Systems of Plato and Aristotle Compared as to their Contribution to 
Physics”, in W. SPOHN, B. C. VAN FRAASSEN, B. SKYRMS (eds.), Existence and 
Explanation. Essays presented in Honor of Karel Lambert, Springer, 1991, p. 197-201 
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two very incommensurable parts, as Aristotelianism does by separating perfect and 
necessary celestial phenomena from imperfect and contingent sublunary phenomena70. So, 
for Platonists, even the astronomical revolutions keep an unknown waste, unlike 
Aristotle’s cosmology. Such an irrational residue is ultimately due to the conjunction of 
χώρα’s paroxysmal and fuzzy instability71, and imperfections of psychic mover which 
introduces a supplementary element of disorder and irregularity into sensible realm. 
Insofar as χώρα’s dyadic mutability72 and ψυχή’s self-motion yield sensible ἀνώμαλα73, 
kinematics which studies sensible movements is condemned to be an imperfect science, 
either because an infrasensible effervescence, or because a suprasensible pressure onto a 
refractory matter. This defective accuracy of kinematics is explicitly claimed by Plato in 
Timaeus74, when he declares that his physical exposition is only plausible and not 
undoubtedly true because a veracity of a science is proportional to its subject’s stability 
and reliability. This unknowledge or irrationality of sensible motion actually explains the 
irreducibility of the “weirdness”75 of ἐξαίφνης: as all sensible events by virtue of their 
sensibility, the ‘instant of change’ is not in itself fully understandable. 
  By virtue of this restriction about kinematics’ scientificity, the status of kinematic 
puzzles is not the same for Platonism and for Aristotelianism. For the first, we must accept 
that sensible motion implies insoluble puzzles, as the precise nature of ‘instant of change’, 
and we should consider that dynamics is in itself more scientific and less aporetic than 
kinematics, but also more enigmatic for us who sail on sensible water. For the second, 
because of the predominance of kinematics upon dynamics, and of the rejection of the 
separated intelligible realm, all motions are sensible, and kinematics must be a genuine 
science. Admittedly, by virtue of its complex matters, sublunary kinetics is imperfect and 
has an unknown residue, but it is not the case with the perfect celestial uniform revolutions 
produced by substance whose matter is reduced to place. Thus there must be a high 
scientific theory of kinematics to explain them. In other words, Aristotelianism must not 
admit the insolubility of kinematic puzzles: it is necessary to solve them, since 
Aristotelianism must save the ontological and epistemological privileges of Heavens’ 
sempiternal items76. So, the unicity of abstract kinematics which studies all kinematic 
phenomena wherever they are77 involves that kinematic puzzles restricted to sublunary 
realm (which is the place of rectilinear and non-uniform motions), as the aporia of kinetic 
starting, must be solved if Aristotelianism wants to preserve the scientificity of astronomy. 
On the contrary, Platonism, with his doctrine of sensible homogeneity, must not. 
 
70 On the principle of the conservation of modal status in Aristotelianism, see: J. 
VUILLEMIN, Necessity or Contingency. The Master Argument, CSLI Publications, 1996, p. 
16-17; p. 30 (see also, for the same principle in Platonism: p. 226 n. 3) 
71 PLATO, Timaeus, 49b-50a, 52d-53b 
72 PLATO, Timaeus, 57d-58c (see also: Phaedo, 110a-114a) 
73 PLATO, Menexenus, 238e, Republic, VIII 547a, Timaeus, 52e, 57e, 58a, c, Laws, VI 775d 
74 PLATO, Timaeus, 29b-d (see also: Republic, VI 511d-e, VII 533e-534a) 
75 PLATO, Parmenides, 156d 
76 Here, it appears the Aristotelean thesis of ἀλήθεια-φύσις (Met, α 1 993b27-31), see: I. 
DÜRING, “Aristotle on Ultimate Principles from ‘nature and reality’”, in Aristotle and Plato 
in Mid-fourth century, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia XI, 1960, p. 35-55 and M. 
RASHED, “Alexandre d’Aphrodise, lecteur du Protreptique”, in L’héritage aristotélicien, 
Les Belles Lettres, 2007, p. 182-191, Essentialisme. Alexandre d’Aphrodise entre logique, 
physique et cosmologie, de Gruyter, 2007, chap. 9, §3, p. 309-323 
77 However, it must be noted that some cosmological theses of Aristotle dangerously threat 
such a unicity of kinematics, for instance the fact that, as Philoponus had pointed, the 
definition of change seems to be hardly applicable for infinite celestial revolutions, see: H. 
CHERNISS, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1944, 
p. 582-583; L. ROBIN, Aristote, puf, 1944, p. 132 and S. WATERLOW, Nature, Change, and 
Agency in Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1982, p. 249-256 
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  Albeit the privilege of kinematics was a characteristic of the majority of Hellenistic 
schools, as Aristotelianism, Epicureanism and Stoicism, kinematics is just a very inferior 
science for Platonism which claims that the genuine science of motion is only dynamics78, 
while sensible trajectories must be studied only geometrically, that is to say abstractly to 
its movable and unknowable aspect79. In fact, for Platonism, kinematics’ status in the 
hierarchy of sciences is close to constructive mechanics, namely nonentity80. By virtue of 
this, Plato can stop his analysis of the ἐξαίφνης on the brink of the apparition of its oddity 
and can do not shed light on it, given that its very nature keeps an irreducible residue of 
irrationality. Hence also the contrast between Aristotle’s elaborated concept of the νῦν and 
Plato’s simple adumbration of the ἐξαίφνης that takes root in their opposite 
epistemological and ontological underpinnings. 
 
 
 2. FROM PLATO TO EARLY NEOPLATONISM: TAURUS, PLOTINUS AND IAMBLICHUS 
 
 2.1. The Middle-Platonism and Its Focusing on Timaeus: The Case of Taurus 
  Despite the great number of Platonists from 1st-Century BC to AD 2nd-Century – who are 
more often and unfortunately known only by few testimonies81 –, it is very hard to discover 
in their thoughts an interest in abstract kinematics. Indeed, Middle Platonist Physics, in 
agreement with its Timaeus-focusing, is mainly concerned by the debate about the creation 
or the eternity of the world, by the number of the elements – namely the question whether 
the aether is a genuine fifth element or not –, by cosmological issues induced by their 
multi-layered ontology, or by classic and platonizing issues about the soul82. As far as I 
know, only one exception can be found, that is an anecdote about Lucius Calvenus 
Taurus83 reported by Aulus Gellius in which the Middle Platonist explicitly refers to Parm, 
156c-e and deals with the puzzle of ‘instant of change’ as a kinematic problem. 
  Taurus was a paradigmatic Middle Platonist by virtue of his obvious Timaeus-focusing, 
which historically succeeds the Theaetetus-focusing of Arcesilaus and Carneades84, and 
predates the Parmenides-focusing characterizing Neoplatonism from Plotinus. By ‘x-
focusing’, here, I simply mean the centre of gravity of their diverse understandings of the 
 
78 M. RASHED (ed.), Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la Physique d’Aristote 
(livres IV-VIII). Les scholies byzantines, de Gruyter, 2011, p. 115-116 
79 PLATO, Republic, VII, 527c-d, 528d-530c (kinematics is nothing but the examination of 
the geometrical figures of the completed movements) 
80 As the dispute between Speusippus (who supports Republic, VII 527a) and Menaechmus 
shows: G. MOLLAND, “Implicit versus explicit geometrical methodologies: the case of 
construction”, in R. RASHED (ed.), Mathématiques et philosophie de l’Antiquité à l’âge 
classique: hommage à Jules Vuillemin, CNRS, 1991, p. 182-190 
81 Evidences recently gathered in: M.-L. LAKMANN (ed.), Platonici minores. 1. Jh.v.Chr.-
2. Jh.n.Chr. Prosopographie, Fragmente und Testimonien mit deutscher Übersetzung, Brill, 
2017 
82 For an introduction, see: J. M. DILLON, The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism. 80 
B.C. to A.D. 220, Duckworth, 1977 
83 On Taurus, see: F. PETRUCCI, Taurus of Beirut. The Other Side of Middle-Platonism, 
Routledge, 2018 
84 Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, 10.16-20. See: D. N. SEDLEY, “Three 
Platonist Interpretations of the Theaetetus”, in Ch. GILL, M. M. MCCABE (eds.), Form and 
Argument in Late Plato, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 85-89; H. TARRANT, 
“L'importance du Théétète avant Thrasylle”, in D. EL MURR (ed.), La mesure du savoir. 
Etudes sur le Théétète de Platon, Vrin, 2013, p. 250-252. I shall return to this Theaetetus-
focusing in Carneades in a future paper: “Carnéade, in Cicéron, De fato, XIV, 31-33: le 
platonisme dé-voilé?” 
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Corpus Platonicum, which had, of course, varied through the history of Platonism, but 
without breaking off the deep continuity of their adherence to the Platonic hard core85. 
  The Timaeus-focusing of Middle-Platonism86, beyond its wealthy variety, is expressed 
enough by the high number and the high level of Middle-Platonic full commentaries on 
the dialogue: after Cantor who wrote his own before Arcesilaus’ fellowship, Derkyllides87, 
Clemens88, Gaius89, Albinus90, Cronius91, Severus92, Harpocration93, and, of course, 
Taurus94 seem to have explained Plato’s Timaeus. By comparison, the second Platonic 
dialogue which had been massively commented from 1st-Century BC to AD 2nd-Century is 
Republic – however that commentary is more often only devoted to the Myth of Er 
(Derkyllides95, Gaius96, Albinus, Maximus of Nicea, Harpocration, Euclides, Clemens97, 
Cronius98, Taurus99). Thus, whether the history of the commentaries on Parmenides as a 
key of Plato’s Thought (so, after the dialectical reading of Albinus) seems really to have 
begun from Plotinus – with those of Amelius and Porphyry –, the ‘historiography’ of 
Timaeus had begun long before. 
  Taurus’ commentary on Timaeus had durably influenced the reading of the dialogue, 
notably on the question whether or not the world had had a beginning, that is to say of its 
temporal creation100. For instance, on the one hand, Philoponus, who was a very heterodox 
Christian, is perfectly aware that he must refute the authority of Taurus in the course of 
his polemic against Aristotelian and Neoplatonic belief in the eternity of the world101. 
Indeed, his opponents Porphyry and Proclus had followed Taurus on this point102 on which 
the Middle Platonist had distinguished four meanings of the word γενητός to support the 
view according to which Plato had taught that the world is non-chronologically 
 
85 So, of course, this historical thesis involves the rejection of a so-called scepticism in the 
Middle and New Academies. I expect explaining why in “Carnéade, in Cicéron, De fato, 
XIV, 31-33: le platonisme dé-voilé?”. 
86 By the way, a quick look on the ‘Index of Platonic Passages’ or ‘Index Locorum’ of 
whichever monography on Middle-Platonism is enough to notice this Timaeus-focusing. For 
instance, see: J. M. DILLON, The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism. 80 B.C. to A.D. 
220, Duckworth, 1977, p. 428 
87 PROCLUS, In Tim, I 20.9-11 
88 See: M.-L. LAKMANN (ed.), Platonici minores, Brill, 2017, p. 151, p. 558-559 
89 PROCLUS, In Tim, I 340.23-341.4 
90 PROCLUS, In Tim, I 340.23-341.4 
91 PROCLUS, In Remp, II 22.20-23.5 
92 PROCLUS, In Tim, I 204.16-18 
93 Scholium on Proclus, In Tim, II 377.15-27; PROCLUS, In Tim, I 304.22-305.7 (see: M.-
L. LAKMANN (ed.), Platonici minores, Brill, 2017, p. 123, p. 484-485 and J. M. DILLON, 
“Harpocration’s ‘Commentary on Plato’: Fragments of a Middle Platonic Commentary”, in 
California Studies in Classical Antiquity, 4, 1971, p. 125-146) 
94 Fragments of his commentary are available in: M.-L. LAKMANN, Der Platoniker Tauros 
in der Darstellung des Aulus Gellius, Brill, 1995, p. 248-257 and M.-L. LAKMANN (ed.), 
Platonici minores, Brill, 2017, p. 736-757 
95 THEON OF SMYRNA, On Mathematics Useful for the Understanding of Plato, 198.9-
202.7 (see: M.-L. LAKMANN (ed.), Platonici minores, Brill, 2017, p. 98, p. 426-427) 
96 PROCLUS, In Remp, II 96.10-15 
97 See: M.-L. LAKMANN (ed.), Platonici minores, Brill, 2017, p. 151, p. 558-559 
98 PROCLUS, In Remp, II 110.2-7 
99 See: M.-L. LAKMANN (ed.), Platonici minores, Brill, 2017, p. 241, p. 736-737 
100 Debate based on PLATO, Timaeus, 27c-28c 
101 J. PHILOPONUS, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, 121.18-21, 123.15-23, 145.1-
147.9, 186.17-189.9, 191.15-193.9, 223.1-224.12, 520.4-521.25 
102 J. PHILOPONUS, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, 144.16-145.8, 147.25-148.7 
(see: PROCLUS, In Tim, I 279.30-296.12 (see also: 276.30-277.32)) 
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‘created’103: (1) either insofar as the sensible world belongs to the same genus as things 
that are really created – namely the genus of ‘sensible being’ –, (2) or, in a more 
Neopythagorean fashion104, insofar as the world is theoretically composite even if it has 
not in fact combined, (3) or insofar as the sensible world is always in process of γένεσις 
on the contrary to the intelligible realm, (4) or insofar as the sensible world is ontologically 
dependent on its outside source, namely God. It appears that meanings 3 and 4 have been 
adopted by Alkinoos105 and Proclus106, meanings 2 and 4 by Albinus107 and Porphyry108, 
meaning 4 by Calcidius109,  and meaning 1 has been favoured by Apuleius110. But, on the 
other, Philoponus is also aware that he can take advantage of the authority of Taurus on 
another point, namely on the rejection of aether as a real fifth element111. Ironically, 
Philoponus uses this second thesis of Taurus for justifying his denial of the first112. 
  Albeit Taurus was undoubtedly very influential in the exegesis of Timaeus, the situation 
is quite different in regard of his importance on the interpretation of Parmenides. By the 
way, he did not write a commentary on this dialogue, and only one testimony keeps a 
record of its Taurus’ reading, namely the dinner-anecdote presented below. This anecdote 
about Taurus is found in Aulus Gellius’ Noctes Atticae (7.13)113 whose text is as follows: 
 
  Quaesitum est, quando moriens moreretur? 
cum iam in morte esset, an cum etiamtum in 
vita foret; et quando surgens surgeret? cum iam 
staret, an cum etiamtum sederet? et qui artem 
disceret, quando artifex fieret? cum iam esset, 
an cum etiamtum non esset. Utrum enim 
horum dices, absurde atque ridicule dixeris, 
multoque absurdius videbitur, si aut utrumque 
esse dicas aut neutrum.  
  Sed ea omnia cum captiones esse quidam 
  The question was asked, when a dying man 
died – when he was already in the grasp of 
death, or while he still lived? And when did a 
rising man rise – when he was already 
standing, or while he was still seated? And 
when did one who was learning an art become 
an artist – when he already was one, or when 
he was still learning? For whichever answer 
you make, your statement will be absurd, if 
you say either ‘both’ or ‘neither’. 
 
103 J. M. DILLON, The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism. 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, 
Duckworth, 1977, p. 242-246, R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the continuum, Duckworth, 
1983, p. 268-276 and, for Middle Platonism: C. MORESCHINI, Apuleius and the 
Metamorphoses of Platonism, Brepols, 2015, p. 265-279. On the Islamic transmission of 
this classification, see: M. RASHED, “Nouveaux fragments antiprocliens de Philopon en 
version arabe et le problème des origines de la théorie de l’‘instauration’ (ḥudūth)”, in Les 
Etudes philosophiques, 2013-2, p. 261-292 
104 STOBAEUS, Anthology, I 186.14 
105 ALKINOOS, Didaskalikos, §14.3 (see: J. M. DILLON (ed.), Alcinous. The Handbook of 
Platonism, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 123-125) 
106 J. PHILOPONUS, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, 166.26-167.2 
107 PROCLUS, In Tim, I 219.1-12 
108 J. PHILOPONUS, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, 149.16-21 
109 CALCIDIUS, In Tim, §23 
110 APULEIUS, De Platone et eius Dogmate, I 8.198 
111 J. PHILOPONUS, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, 520.4-521.25 
112 Especially in the Contra Aristotelem. On the link between the two theses, see: R. 
SORABJI (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, Cornell University 
Press, 1987, p. 25, M. RASHED, “The Problem of the Composition of the Heavens (529-
1610): A New Fragment of Philoponus and its Readers”, in P. ADAMSON, H. BALTUSSEN, 
P. STONE, Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, 
Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, suppl. vol. 83, 2004, p. 35-56 and Ch. 
WILDBERG, John Philoponus’ Criticism of Aristotle’s Theory of Aether, de Gruyter, 1988 
113 On this passage, see: J. M. DILLON, The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism. 80 
B.C. to A.D. 220, Duckworth, 1977, p. 246; M.-L. LAKMANN, Der Platoniker Tauros in 
der Darstellung des Aulus Gellius, Brill, 1995, p. 72-81 and N. STROBACH, The Moment of 
Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 41-
42 
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futtiles atque inanes dicerent, “Nolite” inquit 
Taurus, “haec quasi nugarum aliquem ludum 
aspernari. Gravissimi philosophorum super 
hac re serio quaesiverunt114; et alii moriendi 
verbum atque momentum manente adhuc vita 
dici atque fieri putaverunt, alii nihil in eo 
tempore vitae reliquerunt totumque illud, quod 
mori dicitur, morti vindicaverunt; item de 
ceteris similibus in diversa tempora et in 
contrarias sententias discesserunt. Sed Plato,” 
inquit, “noster neque vitae id tempus neque 
morti dedit, idemque in omni consimilium 
rerum disceptatione fecit. Vidit quippe 
utrumque esse pugnans neque posse ex duobus 
contrariis altero manente, alterum constitui 
quaestionemque fieri per diversorum inter se 
finium mortis et vitae cohaerentiam, et idcirco 
peperit ipse expressitque aliud quoddam 
novum in confinio tempus, quod verbis 
propriis atque integris τὴν ἐξαίφνης φύσιν 
appellavit, idque ipsum ita, uti dico,” inquit, 
“in libra, cui Parmenides  titulus est, scriptum 
ab eo reperietis.”115 
  But when some declared that all these 
questions were pointless and idle sophisms, 
Taurus said: “Do not despise such problems, as 
if they were mere trifling amusements. The 
most earnest of the philosophers have seriously 
debated this question. Some have thought that 
the term ‘die’ was properly used, and that the 
moment of death came, while life still 
remained; others have left no life in that 
moment, but have claimed for death all that 
period which is termed ‘dying’. Also in regard 
to other similar problems they have argued for 
different times and maintained opposite 
opinions. But our master Plato”, said he, 
“assigned that time neither to life nor to death, 
and took the same position in every discussion 
of similar questions. For he saw that the 
alternatives were mutually contrary, that one of 
the two opposites could not be maintained 
while the other existed, and that the question 
arose from the juxtaposition of two opposing 
extremes, namely life and death. Therefore, he 
himself devised, and gave a name to, a new 
stuff of time, lying on the boundary between 
the two, which he called in appropriate and 
exact language τὴν ἐξαίφνης φύσιν; and this 
very term, as I have given it,” said he, “you will 
find used by him in the dialogue entitled 
Parmenides.”116 
 
  Here, Taurus alludes to the very fashionable case of the instant of death to show the 
superiority of Plato’s ἐξαίφνης. Perhaps Taurus, here, had additionally in mind a passage 
of Gorgias in which Plato briefly mentions the ἐξαίφνης of dying which coincides with 
the separation of the soul from the body117. Since Taurus had fully explained this 
dialogue118, he might had commented Gorg, 523e by referring to Plato’s solution found in 
Parm, 156c-d, and perhaps might have seized the opportunity for discussing Hellenistic 
alternative solutions too. Indeed, as Rashed has argued119, this question of the instant of 
death is far to be trivial, but was a critical point in Hellenistic polemics on the continuum 
and kinematics. And precisely, Taurus said to his guests that this puzzle is not just a 
sophistic puerility but a very important query which had been examined by the most 
earnest philosophers. So, Taurus surely had in mind the Hellenistic debate on the death of 
Dion120, and the discussions on the ‘instant of change’. This is demonstrated enough by 
his quick overview of the various rejected solutions which is occurring in two parts: 
 
114 See: AULUS GELLIUS, Noctes Atticae, 6.21 
115 AULUS GELLIUS, Noctes Atticae, 6.21 5-12 
116 English translation (modified): J. C. ROLFE (ed.), The Attic Nights of Aulius Gellius, vol. 
2, Harvard University Press, 1927, p. 124-127 
117 PLATO, Gorgias, 523e2-6: καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ 
αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν 
συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ. 
118 AULUS GELLIUS, Noctes Atticae, 7.14 5 
119 M. RASHED (ed.), Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la Physique d’Aristote 
(livres IV-VIII). Les scholies byzantines, de Gruyter, 2011, p. 109-113 
120 M.-L. LAKMANN, Der Platoniker Tauros in der Darstellung des Aulus Gellius, Brill, 
1995, p. 77-78 
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Utrum enim horum dices, absurde atque 
ridicule dixeris, multoque absurdius videbitur, 
si aut utrumque esse dicas aut neutrum. 
 
[…] 
 
Gravissimi philosophorum super hac re serio 
quaesiverunt; et alii moriendi verbum atque 
momentum manente adhuc vita dici atque 
fieri putaverunt, alii nihil in eo tempore 
vitae reliquerunt totumque illud, quod mori 
dicitur, morti vindicaverunt; item de ceteris 
similibus in diversa tempora et in contrarias 
sententias discesserunt. 
Rejection of the Both-states-option and of the 
neither/nor-option at once: the first targets 
certainly Stoicism, the second weirdly seems 
to target Plato himself.121 
 
 
Rejection of the either/or-option: the targets 
are probably either Peripatetic thinkers or 
Dialecticians or both. 
 
  Afterwards, Taurus introduces Plato’s answer with a reasoning for sustaining it: since all 
other alternatives are meaningless, there remains only one understandable answer, namely 
the neither/nor-option. It seems very odd that Aulus Gellius reports Plato’s solution, 
whereas he has rejected few words before the neutrum-option. Of course, Aulus Gellius, 
whom the philosophical capacity is dubious, surely did not know a lot about the puzzle he 
reports, and we should not be too confident in his record. 
  The fact remains that Taurus still considers, as Plato did, ἐξαίφνης as a notion which 
merely belongs to kinematics. Besides, its logical and ontological status are rigorously 
circumscribed, since Taurus seems to say that the ‘sudden’ belongs to the set of temporal 
entities (quoddam novum in confinio tempus), namely a kind of boundary (confinium), 
which is neither in A-state nor in ¬A-state, in such a way that Taurus’ exegesis is 
absolutely in agreement with the common view defended above122. Thus, there is at least 
one Platonist reader of Plato who had been perfectly aware of the kinematic background 
of ἐξαίφνης from 1st-Century BC to AD 2nd-Century. 
  Yet, perhaps Taurus was not the only Middle Platonist who alludes to ἐξαίφνης, the topic 
of ‘instant of change’ can be found notably in Apuleius123 (who maybe was a pupil of 
Taurus, as Dillon has suggested124), albeit in a more encrypted way. But the fact is that, 
contrary to Taurus, Apuleius had mentioned this point into a moral framework, namely 
about the progress toward virtue and wisdom125. 
 
Eum qui per haec profectus fidenti et securo 
gradu virtutis via graderetur, adeptum solidam 
vivendi rationem, repente fieri perfectum; 
hunc repente praeteriti futurique aevi 
ultimas partes adtingere et esse 
quodammodo intemporalem.126 
The one who, after such a departure, walks 
with a confident and assured step in the path of 
virtue, in possession of an unshakable rule of 
life, suddenly becomes perfect; it suddenly 
reaches the extreme limits of the past and 
the future and is, as it were, timeless. 
 
121 N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space 
and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 42 
122 N. STROBACH, The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space 
and Time, Springer, 1998, p. 41-42 
123 M.-L. LAKMANN, Der Platoniker Tauros in der Darstellung des Aulus Gellius, Brill, 
1995, p. 78 n.25 
124 J. M. DILLON, The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism. 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, 
Duckworth, 1977, p. 306-308, p. 338 
125 Nothing can put us in mind that the Middle Platonists refer to Laws, III 678b5-c1 when 
they discuss this point. 
126 APULEIUS, De Platone et eius Dogmate, II 20.248 (On the authorship of this essay, see 
the overview in: J. D. REDFORS, Echtheitskritische Untersuchung der Apuleien Schriften 
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  Whether Apuleius had in mind Parm, 156c-d, then his reading is quite different from 
Taurus on the ontological status of the ‘sudden’ which Apuleius describes as ‘timeless’ 
(intemporalis). However, Apuleius might have in mind a Stoic doctrine rather than Plato’s 
Parmenides127. Indeed, Plutarch informs us that Stoics believe that it is possible for a new 
wise man does not realize that he has reached perfection128, precisely because becoming a 
sage can be imperceptible and happen instantaneously129, in such a way that the final 
transition toward wisdom can be unnoticeable for the new wise himself. Such a Stoic 
thesis was, of course, weightily mocked by Plutarch. But a textual fact should be remarked 
and makes the exegesis a little more complex, namely that Plutarch was using the word 
ἐξαίφνης when he displayed the controversial Stoic position: 
 
 καὶ γὰρ ἀκαρεὶ χρόνου καὶ ὥρας ἐκ τῆς ὡς ἔνι 
μάλιστα φαυλότητος εἰς οὐκ ἔχουσαν 
ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς διάθεσιν μεταβαλὼν ὁ 
σοφός, ἧς οὐδ’ ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ μέρος ἀφεῖλε 
κακίας, ἅμα πᾶσαν ἐξαίφνης ἐκπέφευγε.130 
Why, if this be so, the wise man in a moment 
or a laps of time changes from the lowest 
possible depravity to an unsurpassable state of 
virtue; and all his vice, of which he has not in 
long years succeeded in removing even a small 
portion, he suddenly leaves behind for ever.131  
 
  Surprisingly, when Plutarch was challenging with the paradoxes of time and change in 
another essay, he did not allude to Plato’s ἐξαίφνης132. How must be interpreted this state 
of affairs? Perhaps here ἐξαίφνης is a terminus mysticus rather than a terminus technicus, 
more precisely an ironic one. By using a Platonic word to describe a Stoic thesis, Plutarch 
would play with his habitual tendency to sarcasm (like if he had said: ‘Gosh, Stoics believe 
that becoming wise happens very suddenly, so as a miracle’). Furthermore, in spite of an 
obvious syncretism133, since none of Apuleius’ evidences can really put us in mind that he 
had a radical and conscious inclination toward Stoicism to the detriment of Platonic 
‘orthodoxy’, Apuleius’ parallel seems rather to highlight that the Platonic text which 
Plutarch and him have in mind is rather one of some passages in which Plato was talking 
about a ‘sudden acquisition/loss of knowledge’134 or one of the two ‘mystical’ passages I 
shall present in length below135 than Parm, 156c-d. In this case, the ‘atemporality’ 
(intemporalis) attributed to the wise man by Apuleius might result from a kind of 
 
De Platone und De mundo, Lund, 1960, p. 75-117 and G. BARRA, “La questione 
dell’autenticità del ‘De Platone et eius dogmate’ e del ‘De mundo’ di Apuleio”, in 
Rendiconti dell’Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere et Belle Arti di Napoli, 41, 1966, p. 127-
188) 
127 J. M. DILLON, The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism. 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, 
Duckworth, 1977, p. 335 and C. MORESCHINI, Apuleio et il platonismo, Leo S. Olschki, 
1978, p. 121-123, Apuleius and the Metamorphoses of Platonism, Brepols, 2015, p. 325-326 
128 PLUTARCH, De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos, 1062b 
129 PLUTARCH, Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus, 75c-d 
130 PLUTARCH, Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus, 75c-d 
131 English translation: F. C. BABBITT (ed.), Plutarch’s Moralia in Sixteen Volumes, 
Harvard University Press, vol. 1, 1927, p. 403 
132 PLUTARCH, De E Delphico, 392a-393c 
133 Ph. MERLAN, “Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus”, in A. H. ARMSTRONG (ed.), 
The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, 1967, p. 64-73 and C. MORESCHINI, Apuleius and the Metamorphoses of 
Platonism, Brepols, 2015, p. 191. On the ‘eclecticism’ of Middle-Platonism, see: J. M. 
DILLON, “‘Orthodoxy’ and ‘Eclecticism’: Middle Platonists and New-Pythagoreans”, in J. 
M. DILLON, A. A. LONG (eds.), The Question of ‘Eclecticism’. Studies in Later Greek 
Philosophy, University of California Press, 1988, p. 103-125 
134 PLATO, Cratylus, 391a1, 396b4, c7, d3, Theaetetus, 162c3, 203e1 
135 PLATO, Symposium, 210e, Seventh Letter, 341c 
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connection or union with the intelligible realm136 rather than being a characterization of 
ἐξαίφνης. Nevertheless, Apuleius had maybe consciously matched those Platonic passages 
with the Stoic doctrine tackled by Plutarch. Thus, according to Apuleius’ and Plutarch’s 
testimonies, Middle-Platonism’s ‘mystical’ understanding of ἐξαίφνης foreshadows 
forcefully Plotinus and Iamblichus’ readings. 
 
2.2. Plotinus and Iamblichus: Predominance of the ‘Mystical’ ἐξαίφνης from 
Symposium and Seventh Letter 
  Indeed, when Plotinus and, to a lesser extent, Iamblichus employed the word ἐξαίφνης 
in their works, that is never into a kinematic background in which the puzzle of the ‘instant 
of change’ can rear its head. Quite the reverse, ἐξαίφνης appears in contexts very far from 
the sensible world and sensible motion, namely when Plotinus and Iamblichus were 
alluding to the highest level of their henologies, beyond being and intellect. So, they likely 
follow another Platonic text than Parm, 156c-d. 
 
  2.2.1. The Platonic ‘mystical’ Texts 
  The fact is that apart the Platonic passages in which ἐξαίφνης was used as a very common 
word without real technical or mystical connotation137, there are two kinds of non-kinetic 
meanings for the ‘sudden’: the suddenness of mystic vision of the Idea and the suddenness 
of the acquisition or loss of knowledge. These two kinds of meanings, the ‘mystical’ and 
the ‘epistemological’, are actually not two separate and hermetic senses, as it is shown 
enough by the uncanny resemblance between Seventh Letter, 341c on the one hand, and 
Cratylus, 396c-d and Theaetetus, 162c on the other. Yet, that is useful to pull apart the 
passages in which Plato (or Ps.-Plato138) was explicitly talking about the Intelligible realm 
or, even, beyond (i.e. about the One-Good-Beauty) from the passages in which Plato had 
something else in mind, more often a sarcastic or ironic literary effect (‘Gosh, I’m 
suddenly very smart. It happens like a miracle, right? Maybe, I’m a prophet now.’). 
 
The suddenness of mystic vision 
 
Symposium, 210e2-211a2: ὃς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι 
ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ παιδαγωγηθῇ, 
θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς 
τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης 
κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν, 
τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν καὶ οἱ 
When a man has been thus far tutored in the 
lore of love, passing from view to view of 
beautiful things, in the right and regular ascent, 
suddenly he will have revealed to him, as he 
draws to the close of his dealings in love, a 
wondrous vision, beautiful in its nature; and 
 
136 J. M. DILLON, The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism. 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, 
Duckworth, 1977, p. 335 
137 This absence of mystical connotation should obviously be highly qualified, because in 
these passages Plato employs consciously this word to produce a certain kind of literary 
effect, for instance either for pastiching some literary styles or literary genres, or for laughing 
at some characters: PLATO, Symposium, 212c6, 213c1 (the ‘sudden’ coming of the beautiful 
Alcibiades is obviously linked to the ‘sudden’ mystical vision of beauty of 210e4), 223b2 
(last degradation of the mystical ‘sudden’, since many drunk revellers are ‘suddenly’ coming 
at Agathon’s banquet after Socrates’ speech about beauty and after the speech of the 
beautiful Alcibiades about Socrates. Thus, Alcibiades, by virtue of his physical beauty, 
seems to be a kind of caricature of the Idea of Beauty, and the revellers caricature 
themselves, by their drunkenness, the behaviour of Alcibiades). Other occurrences of 
ἐξαίφνης without explicit connotations: Republic, V 453c7, 472a1, VII 515c6, 516a4, e5 
(Allegory of the Cave: those occurrences need more attention), VIII 553a10, IX 584b7, X 
615d6, 621b6, Parmenides, 164d3, Statesman, 291b7, Laws, II 665b4, IV 712e4, VII 758d4, 
XII 994b2 
138 See: M. BURNYEAT, M. FREDE, The Seventh Platonic Letter. A Seminar, Oxford 
University Press, 2015  
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ἔμπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀεὶ 
ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, 
οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον… 
 
 
Seventh Letter, 341c5-d2: ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς 
ἐστιν ὡς ἄλλα μαθήματα, ἀλλ’ ἐκ πολλῆς 
συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ 
καὶ τοῦ συζῆν ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς 
πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 
γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει.  
this, Socrates, is the final object of all those 
previous toils. First at all, it is ever-existent and 
neither comes to be nor perishes, neither waxes 
nor wanes…139 
 
For it does not at all admit of verbal expression 
like other studies, but, as a result of continued 
application to the subject itself and 
communion therewith, it is brought to 
suddenly birth in the soul, as light that is 
kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter it 
nourishes itself.140 
 
 
The suddenness of the acquisition/loss of knowledge 
 
Cratylus, 396b3-d3: ΣΩ. τοῦτον δὲ Κρόνου 
ὑὸν ὑβριστικὸν μὲν ἄν τις δόξειεν εἶναι 
ἀκούσαντι ἐξαίφνης, εὔλογον δὲ μεγάλης 
τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία·κόρον 
γὰρ σημαίνει οὐ παῖδα, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθαρὸν 
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος 
Οὐρανοῦ ὑός, ὡς λόγος· ἡ δὲ αὖ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις 
καλῶς ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖσθαι, 
‘οὐρανία,’ ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω, ὅθεν δὴ καί φασιν, 
ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, τὸν καθαρὸν νοῦν 
παραγίγνεσθαι οἱ μετεωρολόγοι, καὶ τῷ 
οὐρανῷ ὀρθῶς τὸ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι· εἰ δ’ 
ἐμεμνήμην τὴν Ἡσιόδου γενεαλογίαν, τίνας 
ἔτι τοὺς ἀνωτέρω προγόνους λέγει τούτων, 
οὐκ ἂν ἐπαυόμην διεξιὼν ὡς ὀρθῶς αὐτοῖς τὰ 
ὀνόματα κεῖται, ἕως ἀπεπειράθην τῆς σοφίας 
ταυτησὶ τί ὀνόματα κεῖται, ἕως ἀπεπειράθην 
τῆς σοφίας ταυτησὶ τί ποιήσει, εἰ ἄρα ἀπερεῖ ἢ 
οὔ, ἣ ἐμοὶ ἐξαίφνης νῦν οὑτωσὶ προσπέπτωκεν 
ἄρτι οὐκ οἶδ’ ὁπόθεν. 
ΕΡΜ. Καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτεχνῶς γέ μοι 
δοκεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξαίφνης 
χρησμῳδεῖν.  
 
 
Theaetetus, 162c2-6: λέγε δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, 
πρῶτον μὲν ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἆρα οὐ σὺ 
θαυμάζεις εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσῃ 
μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὁτουοῦν ἀνθρώπων ἢ 
καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἧττόν τι οἴει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον 
μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι; 
 
SOCR. And it might seem, at first hearing [litt. 
suddenly hearing], highly irreverent to call 
him the son of Cronus and reasonable to say 
that Zeus is the offspring of some great 
intellect; and so he is, for κόρος (for Κρόνος) 
signifies not child, but the purity (καθαρόν) 
and unblemished nature of his mind. And 
Cronus, according to tradition, is the son of 
Uranus; but the upward gaze is rightly called 
by the name urania (οὐρανία),  looking at the 
things above (ὁρῶ τὰ ἄνω), and the 
astronomers say, Hermogenes, that from this 
looking people acquire a pure mind, and 
Uranus is correctly named. If I remembered the 
genealogy of Hesiod and the still earlier 
ancestors of the gods he mentions, I would 
have gone on examining the correctness of 
their names until I had made a complete trial 
whether this wisdom which has suddenly 
come to me, I know not whence, will fail or 
not. 
HERM. Indeed, Socrates, you do seem to me 
suddenly to be uttering oracles, exactly like an 
inspired prophet.141 
 
Tell me, Theaetetus, referring to the doctrine 
we have just expounded, do you not share my 
amazement at being suddenly exalted to an 
equality with the wisest man, or even god? Or 
do you think Protagoras’ ‘measure’ applies any 
less to gods than to men?142 
 
139 English translation: W. R. M. LAMB (ed.), Plato in Twelve Volumes, Harvard University 
Press, vol. 3, 1925, p. 205 
140 English translation: R. G. BURY (ed.), Plato in Twelve Volumes, Harvard University 
Press, vol. 7, 1929, p. 531 
141 English translation: H. N. FOWLER (ed.), Plato in Twelve Volumes, Harvard University 
Press, vol. 4, 1926, p. 49 
142 English translation: H. N. FOWLER (ed.), Plato in Twelve Volumes, Harvard University 
Press, vol. 7, 1921, p. 79 
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Theaetetus, 203d7-e1: ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε 
ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά 
τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα 
ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι 
συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος 
ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης. 
 
SOCR. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is 
necessary before one can know both, he who is 
ever to know a syllable must certainly know 
the letters first, and so our fine theory will have 
run away and vanished! 
THEAET. And very suddenly, too.143 
 
  2.2.2. Plotinus and the ‘suddenness’ of the coming of the One 
  Except the passages in which Plotinus just considers a durationless switch without any 
consideration on the nature of ἐξαίφνης144, all his uses of this word are explicitly focused 
on the ‘sudden’ apparition of the One. Moreover, in those cases, the coming of the One is 
often illustrated by the metaphor of a flash of light. Of course, such a metaphor to 
exemplify the ‘suddenness’ of change is very commonplace145, but there is no doubt about 
the fact that Plotinus had in mind the two ‘mystical’ Platonic texts in which the ἐξαίφηνς 
is directly linked to a ‘mystic experience’ of the transcendent realm understood as an 
illumination. In particular, given that Plotinus reserves the ‘sudden’ for describing the 
coming of the One (he never uses this word when he talks about the Intellect), he refers 
rather to Symposium, 210e in which Diotima teaches Socrates how to climb up the steps 
toward the highest principle (the Beauty-One). A sign of this focusing on Symposium can 
also be found in Porphyry, since when he tells us the mystical experiences of Plotinus, 
Porphyry directly makes the connection with Diotima’s speech146. 
 
V 3 [49], 17.28-32: Τότε δὲ χρὴ ἑωρακέναι 
πιστεύειν, ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης φῶς λάβῃ· 
τοῦτο γάρ – [τοῦτο τὸ φῶς] – παρ’αὐτοῦ καὶ 
αὐτός· καὶ τότε χρὴ νομίζειν παρεῖναι, ὅταν 
ὥσπερ θεὸς ἄλλος [ὅταν] εἰς οἶκον καλοῦντός 
τινος ἐλθὼν φωτίσῃ· ἢ μηδ’ ἐλθὼν οὐκ 
ἐφώτισεν. 
 
V 5 [32], 3.12-15: ἐφ’ ἅπασι δὲ τούτοις 
βασιλεὺς προφαίνεται ἐξαίφνης αὐτὸς ὁ 
μέγας, οἱ δ’ εὔχονται καὶ προσκυνοῦσιν, ὅσοι 
μὴ προαπῆλθον ἀρκεσθέντες τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ 
βασιλέως ὀφθεῖσιν. 
 
 
 
V 5 [32], 7.31-35: Οὕτω δὴ καὶ νοῦς αὑτὸν ἀπὸ 
τῶν ἄλλων καλύψας καὶ συναγαγὼν εἰς τὸ 
εἴσω μηδὲν ὁρῶν θεάσεται οὐκ ἄλλο ἐν 
ἄλλῳ φῶς, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ μόνον 
One must believe one has seen, when the soul 
suddenly takes light: for this is from him [i.e. 
the One] and he is it; we must think that he is 
present when, like another god whom someone 
called to his house, he comes and brings light 
to us; for if he had not come, he would not have 
brought the light.147 
 
and after all these [i.e. the Soul and the 
Intellect] the great king himself [i.e. the One] 
is suddenly revealed and the people pray and 
prostrate themselves before him – those at least 
who have not gone away beforehand, satisfied 
with what they saw before the coming of the 
king.148 
 
Just so Intellect, veiling itself from other things 
and drawing itself inward, when it is not 
looking at anything will see a light, not a 
distinct light in something different from itself, 
 
143 English translation: H. N. FOWLER (ed.), Plato in Twelve Volumes, Harvard University 
Press, vol. 7, 1921, p. 229-231 
144 PLOTINUS, Enneads, II 9 [33], 9.53, III 1 [3], 1.17, III 2 [47], 4.42, IV 6 [41], 3.37, V 8 
[31], 7.14 
145 For instance, see: SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, PH, I 141-142; SIMPLICIUS, In De Caelo, 
119.28-29   
146 PORPHYRY, Life of Plotinus, 23 
147 English translation: A. H. ARMSTRONG (ed.), Plotinus in Seven Volumes, Harvard 
University Press, vol. 5, 1984, p. 133-135 
148 English translation: A. H. ARMSTRONG (ed.), Plotinus in Seven Volumes, Harvard 
University Press, vol. 5, 1984, p. 165 
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καθαρὸν ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ ἐξαίφνης φανέν, ὥστε 
ἀπορεῖν ὅθεν ἐφάνη, ἔξωθεν ἢ ἔνδον, καὶ 
ἀπελθόντος εἰπεῖν “ἔνδον ἄρα ἦν καὶ οὐκ 
ἔνδον αὖ”. 
 
 
 
VI 7 [38], 34.8-14: Ὅταν δὲ τούτου εὐτυχήσῃ 
ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἥκῃ πρὸς αὐτήν, μᾶλλον δὲ παρὸν 
φανῇ, ὅταν ἐκείνη ἐκνεύσῃ τῶν παρόντων καὶ 
παρασκευάσασα αὑτὴν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα καλὴν 
καὶ εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἐλθοῦσα – ἡ δὲ παρασκευὴ 
καὶ ἡ κόσμησις δήλη που τοῖς 
παρασκευαζομένοις – ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ 
ἐξαίφνης φανέντα – μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἔτι 
δύο, ἀλλ’ ἓν ἄμφω· οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, 
ἕως πάρεστι· μίμησις δὲ τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐνταῦθα 
ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐρώμενοι συγκρῖναι θέλοντες… 
 
 
 
 
VI 7 [38], 36, 15-21: Ἔνθα δὴ ἐάσας τις πᾶν 
μάθημα, καὶ μέχρι του παιδαγωγηθεὶς καὶ ἐν 
καλῷ ἱδρυθείς, ἐν ᾧ μέν ἐστι, μέχρι τούτου 
νοεῖ, ἐξενεχθεὶς δὲ τῷ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νοῦ οἷον 
κύματι καὶ ὑψοῦ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ οἷον οἰδήσαντος 
ἀρθεὶς εἰσεῖδεν ἐξαίφνης οὐκ ἰδὼν ὅπως, ἀλλ’ 
ἡ θέα πλήσασα φωτὸς τὰ ὄμματα οὐ δι’ αὐτοῦ 
πεποίηκεν ἄλλο ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς τὸ 
ὅραμα ἦν.  
but suddenly appearing, alone, by itself in 
independent purity [the One], so that Intellect 
is at a loss to know whence it has appeared, 
whether it has come from outside or within, 
and after it has gone away will say “It was 
within, and yet it was not within”.149 
 
But when the soul has good fortune with it [i.e. 
the Good-One], and it comes to it, or rather, 
being there already, appears, when that soul 
turns away from the things that are there, and 
has prepared by making itself as beautiful as 
possible and has come to likeness (the 
preparation and the adornment are clearly 
understood, I think, by those who are preparing 
themselves) and it sees it in itself suddenly 
appearing (for there is nothing between, nor 
are there still two but both are one; nor could 
you still make a distinction while it is present; 
lovers and their beloveds here below imitate 
this in their will to be united)…150 
 
It is there that one lets all study go; up to a point 
one has been led along and settled firmly in 
beauty and as far as this one thinks that in 
which one is, but is carried out of it by the 
surge of the wave of Intellect itself and lifted 
on high by a kind of swell and sees suddenly, 
not seeing how, but the vision fills his eyes 
with light and does not make him see 
something else by it, but the light himself [i.e. 
the Good-One] is what he sees.151 
 
  Nonetheless, claiming that, when he alludes to the coming of the One, Plotinus 
remembers his reading of Symposium and Seventh Letter, does not mean that the depth of 
his comprehension of ἐξαίφνης is fully clarified. For instance, it is very easy to link 
together the ‘mystical’ aspect of the ‘suddenness’ of the manifestation of the One and the 
fact that in Parm, 156c-d Plato had described the ‘sudden’ as ἄτοπον, viz. as ‘mysterious’. 
  In regard of Plotinus’ kinetics, there is also a great temptation to look in his theory of 
motion for a treatment on the ‘sudden’, notably in expecting to discover a link between 
the ‘sudden’ and the dynamic kernel of Plotinus’ theory152. However, such a temptation 
remains unfortunately unsatisfied, because Plotinus never mentions the ἐξαίφνης in his 
reasoning on kinematics and dynamics. Despite this state of affairs, insofar as Plotinus 
sowed the future Neoplatonist approach by distinguishing two kinds of motion – the 
 
149 English translation: A. H. ARMSTRONG (ed.), Plotinus in Seven Volumes, Harvard 
University Press, vol. 5, 1984, p. 179 
150 English translation: A. H. ARMSTRONG (ed.), Plotinus in Seven Volumes, Harvard 
University Press, vol. 7, 1988, p. 191-193 
151 English translation: A. H. ARMSTRONG (ed.), Plotinus in Seven Volumes, Harvard 
University Press, vol. 7, 1988, p. 201 
152 It is interesting to note that the current best specialist of Plotinus had formerly promised 
a specific study on the ἐξαίφνης and Plotinus’ kinetics, but has never published it: R. 
CHIARADONNA, Sostanza movimento analogia. Plotino critico di Aristotele, Bibliopolis, 
2002, p. 187 n. 60 
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causative process and the sensible trajectory –, I shall give a brief account of his kinetics 
which had been masterly analysed by Chiaradonna153. 
  Plotinus illustrates wonderfully the genuine aspects of Plato’s kinetics presented above, 
notably the fact that Platonic dynamics is primarily vertical and depends on a multi-
layered ontology154. Indeed, to reply to Alexander’s Neo-Aristotelian physics155 and to the 
exegetic tendencies of his pupil Porphyry, Plotinus supports psychic self-motion by 
considering – in VI 1 [42], 16 – each kinetic process must be explained by means of two 
kinds of motion156: firstly, the recursive causative motion of the process, secondly the 
extensive process itself. In his view, motion in itself should be strongly distinguished from 
the extended process or trajectory accomplished by the sensible moving object. Indeed, 
the causative motion is a complete ἐνέργεια outside space157 and time158, contrary to the 
second which is incomplete, derived and quantitative. Thus, there is the vertical causation 
of the process and the horizontal process itself, in such a way that dynamics studies the 
first and kinematics the second. So, Plotinus’ kinetics exemplifies perfectly the 
characteristics of an orthodox Platonism by separating dynamics’ and kinematics’ realms. 
  In the very anti-Aristotelian VI 1-3 [42-44] which are an indirect and elenctic proof of 
Platonism159, Plotinus strategically did not explicitly clarify the metaphysical status of the 
causative motion, but in other treatises160, following Plato, he asserts that is extra-physical 
and psychic, namely the soul is essentially dynamical and principle of sensible and 
 
153 R. CHIARADONNA, Sostanza movimento analogia. Plotino critico di Aristotele, 
Bibliopolis, 2002, p. 167-225, “Energeia et kinesis chez Plotin et Aristote (Enn. VI 1, [42], 
16, 4-19)”, in M. CRUBELLIER, A. JAULIN, D. LEFEBVRE, P.-M. MOREL (eds.), Dunamis. 
Autour de la puissance chez Aristote, Peeters, 2008, p. 471-491; “The categories and the 
status of the physical world: Plotinus and the Neo-platonic commentators”, in P. ADAMSON, 
H. BALTUSSEN, M. W. F. STONE (eds.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic 
and Latin Commentaries, Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, 2004, p. 
126-130 and “Movimento dell’intelletto e movimento dell’anima in Plotino (Enn. VI 2 [43], 
8.10)”, in F. ALESSE, F. ARONADIO, C. DALFINO, L. SIMEONI, E. SPINELLI (eds.), 
Anthropine sophia. Studi di filogia e storiografia filosofica in memoria di Gabriele 
Giannantoni, Bibliopolis, 2008, p. 497-508 
154 M. F. WAGNER, “Vertical Causation in Plotinus”, in R. BAINE HARRIS (ed.), The 
Structure of Being. A Neoplatonic Approach, State University of New York Press, 1982, p. 
51-72 
155 ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, In Phys, scholium 435, in M. RASHED (ed.), Alexandre 
d’Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la Physique d’Aristote (livres IV-VIII). Les scholies 
byzantines, de Gruyter, 2011, p. 428-429 (see also: N. RESCHER, M. E. MARMURA (eds.), 
The Refutation by Alexander of Aphrodisias of Galen’s Treatise on the Theory of Motion, 
Islamabad, 1965, p. 15-16; p. 74-75) 
156 R. CHIARADONNA, “Energeia et kinesis chez Plotin et Aristote (Enn. VI 1, [42], 16, 4-
19)”, in M. CRUBELLIER, A. JAULIN, D. LEFEBVRE, P.-M. MOREL (eds.), Dunamis. 
Autour de la puissance chez Aristote, Peeters, 2008, p. 471-491; “The categories and the 
status of the physical world: Plotinus and the Neo-platonic commentators”, in P. ADAMSON, 
H. BALTUSSEN, M. W. F. STONE (eds.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic 
and Latin Commentaries, Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, London, 
2004, p. 126-130 
157 PLOTINUS, Enneads, V 2 [11], 2.10-24 
158 PLOTINUS, Enneads, VI 5 [23], 11, IV 4 [28], 15-17 (on the complex relation between 
soul, time and motion: IV 4 [28], 15-17, III 7 [45], 8-10, 11.59-62, 12.15-22, 13.30-69. See: 
F. KARFÍK, “Le temps et l’âme chez Plotin. A propos des Ennéades VI 5 [23], 11; IV 4 [28] 
15-16; III 7 [45] 11”, in Elenchos, 23, fasc. 2, 2012, p. 227-257) 
159 R. CHIARADONNA, “The categories and the status of the physical world: Plotinus and 
the Neo-platonic commentators”, in P. ADAMSON, H. BALTUSSEN, M. W. F. STONE (eds.), 
Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, Institute of 
Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, London, 2004, p. 129 
160 PLOTINUS, Enneads, III 6 [26], 4 
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quantitative process. Moreover, it is interesting to note that, as Plato said in the Laws161, 
for Plotinus the soul, without being local, is accountable of circularity in extended motion, 
while the body moves naturally in a rectilinear way162. In brief, as other phenomena163, 
corporeal motions are explained via the reference to their extra-physical and intelligible 
causes, namely dynamical soul. To be truly exhaustive, beyond psychic self-motion, there 
is also the Great Genera or Idea of Motion in the Intellect164. So, Plotinus’ triadic theory 
of motion can be schematized as follows165: 
 
Intelligible Intellect: Idea of Motion166  
Soul: psychic self-motion167 (dynamics) 
Sensible Body: quantitative motion168 (kinematics) 
 
  Later, I shall focus on the influence of Plotinus’ kinetics in Neoplatonism, notably for 
Damascius who has imposed a twist to Platonic ‘sudden’ from kinematics to dynamics. 
Coming back to Plotinus’ understanding of ἐξαίφνης, I wish concisely return to 
Chiaradonna’s suggestion according to which the ‘sudden’ of Parm, 156c-d is, in an 
amphibious way, present in Plotinus’ conception of the causative psychic self-motion169. 
Indeed, I actually think Chiaradonna’s intuition was historically followed by Damascius. 
  Plotinus would have interpreted the psychic dynamical causation in connection with the 
ἐξαίφνης for the following reasons: firstly, the soul (at least partially170) as well as the 
‘sudden’ is apart from time; and secondly, Plato had appealed to ἐξαίφνης for explaining 
change as well as the causation of the soul is employed as an explanation of the sensible 
motion by Plotinus. So, Plotinus would have conceived that Plato had said that the 
‘sudden’ is ‘apart from time’ in the sense according to which that is a non-temporal entity 
outside of time or beyond the time. This characterization of ἐξαίφνης as timeless is 
obviously in total agreement with the mystic suddenness of the coming of the One. 
  The meeting between the soul and the One on the occasion of the psychic ascent occurs 
outside of time171, in the same way that, for Apuleius, wisdom corresponds to a timeless 
(intemporalis) connection of the soul with the everlasting Intelligible realm172. In the 
‘sudden’, by virtue of such a union (which, strictly speaking, is a unification), the soul 
takes part in the super-eternity of the highest principle, while the soul partakes in time in 
 
161 PLATO, Laws, X 893b-899b 
162 PLOTINUS, Enneads, II 2 [14], 1.2-19, 39-51, 2.5-27 (see: M. RASHED, “Contre le 
mouvement rectiligne naturel: trois adversaires (Xénarque, Ptolémée, Plotin) pour une 
thèse”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in 
Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 34-41) 
163 D. J. O’MEARA, “Plotinus on How Soul Acts on Body”, in D. J. O’MEARA (ed.), 
Platonic Investigations, Catholic University of America Press, 1985, p. 247-262 
164 PLOTINUS, Enneads, VI 2 [43], 7-8 (see: R. CHIARADONNA, “Movimento 
dell’intelletto e movimento dell’anima in Plotino (Enn. VI 2 [43], 8.10)”, in F. ALESSE, F. 
ARONADIO, C. DALFINO, L. SIMEONI, E. SPINELLI (eds.), Anthropine sophia. Studi di 
filogia e storiografia filosofica in memoria di Gabriele Giannantoni, Bibliopolis, 2008, p. 
497-508) 
165 Explicitly mentioned in: PLOTINUS, Enneads, VI 3 [44], 22.16-18 
166 PLOTINUS, Enneads, VI 2 [43], 7-8 
167 PLOTINUS, Enneads, VI 1 [42], 16, 3 [44], 22-23 and 3 [44], 27.23-25 
168 PLOTINUS, Enneads, VI 3 [44], 21-27 
169 R. CHIARADONNA, Sostanza movimento analogia. Plotino critico di Aristotele, 
Bibliopolis, 2002, p. 187 n. 60 
170 PLOTINUS, Enneads, III 7 [45], 7.1-7 
171 PLOTINUS, Enneads, VI 7 [38], 31-35 
172 APULEIUS, De Platone et eius Dogmate, II 20.248 
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the course of the psychic fall toward the sensible world and its embodiment173. These 
mystical experiences (according to Porphyry, Plotinus had lived at least four 
‘unifications’174) happen in the life of the soul as sandwiching a timeless activity between 
– even, by virtue of the intermediary psychic nature according to which the soul is partaken 
between an intellective part and a sensible one175: inside – temporal ones176, in the same 
way that in Parm, 156c-d, the ἐξαίφνης occurs between two periods or stretches of time. 
  So, albeit Plotinus position seems to be closest to Apuleius than Taurus, the possibility 
might remain, according to Chiaradonna’s suggestion, that Plotinus’ insistence on the 
ἐξαίφνης of Symposium was in fact linked to an unorthodox reading of the kinematic 
excursus of Parmenides, in the way of a transfer of the ‘sudden’ from kinematics to 
dynamics which was later explicitly followed by Damascius. However, the fact is that 
Plotinus keeps the ἐξαίφνης for describing the connection with the One; furthermore, none 
of his texts can really put us in mind that he had elsewhere employed this word for another 
specific and dynamic entity, notably for the soul177. Thus, I think, in view of the available 
texts, the mystical understanding of Plotinus’ ἐξαίφνης should be favoured rather than the 
dynamical one. 
 
  2.2.3. Iamblichus: between Kinematics and Mysticism 
  Iamblichus draws a reading quite different of the ‘mystical’ ἐξαίφνης. Besides, the word 
rarely appears in Iamblichus: in the chapter of Protrepticus in which Iamblichus copies 
the Platonic Allegory of the Cave almost word for word178, in few passages of De 
mysteriis, in one of De Anima, and in none of the preserved fragments of his commentaries 
on Plato179. 
 
De mysteriis, I 7 21.1-5: Τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἄκρον 
καὶ ὑπερέχον καὶ ὁλοτελές, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον 
καὶ ἀπολειπόμενον καὶ ἀτελέστερον· καὶ τὸ 
μὲν πάντα δύναται ἅμα ἐν τῷ νῦν μονοειδῶς, 
τὸ δὲ οὔτε ὅλα οὔτε ἀθρόως οὔτε ἐξαίφνης 
οὔτε ἀμερίστως. 
 
 
 
De mysteriis, III 13 130.8-14: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡλίου 
καταλάμψαντος οὐ πέφυκε τὴν αὐγὴν 
The one (of these extremes) [i.e. the genus of 
the Gods] is at the summit, and transcendent 
and perfect, while the other [i.e. the genus of 
the Souls] is at the bottom, deficient, and 
relatively imperfect; the one can achieve all 
things in the present instant and unitarily, 
while the other can achieve neither all things 
nor all at once nor suddenly nor indivisibly.181 
 
For just as when the sun shines, the darkness 
by its nature is not able to resist its light, and 
 
173 PLOTINUS, Enneads, III 7 [45], 11-13 
174 PORPHYRY, Life of Plotinus, 23 
175 PLOTINUS, Enneads, II 9 [33], 2, 4-10, IV 1 [21], 1.12-13, IV 3 [27], 30, IV 8 [6], 4, 25-
35, 7-8. That point is highly debated amongst the Platonists. For instance, Plotinus’ option 
had been forcefully criticized by Iamblichus. See: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on 
the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 
34-51 and G. SHAW, Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus, The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 61-69. See also: PROCLUS, Elements of 
Theology, §211, In Tim, III 333.28-334.28, In Parm, IV 948.12-30 and R. CHLUP, Proclus. 
An Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 26-27 
176 See: R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 161-163 
177 PLOTINUS, Enneads, II 9 [33], 9.53, III 1 [3], 1.17, III 2 [47], 4.42, IV 6 [41], 3.37, V 8 
[31], 7.14. In all these texts, ἐξαίφνης means ‘suddenly’ in the sense of a kinematic 
durationless switch. 
178 IAMBLICHUS, Protrepticus, 15 
179 Collected in: J. M. DILLON (ed.), Iamblichi Chalcidensis. In Platonis Dialogos 
Commentariorum Fragmenta, Brill, 1973 
181 English translation (modified): E. C. CLARK, J. M. DILLON, J. P. HERSHBELL (eds.), 
Iamblichus. De mysteriis, Society of Biblical Literature, 2003, p. 27 
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ὑπομένειν τὸ σκότος, ἐξαίφνης δὲ ἀφανὲς 
ἄρδην καθίσταται καὶ παντελῶς ἐκ μέσων 
ὑποχωρεῖ καὶ ἐκποδὼν ἐξίσταται, οὕτω καὶ τῆς 
πάντα ἀγαθῶν πληρούσης τῶν θεῶν δυνάμεως 
πολλαχόθεν ἐπιλαμπούσης οὐκ ἔχει χώραν ἡ 
τῶν κακῶν ταραχὴ πνευμάτων, οὐδὲ δύναταί 
που διαφαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ μηδὲν ἢ ἐν τῷ μὴ 
ὄντι κεχώρισται, οὐδαμοῦ φύσιν ἔχουσα 
κινεῖσθαι τῶν κρειττόνων παρόντων ἢ 
παρενοχλεῖν αὐτοῖς δυναμένη ἡνίκα ἂν 
ἐπιλάμπωσιν. 
 
De mysteriis, V 4 203.9-12: Ἦ που ἄρα τὰ τῶν 
θεῶν χραίνεται ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἀτμῶν, ἃ καὶ 
τῆς ὕλης ὅλης καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων σωμάτων τοὺς 
ἀτμούς, ἵν’ οὕτως εἴπωμεν, ἐξαίφνης κατὰ 
μίαν βολὴν ἀποκόπτει; 
 
De Anima, frg. 36. 14-19180: Εἰ δὲ ὡς δύναμις 
ὑποκειμένου, ὥσπερ δὴ ἁρμονία λύρας ἢ 
τελειότης, προαφίσταται τοῦ σώματος ἐν τῷ 
ἀποθνῄσκειν ἡ ψυχή, προφθείρεται μὲν 
οὐδαμῶς (οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ κινήσεως πρόεισιν εἰς 
τὸ μὴ εἶναι), ἀλλ’ ἐξαίφνης εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι 
μεθίσταται ἀχράντως καὶ ἄνευ φθορᾶς, ὥσπερ 
δὴ καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε ἔστιν ἀθρόως οἷον ἀστραπῆς 
ἐκλαμπούσης. 
suddenly becomes wholly invisible, 
withdraws completely from its midst, and 
altogether ceases, so when the power of the 
gods, filling all with its benefits, shines forth in 
many directions, the tumult of evil spirits has 
no place, and cannot manifest itself in any way, 
but is set apart as nothing or non-being, in no 
way having a nature to move itself when 
superior beings are present, or able to cause 
them annoyance when they shine forth.182 
 
 
Is it likely, then, that the substance of the gods 
should suffer any pollution from such vapours, 
seeing as it suddenly and at one blow, so to 
speak, cuts off the vapours emanating from 
matter as a whole and from material bodies?183 
 
If, on the other hand, the soul is like a 
potentiality inhering in an object – as for 
instance the harmony of a lyre – or like the 
perfection of an object, and departs from the 
body in death, it by no means is corrupted 
before the body (for it does not proceed to non-
being through motion), but suddenly changes 
to non-being without time elapsing or the soul 
being corrupted, just as, when it exists, it exists 
instantaneously, like lightning flashing.184 
  
  In three of these passages, Iamblichus makes a connection between the ‘suddenness’ of 
a change and the commonplace example of lightning flash as Ps.-Plato did in Seventh 
Letter, 341c, in such a way Iamblichus’ uses taste almost like mystical ones. Such a taste 
is obviously reinforced by the fact that ἐξαίφνης, at least in De mysteriis, appears in 
contexts in which Iamblichus speaks about Gods. So, as Plotinus, Iamblichus keeps the 
ἐξαίφνης for the higher levels of his theology (he never uses it for the intermediary genus 
of daemons and heroes), in such a way that, contrary to later Neoplatonists, he does not 
interlace a specific meaning of ἐξαίφνης with the soul-level. 
  However, such a ‘mystic’ overtone must be qualified by the fact that Iamblichus does 
not explain in detail his conception of ἐξαίφνης and uses it for instantaneous change 
understood as durationless switch in total agreement with Parm, 156c-d. Furthermore, in 
the quotation extracted from De Anima in which Iamblichus is focused on the event of 
dying, maybe, as I have suggested for Taurus, Iamblichus had in mind a passage of 
Gorgias in which Plato precisely discusses the ‘sudden’ separation of the soul from the 
body at the time of death185. Anyway, as De mysteriis, I 7 21.1-5 shows, Iamblichus does 
not seem to really distinguish between Platonic ἐξαίφνης and Aristotelian νῦν when he 
has in mind a durationless event. Albeit Iamblichus’ conception of the νῦν, according to 
 
180 = STOBAEUS, Anthology, I 384.2-8 
182 English translation: E. C. CLARK, J. M. DILLON, J. P. HERSHBELL (eds.), Iamblichus. 
De mysteriis, Society of Biblical Literature, 2003, p. 153 
183 English translation (modified): E. C. CLARK, J. M. DILLON, J. P. HERSHBELL (eds.), 
Iamblichus. De mysteriis, Society of Biblical Literature, 2003, p. 231 
184 English translation: J. F. FINAMORE, J. M. DILLON (eds.), Iamblichus De Anima. Text, 
translation, and commentary, Brill, 2002, p. 65 
185 PLATO, Gorgias, 523e2-6 
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Proclus’ and Simplicius’ testimonies of Iamblichus’ In Timaeum186, had been quite 
complex and very elaborated187, none of the evidences has preserved a substantial analysis 
either of the precise kinematic properties of the ἐξαίφνης/νῦν, or of its logical status. 
  In conclusion, due to the status of our sources, that seems difficult to understand well 
Iamblichus’ reading of Plato’s ἐξαίφνης. In view of his strong tendency to mysticism, the 
father of theurgy would likely have insisted on Diotima’s speech rather than on the 
kinematic excursus of Parmenides. But in the absence of any evidence concerning his 
reading of these two passages (notably in the lost commentary on Parmenides), all 
interpretations of Iamblichus’ position remain highly and desperately conjectural. 
  Nevertheless, there stays few clear-cut points: from Middle-Platonism to Early 
Neoplatonism, the ἐξαίφνης had always been understood as belonging – more or less 
explicitly – to kinematics, and never expressly to dynamics on the one hand, and during 
that period Platonists seem to have particularly emphasized its ‘mystical’ overtone on the 
other. 
 
 
3. LATER NEOPLATONISM: THE TRANSFER OF THE ἘΞΑΙΦΝΗΣ FROM KINEMATICS TO 
DYNAMICS 
 
  If the Platonist readings presented above, I apologize, are far from being very enthralling, 
especially by comparison with the original Platonic text, the situation is fortunately quite 
different for the following. Indeed, by virtue of the Parmenides-focusing of Later 
Neoplatonism, the interpretation of ἐξαίφνης becomes a significant issue for discovering 
the ‘true’ understanding of Plato’s thought, notably concerning the very nature of the soul. 
 
 3.1. The σκοπός of the Third Hypothesis of Parmenides 
  In several texts, Proclus draws an overview of the various readings of the Hypotheses of 
Parmenides, from Middle-Platonism to him188. These important testimonies, supported by 
their scholia189, show that there was a large consensus on the σκοπός of the Third 
Hypothesis from Plotinus to Damascius, by way of Amelius, Porphyry, Plutarch, Syrianus 
 
186 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 30.30-32.6, 33.1-30; SIMPLICIUS, In Cat, 351.32-352.20, 353.19-
356.7, 355.27-356.1, In Phys, 786.11-788.33, 792.20-795.3 (available in: S. SAMBURSKY, 
S. PINES (eds.), The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism. Texts with Translation, 
Introduction and Notes, Jerusalem, 1971, p. 26-47) 
187 Ph. HOFFMANN, “Jamblique exégète du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalités d’une 
doctrine du temps”, in Les Etudes philosophiques, 3, 1980, p. 320-323 and R. SORABJI, 
Time, creation and the continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 33-45 
188 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology I 7-12, In Parm, I 630.37-643.5, VI 1051.34-1064.12. On 
the last text, see: H. D. SAFFREY, L. G. WESTERINK (eds.), Proclus. Théologie 
Platonicienne, vol. 1, Les Belles Lettres, 1968, p. lxxv-lxxxix; C. STEEL, “Une histoire de 
l’interprétation du Parménide dans l’Antiquité”, in M. BARBANTI, F. ROMANO (eds.), Il 
Parmenide di Platone et la sua tradizione, Catania, 2002, p. 11-40 and C. LUNA, A.-Ph. 
SEGONDS (eds.), Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, vol. 6, Les Belles 
Lettres, 2017, p. xvi-xxiv 
189 scholia of the manuscripts Ambrosionus A167 sup., fol. 157r; Parisianus graecus 1810, 
fol. 178v, 179r and Laurentianus Plut. 85.8, fol. 188v, 189v, 190r, 191r, 192r (available in: 
C. LUNA, A.-Ph. SEGONDS (eds.), Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, vol. 
6, Les Belles Lettres, 2017, p. 147-150). By the way, some of those assignations are 
confirmed by SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 230.4-231.6 and DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 247.15-16, 
256.20-21, 286.19-23, 292.7-9 (= L. G. WESTERINK, J. COMBÈS (eds.), Damascius. 
Commentaire du Parménide de Platon, Les Belles Lettres (abbreviated by W&C in the next 
footnotes), vol. 4, 2003, p. 3.15-17, 19.14-16, 74.8-12, 84.5-9). On the manuscripts and the 
textual tradition of In Parm, see: C. LUNA, A.-Ph. SEGONDS (eds.), Proclus. Commentaire 
sur le Parménide de Platon, vol. 1, Les Belles Lettres, 2007, p. cxv-cdlxviii 
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and Proclus. Indeed, all agreed that in this Hypothesis, Plato had aimed at catching the 
intermediary nature of the soul190. The only black sheep appears to be Iamblichus who 
thought that the σκοπός concerns the essence of the intermediary genus of a theological 
bestiary (heavily inspired by the Chaldaic Oracles), namely the nature of angels, daemons 
and heroes, while Plato would have treated with the soul in the Fourth and Fifth 
Hypotheses191. Iamblichus’ position had been harshly rejected by his successors Proclus192 
and Damascius193 in their commentaries, despite the usual claims about the ‘greatness’ of 
the father of theurgy. Thus, a Neoplatonist consensus seems to enclose together the soul-
level and the brief passage on the ‘sudden’, in such a way that they must find a kind of 
connection between the very psychic nature and the ἐξαίφνης. 
  Despite this exegetical claim, that is hard to discover a high interest for the ‘sudden’ in 
their respective thoughts, as if they were discomforted with the content of the Third 
Hypothesis. I think the very reason why Neoplatonists had considered this text as referring 
to the soul, before anything else, was purely exegetical, so, in a sense, purely formal, 
without any preliminary scouring of its precise matter. In other words, such an 
interpretation above all results from their Parmenides-focusing. 
  The Neoplatonic Parmenides-focusing is utterly obvious, even if the intertwining of the 
exegesis of the dialogue with the elaboration of a genuine Platonic theology is still 
partially obscure194. By the way, Proclus claims in the Platonic Theology that the complete 
theological thought of Plato can especially be found in the Parmenides rather than in the 
other dialogues195. Following this statement and the alleged concordance between the 
levels of Neoplatonic multi-layered theology and the Hypotheses, the Third Hypothesis 
must match with a diacosm. What is the best candidate? 
  The answer must be discovered in the exegetical tradition of the Parmenides. Beyond 
the Middle-Platonist dialectical interpretations of the Parmenides196, the Third Hypothesis 
had been typically commented as an arcane key of the soul’s realm from the 
Neopythagoreanism of Moderatus197, and through him from his reader Plotinus198. The 
deep influence of Plotinus upon his successors had quickly transformed the brief allusions 
 
190 See: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: 
Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 80-87 
191 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 1054.37-1055.25 (Proclus’ evidence is sustained by 
DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 247.15-16, 256.20-21, 286.19-23, 292.7-9 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 
3.15-17, 19.14-16, 74.8-12, 84.5-9). On Iamblichus’ interpretation: J. F. FINAMORE, 
“Iamblichus’s Interpretation of the Parmenides’ Third Hypothesis”, in J. D. TURNER, K. 
CORRIGAN (eds.), Plato’s Parmenides and its heritage, vol. 2: Its Reception in Neoplatonic, 
Jewish and Christian Texts, Society of Biblical Literature, 2010, p. 119-132 
192 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 1055.17-1057.5 
193 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 247 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 4.1-19) 
194 C. STEEL, “Le Parménide est-il le fondement de la Théologie Platonicienne?”, in A.-Ph. 
SEGONDS, C. STEEL (eds.), Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne. Actes du Colloque 
International de Louvain (13-16 mai 1998), Leuven University Press/Les Belles Lettres, 
2000, p. 373-398 
195 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology I 7 
196 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology I 8-9, In Parm, I 630.37-635.27 
197 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 230.36-40. E. R. DODDS, “The Parmenides of Plato and the 
Origins of the Neoplatonic One”, in Classical Quarterly, 22, 1928, p. 129-142 and J. M. 
RIST, “The Neoplatonic One and Plato’s Parmenides”, in Transactions and Proceedings of 
the American Philological Association, 93, 1962, p. 389-401. For a qualification of the 
Moderatus’ origin, see: C. STEEL, “Une histoire de l’interprétation du Parménide dans 
l’Antiquité”, in M. BARBANTI, F. ROMANO (eds.), Il Parmenide di Platone et la sua 
tradizione, Catania, 2002, p. 17-22 
198 PORPHYRY, Life of Plotinus, 20 
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of the schedule of the Parmenides present in the Enneads199 into extended commentaries 
of the dialogue that systematize Plotinus’ teaching. Thus, a consensus emerges from 
Plotinus according to which the σκοπός of the First Hypothesis is the One, of the Second 
is the Intellect, and of the Third is the Soul. Iamblichus will be the single to interpret the 
Third Hypothesis differently. All other commentators, from earlier Neoplatonists as 
Amelius and Porphyry to the later who succeed to the teaching of Plutarch of Athens, had 
followed Plotinus, sometimes, of course, with great amendments aiming to erect a very 
‘baroque’200 theology from the initial Plotinian bricks, notably by distinguishing several 
diacosms inside the three hypostases (intelligible, intelligible-intellective, intellective in 
the original homogeneous Intelligible realm). Thus, that is the respect for the tradition, 
and especially for Plotinus, which is primarily accountable for the conflation between the 
soul and the ἐξαίφνης – in other words, a purely formal reason. 
  The ‘formalism’ of the concordance between the Hypotheses and the diacosms is vivid 
in a very funny fact: albeit all Plotinus’ successors were in agreement both with the 
conflation of the soul-level and the Third Hypothesis and with the Plotinian schedule of 
the Parmenides, they had split the dialogue in different ways, in such a way that the Third 
Hypothesis is not the same text for all201. Consequently, for some Neoplatonists, the 
passage on the ‘sudden’ belongs to the Second Hypothesis rather than to the Third. 
According to Proclus, Amelius had divided the dialogue into eight Hypotheses202, while 
Porphyry and the majority of Plotinus’ heirs (Iamblichus, Plutarch of Athens, Syrianus, 
Proclus, and Damascius) into nine203, the ‘Anonymous of Rhodes’ into ten204. Therefore, 
for Amelius the Third Hypothesis likely corresponds to 157b6-159b1205, for Porphyry and 
his followers to 155e4-157b5. Proclus judges the more consensual division into nine 
hypotheses as certainly more natural than the others, but given that the passage on the 
‘sudden’ is likely a corollary or an appendix of the Second Hypothesis206, the true number 
is rather eight according to Amelius. Anyway, the various cuttings of Plotinus’ pupils 
show us that Plotinus had surely neither elaborated a precise exegesis of the Hypotheses, 
nor got closer together the essence of the soul and the ‘sudden’ (indeed, Plotinus seems to 
have rather kept the ‘sudden’ for the coming of the One). Consequently, directly after his 
teaching and in the absence of clear indications, his pupils Amelius and Porphyry had 
 
199 PLOTINUS, Enneads, IV 2 [4], 2.52-55, V 1 [10], 8.1-27. For a reconstruction of Plotinus’ 
exegesis, see: H. D. SAFFREY, L. G. WESTERINK (eds.), Proclus. Théologie Platonicienne, 
vol. 1, Les Belles Lettres, 1968, p. lxxv-lxxix and K. CORRIGAN, “Plotinus and the 
Hypotheses of the Second Part of Plato’s Parmenides”, in J. D. TURNER, K. CORRIGAN 
(eds.), Plato’s Parmenides and its heritage, vol. 2: Its Reception in Neoplatonic, Jewish and 
Christian Texts, Society of Biblical Literature, 2010, p. 35-48 
200 R. WARDY, Doing Greek Philosophy, Routledge, 2007, p. 81 
201 See: C. LUNA, A.-Ph. SEGONDS (eds.), Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de 
Platon, vol. 6, Les Belles Lettres, 2017, p. 1 n.5 (p. 164-168) 
202 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 1052.31-1053.35 
203 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 1053.36-1055.25, 1058.21-1064.12 
204 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 1057.5-1064.12 
205 Corrigan considers that Amelius had neglected the last hypothesis (165e2-166c5) rather 
than regarded 155e4-157b5 as a part of the Second Hypothesis, see: K. CORRIGAN, 
“Plotinus and the Hypotheses of the Second Part of Plato’s Parmenides”, in J. D. TURNER, 
K. CORRIGAN (eds.), Plato’s Parmenides and its heritage, vol. 2: Its Reception in 
Neoplatonic, Jewish and Christian Texts, Society of Biblical Literature, 2010, p. 39-40 
206 F. M. CORNFORD, Plato and Parmenides, Kegan Paul, 1939, p. 194, p. 202; F. 
NIEWOEHNER, Dialog und Dialektik in Platons ‘Parmenides’, Meisenheim, 1971, p. 280; 
S. SCOLNICOV (ed.), Plato’s Parmenides, University of California Press, 2003, p. 134 and 
M. DIXSAUT, “Le temps qui s’avance et l’instant du changement (Timée, 37c-39e, 
Parménide, 140e-141e, 151e-155E)”, in Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 101, 2003-2, p. 
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challenged in different ways the text about the ἐξαίφνης. But Amelius was unlucky, since 
his (possible) best heir – Iamblichus – had rejected his interpretation by favouring the 
division into nine sections. Yet, given that the σκοποί of the next two hypotheses, for 
Amelius and Iamblichus, are the same (namely the superior/rational and the 
inferior/irrational souls), Iamblichus had probably kept from Amelius that the σκοπός of 
155e4-157b5 is not the soul but the last divine genus – namely angels, daemons and heroes 
– before the rational soul possessed by men, in such a way his innovation had consisted to 
split the Second Hypothesis of Amelius into two separated hypotheses. 
  In conclusion, at least from Porphyry, commenting on the Third Hypothesis was become 
equivalent to challenging with the ‘sudden’, in such a way that the commentators should 
discover a psychic dimension for the ‘sudden’. Unfortunately, only Damascius’ 
commentary on the Third Hypothesis has lasted the centuries to us, in such a way that the 
fashion by which Porphyry or Proclus had proceeded for integrating the ἐξαίφνης into the 
study of the soul remains highly conjectural, especially as the ‘sudden’ is far from being 
very present in their other writings. 
  However, I wish to suggest a possible puzzle that would force the Neoplatonists to 
elaborate a non-usual understanding of the ἐξαίφνης. By virtue of their belief of an ideal 
harmony between Aristotle and Plato207, they did not hesitate to have kinematics very 
strongly influenced by Aristotle’s (sometimes too influenced for some Neoplatonists 
themselves208). Yet, interpreting the ἐξαίφνης kinematically as an Aristotelian νῦν or not 
doing that implies to mangle either the concordance between the Hypotheses and the 
diacosms, or the harmonization of Aristotle with Plato. Indeed, understanding the 
ἐξαίφνης as kinematic actually involves an invasion of Platonic doctrines in a sensible 
realm usually governed by Aristotelian laws (and, conversely, an intrusion of Aristotelian 
physics into a theological Platonic framework), so the cost will be at least a kind of 
confusion between the two philosophers’ jurisdictions, and – more intolerable – will 
highlight an evident tension between Aristotle’s and Plato’s teachings: Aristotle’s νῦν is 
merely physical, whereas Plato’s ἐξαίφνης should be, for exegetical reasons, psychic. So, 
the Neoplatonists have two options: either rejecting the conflation between the νῦν and 
the ἐξαίφνης for preserving the Plotinian schedule of the Hypotheses by supporting that 
the ἐξαίφνης is a psychic stuff, if so they miss an opportunity to harmonize Aristotle’s and 
Plato’s physics; or, as Simplicius did209, preferring such harmonization by supporting that 
the νῦν and the ἐξαίφνης are the same item, if so that becomes very hard to interpret the 
Third Hypothesis as speaking about the Soul. The conjunction between their ideal of 
harmonization and their respect for the Plotinian exegesis entails a kind of Cornelian 
choice. So, perhaps, at least in the context of a commentary on the Parmenides, it becomes 
crucial to elaborate a clear distinction between the Aristotelian νῦν and the Platonic 
ἐξαίφνης to preserve the concordance between the Hypotheses and the hypostases. I shall 
argue that Damascius was perfectly aware of this dilemma and had chosen to strongly 
distinguish between a kinematic νῦν (that is true, not really in an Aristotelian fashion) and 
a dynamic ἐξαίφνης. Notwithstanding, the case of Proclus appears as being quite different. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 On this Neoplatonic ideal of a deep harmony between Plato and Aristotle, see: I. HADOT, 
Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato, 
Brill, 2015 
208 For instance, Simplicius found Proclus’ theory of motion too Aristotelian: SIMPLICIUS, 
In Phys, 404.16-33 
209 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 982.6 
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 3.2. The ἐξαίφνης as constituting the Essence of the Soul 
 
  3.2.1. Proclus’ Ambiguity 
  Given the loss of Proclus’ commentary on the Third Hypothesis, Proclus’ understanding 
of the ‘sudden’ should be discovered in his other works. The least that can be said is that 
Proclus was not very interested by the ἐξαίφνης, since he had used this word only seven 
times in his very vast oeuvre210. Such parsimony is rather surprising for Proclus. 
Fortunately, one of these occurrences is explicitly linked to the Third Hypothesis, and 
several of them are employed in a context in which Proclus had in mind either the journey 
of the soul, or the coming of Daemons or of the Forms, in such a way that they constitute 
a coherent and homogeneous corpus. 
 
In Alc, 80.9-13: καὶ κατ’ αὐτὴν τοῦ δαίμονος 
τὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον οὐδὲ ταῖς 
δοξαστικαῖς δυνάμεσιν ὑπεδέχετο τὸ ἐκεῖθεν 
προϊὸν φῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πνεύματι, διὰ πάσης 
αὐτοῦ τῆς ζωῆς χωρούσης ἐξαίφνης τῆς 
δαιμονίας ἐλλάμψεως καὶ αὐτὴν ἤδη τὴν 
αἴσθησιν κινούσης. 
 
In Tim, I 112.25-113.7: οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ὅτι καὶ 
Πλούταρχος ὁ Χαιρωνεὺς ἱστορεῖ τῶν περὶ τὴν 
Βρεττανίαν νησίδων κατά τινα μίαν ἱερὰν εἶναι 
δοκοῦσαν καὶ ἄσυλον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο  
ἀφειμένην ὑπὸ τῶν κρατούντων πολλάκις 
γίνεσθαι τοῦ ἀέρος συγχύσεις ἐξαίφνης καὶ 
καταπτώσεις ἢ ὄμβρων ἢ κεραυνῶν καὶ λέγειν 
τοὺς ἐγχωρίους, ὅτι τῶν κρειττόνων τις 
ἐξέλειπε, συνήθεις ὄντας τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις, 
ὀνομάζειν δὲ κρείττονας ψυχὰς 
μετενσωματουμένας καὶ ἀπολιμπανούσας τινὰ 
γένεσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατιουσῶν εἰς 
σώματα ψυχῶν τοιαῦτα συμπίπτειν οὐκ 
ἀπογνωστέον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν 
μεγαλουργῶν καὶ δαιμονιωτέραν οὐσίαν 
λαχουσῶν, οἵαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ Φαέθοντος εἶναι 
ψυχὴν ὁ μῦθος οὗτος ᾐνίξατο. 
 
 
 
In Parm, IV 844.2-11: διὸ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον 
ἀεὶ γίγνεται παρ’ αὐτῆς· ὁμοῦ γὰρ τῷ ποιοῦντι 
πανταχοῦ τὸ γιγνόμενον· ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ 
χρόνον ὑφισταμένοις ἐν τῷ ἐξαίφνης 
παραγίγνεται τὸ εἶδος τῶν πρὸ τῆς  
παρουσίας αὐτοῦ ποιήσεων τὰ ἐμπόδια μόνον  
τῆς παρουσίας ἐξαιρουσῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ μὲν 
ἐξαίρεσις <τῶν ἐμποδίων κατὰ χρόνον 
as regards the actual operation of the daemon 
he received the light proceeding therefrom not 
merely in the discursive reason or the powers 
of conjecture, but also in the vehicle of the 
soul, the daemon-like irradiation passing 
suddenly through all the levels of his life and 
even arousing sense-perception.212 
 
I know that Plutarch of Chaeronea tells the 
story213 that, on one of the little islands around 
Britain – one that is reputed to be holy and 
inviolate, and has for this reason been left 
alone by those in power – there often suddenly 
occur disturbances of the air and the 
unleashing of either downpours or 
thunderbolts. Further he says the inhabitants 
who are used to such happenings say that one 
of the superior powers has passed on, meaning 
by ‘superior ones’ souls that are experiencing 
a change of bodies and are leaving one life-
form. All the same one should not dismiss the 
idea that such things also occur when souls 
descend into bodies, especially in the case of 
those who are workers of greatness and have 
received a daemonic lot, such as this myth 
riddlingly suggests was the case with 
Phaethon’s soul.214 
 
For this reason the thing that comes to be 
always comes to be from thought, for the being 
being made is everywhere together with its 
maker. Hence even in things that come to be in 
time the Form appears suddenly, the creative 
actions preceding its appearance serving only 
to remove the obstacles to its appearance. For 
the removal of obstacles <takes time, but the 
 
210 PROCLUS, In Alc, 80.12, In Remp, II 353.2, 27, In Parm, IV 844.6, In Crat, 54.19, In 
Tim, I 112.30, In Eucl, 20.9 
212 English translation: W. O’NEIL (ed.), Proclus. Alcibiades 1. A Translation and 
Commentary, Springer, 1971, p. 53 
213 PLUTARCH, De defectu oraculorum, 419e-f 
214 English translation: H. TARRANT (ed.), Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, vol.1: 
Book 1. Proclus on the Socratic State and Atlantis, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 
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γίγνεται, ἡ δὲ παρουσία τοῦ εἴδους> κατὰ τὸ 
νῦν, μιμουμένη τὴν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰώνιον τῶν 
πάντων γένεσιν διὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα τῆς 
ὑποδοχῆς. 
 
In Remp, II 352.23-353.7: εἰ δὲ ἄλλην ἄλλῃ καὶ 
ἐξαπίνης211 ὁρμᾶν φησιν, δῆλον δήπουθεν ὡς 
διασπείρονται μὲν εἰς τὴν πεπληθυσμένην καὶ 
διῃρημένην ἐν τῇ γενέσει ζωὴν καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις 
διαφερούσας καὶ μερίδας τῆς γῆς, ἀθρόως δὲ 
εἰσκρίνονται πᾶσαι καὶ ἀχρόνως τὰ σώματα 
ἐμψυχοῦσιν καὶ ἐνοικίζονται ἐν αὐτοῖς· ὡς τῆς 
ἔξω τῶν σωμάτων ζωῆς καὶ τῆς ἐν σώμασιν 
τὸν διορισμὸν ἀνεπαίσθητον ὑπάρχειν. 
τοιαύτην γὰρ ἐν Παρμενίδῃ τοῦ ἐξαίφνης 
αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ἡρμήνευσεν φύσιν, ἄτοπον δή τινα 
οὖσαν ὡς ἐκεῖ λέγει, καθ’ ἣν αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἀντικειμένων εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα γίνονται 
μεταστάσεις. καὶ εἰσκρίσεις οὖν αἱ εἰς τὰ 
σώματα τῶν ψυχῶν ἐν τούτῳ δὴ τῷ ἐξαπίνης 
ἐπιτελοῦνται, καὶ πᾶσα μεταβολὴ εἴς τε στάσιν 
ἐκ κινήσεως καὶ εἰς κίνησιν ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως.  
 
 
 
 
In Remp, II 353.26-354.2: Τὸ δ’ οὖν ἐφεξῆς 
πάντων τούτων, ὅτι πῶς μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι 
γέγονεν, οὐκ οἶδεν – ἡ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης ὁδὸς οὐκ  
ἔδωκεν ἐπιστάσει χώραν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἐξαπίνης γινομένων ἐφίσταμεν, χρόνου 
παράτασιν τῆς ἐπιστάσεως ἀπαιτούσης, ἵνα 
παρακολουθήσῃ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τῷ 
τέλει τοῦ συμβαίνοντος –, ἀναβλέψας δὲ 
ἕωθεν ἑαυτὸν εἶδεν ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενον 
δωδεκαταῖον, ὡς εἴρηται ἐν προοιμίοις. 
appearance of Form occurs> in an instant, 
imitating in this the eternal genesis of all things 
at once through the principle of aptitude for 
reception.215 
 
If [Plato] says that ‘<such soul> is rising on 
one side, another to another’, and 
‘suddenly’216, it is clear, I suppose, that, on the 
one hand, souls are dispersed in pluralized and 
divided life of the becoming, into different 
places of residence and into different parts of 
the earth, and that, on the other hand, their 
entering into the body are made for all in one 
go, insofar as it takes no time for them to 
animate and settle in. So that the separation 
between life outside the body and life into the 
body actually is imperceptible. This is how 
Plato himself explains in the Parmenides the 
nature of the sudden, which is a sort of ‘weird’ 
stuff, as he says there, according to which the 
passages from a contrary to another happen. It 
is therefore in this sudden that the entering of 
souls in bodies are accomplished, and every 
change either from motion to rest, or from rest 
to motion.217 
 
As a result of all this, it is said that Er ‘did not 
know how and in what way he returned to his 
body’218 – the suddenness of the passage did 
not allow him to pay attention to it: in fact, in 
the other sudden events either, we cannot pay 
attention to how they happen, because the 
attention requires a certain duration of time, 
which allows us to observe the beginning, the 
middle and the end of what is happening – but 
that, having looked up ‘he saw himself at dawn 
lying on the funeral pyre’219 where he had been 
for twelve days, as it was said in the preamble. 
 
  While reading these texts, a conclusion is blindingly obvious, namely that Proclus makes 
exclusively a kinematic use of ἐξαίφνης. In all these passages, he draws an opposition 
between ‘process that occurs suddenly’ and ‘process that needs a period of time’ (or a 
‘duration/continuance of time’: χρόνου παράτασιν220), so he rediscovers Plato’s 
 
211 ἐξαπίνης which has the same meaning of ἐξαίφνης is almost never employed by the 
Platonists. By the way, ἐξαπίνης is a hapax in Plato (Republic, X 621b3). Proclus uses this 
word only while he was explaining this passage of Plato. 
215 English translation: J. M. DILLON, G. R. MORROW (eds.), Proclus’ Commentary on 
Plato’s Parmenides, Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 215 
216 PLATO, Republic, X 621b3 
217 In absence of any English translation available, those of Proclus’ essays on Republic are 
my own, although they follow very closely the French translation of Festugière. 
218 PLATO, Republic, X 621b5-6 
219 PLATO, Republic, X 621b6-7 
220 PROCLUS, In Remp, II 353.29. On παράτασις, see: Ph. HOFFMANN, “Παράτασις. De la 
description aspectuelle des verbes grecs à une définition du temps dans le néoplatonisme 
tardif”, in Revue des Etudes Grecques, t. 96, fasc. 455-459, 1983, p. 1-26 
F. Marion – The ἐξαίφνης in the Platonic Tradition: from Kinematics to Dynamics 
 
34 
dichotomy between the subset of ἐξαίφνης and the subset of χρόνοι that structures the set 
of ‘temporal-entities’. Additionally, he characterizes the set of χρόνοι as the set of 
‘temporal-items’ for which that is possible to discern a beginning, a middle and an end221. 
  In regard of kinematics, the most important text is the passage of the Sixteenth 
Dissertation on the Republic in which Proclus explicitly alludes to Parm, 156c-d and 
claims that the ‘sudden’ is a ‘weird’ stuff in which the transition from contrary to contrary 
occurs. Taking the example of life and death (or, in a Platonic way, of embodiment and 
uplifting), Proclus seems to allude to the classic puzzle of the ‘instant of change’ already 
treated by Taurus, maybe too he had in mind the precise text of the Gorgias on the 
‘sudden’ separation of the soul from the body at the time of death222. So, according to 
Trouillard’s words, for Proclus the ‘sudden’ is the ‘neutral’ point in which occurs the 
transition between two phases223, for instance between the phase of reversion and the 
phase of procession. Albeit he does not discuss the logical and the ontological status of 
the ‘sudden’ in the text extracted from the Sixteenth Dissertation, the short passage from 
his commentary on the Parmenides is eloquent enough. In this text, Proclus says very 
quickly that the εἶδος is coming into the sensible world suddenly and not in a period of 
time. The allusion must be understood in the light of another text of the same 
commentary224: 
 
In Parm, IV 873.17-25: Ὡσαύτως γε καὶ 
χρόνου παντὸς ὑπερήπλωται· πάρεστι γὰρ 
ἀχρόνως ἅπασι καὶ ἀθρόως· ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ 
γενέσεις προπαρασκευαί τινές εἰσι τῆς ἐκείνων 
μεθέξεως, ὡς προείπομεν, καὶ αὗται μὲν ἐν 
χρόνῳ πάντως, τὰ δὲ εἴδη τοῖς ἐν γενέσει 
δίδωσι τὰς ἑαυτῶν μεθέξεις οὐδὲν ὅλως 
προσδεόμενα τῆς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον 
παρατάσεως, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ νῦν ἀμερίστῳ 
ἀμερίστως, ὃ δὴ καὶ μιμεῖται τὴν αἰώνιον 
αὐτῶν ὑπόστασιν. 
Likewise the Forms transcend all time; they are 
present non-temporally and immediately to all 
their participants. Although, as we have said 
before, comings-into-being are conditions 
preparatory to participation in the Forms, and 
these are of course temporal events; 
nevertheless the Forms permit things in the 
world of generation to participate in them 
without any lapse of time at all, indivisibly 
in an indivisible instant, which is a reflection 
of their eternal reality.225 
 
  In the last text, the word ἐξαίφνης is replaced by τῷ νῦν. The understanding of Proclus 
appears very clearly. Challenging the usual Platonic puzzle of the μέθεξις to explain the 
causation of the Forms226, Proclus supports the view that the Form is coming into the 
sensible realm suddenly, namely without any duration, because such a way is the most 
capable of imitating the eternity of the Forms227. In other words, by virtue of the fact that 
the Forms belong to the everlasting realm, their coming-into-sensible should be the less 
temporal as possible, so the participation occurs durationless, of course, after a durative 
overcoming of the barriers that could prevent its sudden reception (so after the demiurgic 
kneading of the many stages of substrate)228. Given that the duration is a vivid sign of 
temporality, therefore of sensibility, avoiding duration must indicate a higher ontological 
 
221 PROCLUS, In Remp, II 353.29-354.1 
222 PLATO, Gorgias, 523e2-6 
223 J. TROUILLARD, L’Un et l’âme selon Proclos, Les Belles Lettres, 1972, p. 152-153 
224 See: C. LUNA, A.-Ph. SEGONDS (eds.), Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de 
Platon, vol. 4, Les Belles Lettres, 2013, p. 11 n.5 (p. 257) 
225 English translation: J. M. DILLON, G. R. MORROW (eds.), Proclus’ Commentary on 
Plato’s Parmenides, Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 237 
226 PROCLUS, In Parm, IV 837.5-890.37 
227 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 844.10-12, 873.24-25 
228 See: PROCLUS, In Tim, I 395.13-22 and G. VAN RIEL, “Proclus on Matter and Physical 
Necessity”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of 
Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 231-257 
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position and a greater likeness with the High Diacosms that reign beyond the becoming. 
For this reason, a durationless coming here below is more suitable for the Forms than a 
process with duration, even if their instantaneous coming arise after a preparatory 
demiurgic process with duration229. Thus, by their sudden appearance, the Forms do not 
depart from their eternal being, in such a way that their coming into the sensible world 
imitate as far as possible their being. This relation of μίμησις permit to escape the 
absurdities of the ‘proto-Hegelian’ interpretation of ἐξαίφνης presented above230, namely 
the fact that sensible change occurs beyond the time according to a meaningless 
extratemporal fashion, that is to say according to a view which sustains that the ‘instant of 
change’ is outside of time and belongs to the everlasting Intelligible realm. Indeed, for 
Proclus, there is just a relation of imitation between the eternity of the Forms and the 
suddenness of their coming into the sensible world, in such a way that the ἐξαίφνης 
belongs to the diacosm of becoming and keeps its kinematic explanatory strength. 
Furthermore, the fact that Proclus interprets the ‘sudden’ exclusively in a kinematic 
fashion is reinforced by the interchangeability between ἐξαίφνης and νῦν that seems to be 
very usual for the Neoplatonists (given that such interchangeability has already been 
discovered in Iamblichus and Simplicius). 
  Insofar as the suddenness of the coming is a characteristic of the appearance of the Forms, 
beyond the kinematic aspect of the ‘sudden’, Proclus’ understanding is not devoid of a 
mystical overtone. Following the examples of Plotinus who keeps the suddenness for the 
appearance of the One and of Iamblichus who often uses ἐξαίφνης when he was speaking 
about the Gods, Proclus has a deep tendency to link together the ‘suddenness’ of a change 
and the items belonging to non-sensible diacosms, especially to the soul-realm. Indeed, a 
list of examples of change for which Proclus uses the word ἐξαίφνης shows the link with 
the σκοπός of the Third Hypothesis. 
 
In Alc, 80.9-13 The demonic irradiation that enlightens suddenly all Socrates’ soul, 
with an allusion to the psychic triad : δίανοια-δόξα-πνεῦμα/αἴσθησις 
 
In Tim, I 112.25-113.7 The transfers of the souls downwards or upwards occurring with 
changes in their pneumatic clothing231, notably the descent of the soul 
into the last vehicle (ὄχημα), namely into the body232. The ‘sudden’ 
meteorological changes observable on the occasion of their psychic 
transfers can be explained by the greater demonic nature of some souls 
and the chemical properties of the psychic vehicle, as that is the case 
for Phaethon. 
 
 
229 Proclus’ solution for the coming of the Forms has an obvious ‘family-resemblance’ with 
the Aristotelian puzzle of the ‘instant of coming-to-be’, especially with the solution of 
Averroes, see: C. CERAMI, Génération et Substance. Aristote et Averroès entre physique et 
métaphysique, de Gruyter, 2015, p. 402-421 and, for Alexander: M. RASHED (ed.), 
Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la Physique d’Aristote (livres IV-VIII). Les 
scholies byzantines, de Gruyter, 2011, p. 102-105 
230 J. WAHL, Etude sur le Parménide de Platon, F. Rieder, 1926, p. 167-172; W. 
BEIERWALTES, “Exaiphnês oder: die Paradoxie des Augenblicks”, Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch, 74, 1966/1967, p. 271-283 and L. BRISSON, “L’instant, le temps, et l’éternité 
dans le Parménide (155e-157b) de Platon”, in Dialogue, 9, 1970-3, p. 389-396 
231 See: PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §196, §206-210 (on the Neoplatonic doctrine of 
the vehicle, see: E. R. DODDS (ed.), Proclus. The Elements of Theology, Oxford Clarendon 
Press, 1963, p. 313-321; I. HADOT, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès 
et Simplicius, Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978, p. 98-106, p. 181-187 and J. TROUILLARD, 
“Réflexions sur l’ὄχημα dans les Eléments de Théologie de Proclus”, in Revue des Etudes 
Grecques, 70, fasc. 329-330, 1957, p. 102-107) 
232 See: PROCLUS, In Tim, III 298-299 
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In Remp, II 352.23-353.7 The transfers of the souls downwards or upwards, more particularly 
the embodiment of the souls which occurs suddenly, without any 
duration, in such a way that the bodies become alive instantaneously. 
(Proclus comments the ἐξαπίνης of Republic, X 621b6) 
 
In Remp, II 353.26-354.2 Comment on Republic, X 621b5: Er did not remember how he has 
been embodied, owing to the suddenness of the embodiment.  
 
  The fact that Proclus’ uses of ἐξαίφνης are often focused on the ascent and the descent 
of the non-divine soul, especially on its embodiment, points out the context of his reading, 
namely the exegesis of the Third Hypothesis (view, of course, already highly sustained by 
the explicit reference to Parm, 156c-d in the Sixteenth Dissertation). Damascius’ 
discussion on the σκοπός of the Third Hypothesis seems to support this view, insofar as 
Damascius begins his purpose by saying that this hypothesis is concerned with “the soul 
which goes down into the becoming, then climbs back up”233, making an obvious reference 
to one of the last theorems of Proclus’ Elements of Theology234. Inasmuch as Damascius 
likely had Proclus’ In Parm in front of him when he had writing his commentary235, that 
seems rational to suppose that Proclus had linked together the Third Hypothesis and the 
journey of the souls. 
  Besides, in his division of the Parmenides, Proclus has followed his master Syrianus236, 
notably by distinguishing three kinds of souls237, in such a way that the Third Hypothesis 
is devoted only to the demonic and human souls which precisely accomplish procession 
and reversion, and plunge into sensible water (that is not completely the case for the divine 
souls, namely the unparticiped soul which is extra-mundane or hypercosmic238, the World-
Soul239, the souls of the seven planets and of the fixed stars240, and the souls of the gods 
below the moon241). Then, Proclus would have emphasized the superior nature of these 
lower souls by claiming that the coming of these souls share the suddenness with the 
coming of the Forms that in themselves inhabit into the Intelligible realm. In this way, the 
suddenness of the appearance becomes a differentiating sign of the superior diacosms (in 
particular the Intelligible and the Psychic), insofar as one of their common characteristics 
is that their inhabitants enter into the sensible realm without any duration. 
  However, from an exegetical point of view, Proclus’ understanding of the ἐξαίφνης 
seems to entail a difficulty concerning the ‘real’ σκοπός of the Third Hypothesis, inasmuch 
as, in Proclus’ interpretation, Plato would focus on the modalities of the psychic coming 
into the sensible world rather than on the very nature of demonic and human souls. For 
scrupulously respecting the schedule of the Hypotheses, he should have explained the 
 
233 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 247.8-9 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 3.8-10) 
234 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §206 
235 L. G. WESTERINK (ed.), Damascius. Lectures on the Philebus, North-Holland, 1959, p. 
xv-xxii, “Damascius, commentateur de Platon”, in P. HADOT, P.-M. SCHUHL (eds.), Le 
Néoplatonisme, CNRS, 1971, p. 253-260 and C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the 
Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 79-
80 
236 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 1063.5-1064.12 (Fragments of Syrianus’ In Parm are available 
in: S. KLITENIC WEAR, The Teachings of Syrianus on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides, 
Brill, 2011) 
237 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, I 12 56.19-57.14 (see: Elements of Theology, §184 and 
for this classification: E. R. DODDS (ed.), Proclus. The Elements of Theology, Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 295-296 
238 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §164 
239 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 290.3-4 
240 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 255.10-19 
241 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 255.20-23 
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ἐξαίφνης as an element of the psychic ‘one-and-many’ nature. None of Proclean texts in 
which ἐξαίφνης appears can put us in mind that Proclus had elaborated such an exegesis. 
However, Damascius alludes to that kind of explanation from Proclus. Indeed, at the 
beginning of his answer of the eighth issue devoted to the nature of the ἐξαίφνης, 
Damascius writes: 
 
In Parm, 262.8-11242: Τί οὖν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ 
ἐξαίφνης, καὶ τί τὸ ἄχρονον, ὅπερ ὄγδοον ἦν; 
Ἆρα τὸ αἰώνιον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτό, ὥς 
φησιν; καὶ πῶς μέσον τῶν κινήσεων καὶ τῶν 
στάσεων ἀναφαίνεται; ἢ ὡς πρὸ ἀμφοῖν. Ἀπ’ 
αὐτοῦ γοῦν, φησίν, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἡ γένεσις. 
What is this sudden and what is the timeless? 
That was the eighth issue. Is it the eternal of 
the soul and its very being, as [Proclus] says? 
And how can it manifest itself between the 
motions and the rests? He answers: insofar as 
it is anterior to both; at least, that is from it, he 
says, and around it that the becoming 
proceeds.243 
 
As Trouillard has perfectly seen244, a brief passage of Proclus’ commentary on Timaeus 
can sustain Damascius’ testimony: 
 
In Tim, III 215.17-23: ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἅμα 
τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄλυτον καὶ τίθησι πάλιν διὰ 
τῆς τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀναιρέσεως· τὰ γὰρ 
μέσα τοιαύτην ἔλαχε φύσιν, οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένην 
τὸν τῶν ἄκρων λόγον καὶ πάλιν ἀμφότερα 
δοκοῦσαν περιέχειν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις καὶ τὴν 
ψυχὴν ἀμέριστόν τε ἅμα καλοίη καὶ μεριστὴν 
ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὖσαν, καὶ οὔτε ἀμέριστον οὔτε 
μεριστὴν ὡς τῶν ἄκρων ἐξηλλαγμένην· 
For the Demiurge takes away from them 
together the immortal and the indissoluble, and 
again confers these on them through a 
subversion of their opposites. For media are 
allotted this nature, not receiving the nature of 
the extremes, and appearing to comprehend the 
whole of both. Just as if some one should call 
the soul together impartible and partible, as 
consisting of both, and neither impartible, nor 
partible, as being different from the 
extremes.245 
  
  So, it must be noted that the kinematic aspect of Proclean ἐξαίφνης has hidden a deepest 
understanding of the Third Hypothesis. Indeed, the fact that In Tim, III 215.17.23 and the 
σκοπός of the Third Hypothesis are closely linked is blindingly obvious, given that, at 
least from Plotinus, the soul is understood as being both one-and-many246 (following 
Timaeus, 35a) and neither-many-nor-one (following Parm, 155e-156a). In Tim, III 
215.17.23 shows us that the logical status of the ‘sudden’ has actually been transferred 
from his original background to the intermediary soul whose Proclus says that its φύσις 
consists to be neither divisible nor divisible, and both divisible and indivisible – that is to 
say: neither A nor ¬A, and both A and ¬A. Thus, in a sense, the soul ‘puts away’ or 
‘destroys-and-preserves’ both the contrary states. In Proclus (and, as we will see, in 
Damascius), there is a kind of ‘proto-Hegelian’ understanding of the soul by virtue of its 
function of mediation between the indivisible higher principles and the divisible bodies247. 
Such a ‘proto-Hegelian’ overtone should be qualified however, given that this logical 
description of the soul is only due to the difficulty for understanding his ‘strange’ 
 
242 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 29.1-5 
243 In absence of any English translation available, those of Damascius’ commentary are my 
own, although they follow very closely the French translation of Westerink and Combès. 
244 J. TROUILLARD, L’Un et l’âme selon Proclos, Les Belles Lettres, 1972, p. 152-154 
245 English translation (modified): Th. TAYLOR (ed.), The Commentaries of Proclus on the 
Timaeus of Plato in Five Books, vol. 2, London, 1820, p. 349 
246 PLOTINUS, Enneads, IV 2 [4], 2.52-55, V 1 [10], 8.24-27 
247 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §190 
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intermediary and mixed nature248. Naturally, insofar as it is logically characterized by its 
neutrality (neither in A-state nor in ¬A-state), the ‘sudden’ constitutes a very good 
candidate for expressing the psychic nature. 
  Following Damascius, it seems that Proclus would have brought the nature of the soul 
and the ‘sudden’ as follows: firstly, the ‘sudden’ would constitute the being of the soul, 
and, inasmuch as this being is eternal249, the ‘sudden’ is beyond the time; secondly, the 
‘sudden’ would be the dynamic kernel of the soul inasmuch as that is from the psychic 
‘sudden’ that the becoming spreads out, and with it his inherent alternation from a contrary 
to another, in such a way that the psychic ‘sudden’ can be said ‘anterior to the opposites’; 
thirdly, the logical status of the psychic ‘sudden’ is to be neither in A-state nor in ¬A-state 
(because the ‘sudden’ is anterior to them) and both A and ¬A (because they proceed from 
the ‘sudden’) at once; and fourthly, Proclus would illustrate the nature of the psychic 
‘sudden’ and its relation with the flow of becoming by the geometric image of a circle 
whose the psychic ‘sudden’ would be the centre and whose the becoming would be the 
periphery250. 
  Unfortunately, in the rest of his very inspired analysis of the ‘sudden’, Damascius gives 
us almost nothing about the detail of Proclus’ conflation between the soul and the 
‘sudden’, albeit he is not stingy with criticisms about the doctrine of his predecessor. His 
silence and his criticisms could easily be interpreted as a sign of the fact that Proclus’ 
conception was rationally unsatisfying, even for a Neoplatonist. 
  I shall argue that the key to understand the psychic ‘sudden’ can be found in Proclus’ 
kinetics (in this section, I’m focus only on the explanation of physical motion, laying aside 
the other kinds of motions allowed by Proclus, notably the intellectual one251). Proclus’ 
conception of motion is quite different from Plotinus’, in particular he departs from his 
predecessor on the meaning of αὐτοκίνητον. 
  In the Elements of Theology, Proclus had a threefold ‘Plotinian’ classification of motion 
that he borrows from the earlier Neoplatonic scholarship252 (and that Damascius will 
 
248 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 25.19-24 (on its intermediary nature, see: In Tim, II 127.26-132.3; 
on its mixed and homogenous nature, see: In Tim, II 149.25-29, 162.26-163.10, 166.17-19). 
On Proclus’ acceptance of the Law of Contradiction that is, for him, restricted to what of 
which there can be a possible propositional knowledge (therefore, not for the One and, 
probably, not for the soul), see: C. STEEL, “Beyond the Principle of Contradiction? Proclus’ 
‘Parmenides’ and the Origin of Negative Theology”, in H. VON MARTIN PICKAVÉ (ed.), 
Die Logik des Transzendantalen, de Gruyter, 2003, p. 581-599. For a brilliant formalization 
of Proclus’ logic, see: J. N. MARTIN, “Proclus and the Neoplatonic Syllogistic”, in Journal 
of Philosophical Logic, 30-3, 2001, p. 187-240 
249 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §191-192 
250 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 247.12, 20-25 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 29.5, 17-30.3). This 
image is confirmed by some texts of Proclus: PROCLUS, In Tim, II 130.27-28 
251 PROCLUS, In Parm, VII 1152.15-1172.26. The puzzle of the Neoplatonic ‘spiritual 
motion’ has been studied in depth in: S. E. GERSH, Κίνησις ἀκίνητος. A Study of Spiritual 
Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus, Brill, 1973, especially p. 7-26 and p. 111-117 (Gersh 
interprets those non-physical motions as being ‘dynamic logical relations’). See also: J. 
OPSOMER, “The Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on 
Movers and Divisibility”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and 
Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 191-192, p. 214-229 
252 As far as I know, before Proclus, such a terminology for this threefold classification can 
only be found in Apollinaris of Laodicea known for his Platonic erudition and its 
philosophical ability, in such a way that this terminology could at least go back to the 
teaching of some Middle-Platonist circle: GREGORY OF NYSSA, Antirrheticus adversus 
Apollinarium, III.1 192.9-23 and JUSTINIANUS, Contra Monophysitas, §61 in E. 
SCHWARTZ (ed.), Drei dogmatische Schriften Iustinians, München, 1939, p. 17 (= H. 
LIETZMANN (ed.), Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule. Texte und Untersuchungen, 
F. Marion – The ἐξαίφνης in the Platonic Tradition: from Kinematics to Dynamics 
 
39 
borrow too253), namely the distinction between intellective immobility (τὸ ἀκίνητον), the 
causative process of psychic self-mover (τὸ αὐτοκίνητον), and the sensible and extended 
process of the other-moved (τὸ ἑτεροκίνητον)254: 
 
Indivisibility Intellect: immobility (τὸ ἀκίνητον) (dynamics) Soul: self-mover (τὸ αὐτοκίνητον) 
Divisibility Body: other-moved (τὸ ἑτεροκίνητον) (kinematics) 
 
  But, in other works, Proclus had a more elaborated hierarchy that respects more the 
Principle of Continuity in the course of the procession from the One to the matter255. This 
principle means that “since the processions of beings leave no void, even less so than do 
the positions of bodies; everywhere there are intermediate natures between the extremes, 
which provide their connection with one another”256. We can schematize this second 
hierarchy as follows257: 
 
Indivisibility Intellect: unmoved mover dynamics 
Soul: self-mover and self-moved dynamics & kinematics 
Divisibility Nature: mover and moved Body: moved and no mover kinematics 
 
  These two classifications are not mutually exclusive, since Proclus links them together 
in his commentary on Timaeus258. However, their conflation is not devoid of trouble. 
 
Tübingen, 1904, frg. 74, 107, p. 222, p. 232). On Apollinaris the Younger, see: E. 
MÜLHENBERG, Apollinaris von Laodicea, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969 
253 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 29.25-37.2, 261.15-267.8 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1986, p. 42.9-53.28; 
vol. 3, 1991, p. 70.1-78.24). See also: SIMPLICIUS, In Epict. Ench, 1.84-144, 433-441, 
38.310-326. This threefold classification can also be found in Hermias, Priscianus, 
Olympiodorus, Philoponus, and, of course, in many Byzantine Platonizers, for instance in 
Michael Psellus and John Italus. See: I. HADOT, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: 
Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978, p. 168 
254 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §14, §20 
255 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, I 14 60.20, 61.19-22. On the Principle of Continuity, see: 
Elements of Theology, §28, Platonic Theology, III 2 6.21-24, In Tim, I 378.22-379.9, De 
providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis, §20. On the meaning of the Proclean multiplication 
of intermediary-entities, see: J. TROUILLARD, “Le sens des médiations proclusiennes”, in 
Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 55-47, 1957, p. 331-342 and La Mystagogie de Proclos, 
Les Belles Lettres, 1982, p. 71-80. On the importance of such a Principle of Continuity for 
the ‘Chain of Beings’, see: A. O. LOVEJOY, The Great Chain of Beings, Harvard University 
Press, 1936, p. 50-66, and for its Iamblichean origin: E. R. DODDS (ed.), Proclus. The 
Elements of Theology, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1963, p. xxi-xxii. By the way, Th. 
WHITTAKER, The Neo-Platonists. A Study in the History of Hellenism, Cambridge 
University Press, 1918, p. 288 has suggested that Leibniz’ reflections on the continuum are 
partially influenced by his readings of the Neoplatonists. Then, such a suggestion has been 
followed in: J. TROUILLARD, “La Monadologie de Proclus”, in Revue Philosophique de 
Louvain, 57-55, 1959, p. 309-320 
256 PROCLUS, De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis, §20 (a little modified). English 
translation: C. STEEL (ed.), Proclus. On Providence, Bloomsbury, 2007, p. 51 (see also: B. 
STROBEL, Proklos. Tria Opuscula. Textkritisch kommentierte Retroversion der 
Übersetzung Wilhelms von Moerbeke, de Gruyter, 2014, p. 670) 
257 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, I 14, In Tim, II 151.24-27, In Parm, III 795.33-35. On the 
four-part classification of the levels of reality, see: E. R. DODDS (ed.), Proclus. The 
Elements of Theology, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 16-17, p. 201 and S. E. GERSH, 
Κίνησις ἀκίνητος. A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus, Brill, 1973, p. 
106-111 
258 PROCLUS, In Tim, I 373.4-18 
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  The three-part hierarchy emphasizes a strong separation between the sensible realm and 
the levels which are beyond by marking a symmetric boundary between dynamics and 
kinematics. In this way, such a division is in total agreement with Plato’s teaching259. On 
the other hand, the four-part hierarchy sounds a little less Platonic. Indeed, it appears that 
Proclus’ physics is potentially platonically problematic, given that Proclus does not 
separate too drastically dynamics’ and kinematics’ realms. Furthermore, even if Proclus 
claims that only incorporeals are really causative260, he seems to endorse entirely 
Aristotle’s kinematics, as it is obvious in the Elements of Physics (of course, that does not 
mean either that Proclus says that Aristotle’s and Plato’s kinetics are utterly devoid of any 
difference261, or that the Elements of Physics are devoid of any Neoplatonic ingredient262). 
Insofar as Plato and Aristotle made opposing choices in regard to the principles, the 
Neoplatonic realization of their harmonization can only be very difficult, especially in 
physics. Such a difficulty explains the weakness and the ad-hoc characteristic of some 
Neoplatonic attempts, for instance the Simplicius’ terminological one on the self-
motion263. That is clear that Proclus does not avoid the pitfall of Platonic heterodoxy with 
his four-part classification, inasmuch as such a hierarchy implies that the Aristotelian 
kinematics (more precisely: Phys, 8.4-5264) sets the tone to the distinction of the 
subordinated ontological levels265. 
  For Proclus, the soul is both αὐτοκίνητον266 and αὐθυπόστατον267. This last characteristic 
means that although the soul is not really a self-causative entity (by virtue of its 
dependence on the Demiurge268), even so the soul remains highly active in its own process 
of constitution in the course of which the soul collaborates with its demiurgic cause, in 
 
259 J. VUILLEMIN, “The Systems of Plato and Aristotle Compared as to their Contribution 
to Physics”, in W. SPOHN, B. C. VAN FRAASSEN, B. SKYRMS (eds.), Existence and 
Explanation. Essays presented in Honor of Karel Lambert, Springer, 1991, p. 197-201 
260 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §80 
261 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 404.16-33. See: C. STEEL, “Why Should We Prefer Plato’s 
Timaeus to Aristotle’s Physics? Proclus’ Critique of Aristotle’s Causal Explanation of the 
Physical World”, in R. W. SHARPLES, A. SHEPPARD (eds.), Ancient Approaches to Plato’s 
Timaeus, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Suppl. 78, London, 2003, p. 175-187 
262 See: J. OPSOMER, “The Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: 
Proclus on Movers and Divisibility”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), 
Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 193-203 
263 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 421.3-422.9, 1247.27-1250.31. On Simplicius and the ideal of 
harmonization when he discussed kinetics: P. GOLITSIS, Les Commentaires de Simplicius 
et Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. Tradition et innovation, de Gruyter, 2008, p. 114-121 
264 Indeed, the kinematics of the Laws neglects the distinction between ‘unmoved mover’ 
and ‘self-mover’: PLATO, Laws, X 893b-894d 
265 On the Aristotelianism of Proclus’ physics and its problems, see: J. OPSOMER, “The 
Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and 
Divisibility”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of 
Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 189-229 
266 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §20, In Alc, 225.14-226.8 
267 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §191. On the notion of αὐθυπόστατον, see: PROCLUS, 
Elements of Theology, §40-52; E. R. DODDS (ed.), Proclus. The Elements of Theology, 
Oxford Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 223-224 and J. WHITTAKER, “The Historical Background 
of Proclus’ doctrine of the αὐθυπόστατα”, in H. DÖRRIE (ed.), De Jamblique à Proclus, 
Vandoeuvres/Geneva, 1975, p. 193-237. On the two properties of self-motion and self-
constitution, see: C. STEEL, “Proklos über Selbstreflexion und Selbsbegründung”, in M. 
PERKAMS, R. M. PICCIONE (eds.), Proklos. Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik, Brill, 2006, 
p. 230-255 
268 The causal dependence of the soul on the Intellect is explicit in: PROCLUS, Elements of 
Theology, §193 (see: §76) and In Tim, II 119.29-132.3 
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such a way that the soul can be said both constituted by itself and constituted by another269. 
In the same way, its self-motion is subordinated to the immobility of its intellective 
efficient cause270, as if there is a residue of passivity into the being of the soul. Such a 
suspicion is strengthened by the fact that, following a distinction found in Aristotle’s 
Physics271, Proclus claims that the soul is not an unmoved mover, but only a self-mover 
and self-moved. If so, given that the Aristotelian analysis of physical self-motion involves 
at least a conceptual differentiation into the αὐτοκίνητον between an active-mover and a 
passive-moved ‘parts’272, Proclus seems to accept a genuine passivity of the spiritual 
soul273. Of course, Proclus has tried to escape such an awkward consequence, by a 
conflation between self-motion and reversion (i.e. self-thinking) that involves the identity 
of the passive-moved with the active-mover ‘parts’274 (which is permitted by its 
incorporeality275), but this solution permits only to avoid the mereological fragmentation 
of the soul, surely not the fact that its self-activity goes hand in hand with a kind of self-
passivity276. And nothing is more foreign to Plato’s thought277. Thus, when Proclus claims, 
along with Plotinus, that the soul is in itself unaffectable or impassive, contrary to its 
faculties and its acts278, he would presumably be incoherent with his own theory of 
αὐτοκίνησις. But, in fact, in other texts, firstly Proclus rejects forcefully the Plotinian view 
 
269 M. RASHED, “Proclus, commentaire perdu sur la Palinodie du Phèdre: vestiges 
byzantins”, in L’héritage aristotélicien. Textes inédits de l’Antiquité, Les Belles Lettres, 
2016, p. 500-504 
270 PROCLUS, In Eucl, 32.7-13, Platonic Theology, I 14 60.23-61.1. To some extent, the 
puzzle arises from the fact that intellective causation – and, consequently, self-motion – is 
an efficient causation and not only a final one – in other words, Intellect and Soul are 
ποιητικαὶ αἰτίαι. On this point, see: J. OPSOMER, “The Integration of Aristotelian Physics 
in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and Divisibility”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. 
TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, 
p. 191-192, p. 198-200, p. 206-207 and C. STEEL, “Aristote et Proclus sur la causalité 
efficiente de l’Intellect divin”, in J. PEPIN, H. D. SAFFREY (eds.), Proclus: Lecteur et 
interprète des Anciens, CNRS, 1987, p. 213-225 
271 ARISTOTLE, Phys, 8.5 256b27-258b9 (for a commentary on this section, see: D. BLYTH, 
Aristotle’s Ever-turning World in Physics 8: Analysis and Commentary, Brill, 2016, p. 104-
159) 
272 ARISTOTLE, Phys, 8.5 257a31-258b4 
273 On this point, see: J. OPSOMER, “The Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a 
Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and Divisibility”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. 
TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, 
p. 191-192, p. 203-209 and S. MENN, “Self-motion and reflection: Hermias and Proclus on 
the harmony of Plato and Aristotle on the soul”, in J. WILBERDING, Ch. HORN (eds.), 
Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature, Oxford Clarendon Press, 2012, p. 57-58 
274 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §17. See: J. OPSOMER, “The Integration of 
Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and Divisibility”, in R. 
CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek 
Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 208-209 and S. MENN, “Self-motion and reflection: Hermias 
and Proclus on the harmony of Plato and Aristotle on the soul”, in J. WILBERDING, Ch. 
HORN (eds.), Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature, Oxford Clarendon Press, 2012, 
p. 60 
275 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §15 
276 PROCLUS, In Tim, II 147.33-148.2 
277 For this Platonic thesis in Plotinus, see: PLOTINUS, Enneads, III 6 [26], 1-5, IV 4 [28] 
13.22-25 and Ch. I. NOBLE, “Plotinus’ Unaffectable Soul”, in Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, 51, 2016, p. 231-281 
278 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 330.9-331.2 and in his commentary on the Enneads as it appears 
in: M. PSELLUS, De omnifaria doctrina, §33.12-14 
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on psychic absolute impassivity279, and, secondly, seems to restrain the impassivity for the 
substantiality of the soul, keeping quiet about the other superficial kinds of change280. 
  For Plato and, more clearly, for Plotinus, as we have seen, the soul is entirely active, 
inasmuch as the causative self-motion is a complete ἐνέργεια outside space and time, in 
other words, without residual potentiality. In this sense, the Platonic soul is closest to 
Aristotle’s unmoved mover than to Aristotle’s self-mover. Thus, the soul entirely belongs 
to dynamics, and kinematics is just concerned with the sensible bodies. The state of affairs 
is quite different for Proclus. Indeed, the passivity of the soul – that can maybe be 
authorized by some passages of the Phaedrus and of the Laws however281 – forces the soul 
into kinematics (even if that is only a weird kind of spiritual kinematics282 of which the 
physical kinematics would be the offspring283). And this is not avoided by the fact that the 
force acting on the soul is the soul itself, Proclus’ physics actually entails that the soul 
belongs both to dynamics and kinematics, or, in other words, that the soul is both its own 
cause and its own effect284. They are not alone, the beings of the next level – namely the 
enmattered entities (as the enmattered forms and qualities) referring to the level of 
Nature285 – are still motive forces286, in such a way that they are both dynamic and 
kinematic items too. This confusion between dynamics’ and kinematics’ realms287 is not 
without important repercussion on Proclus’ understanding of ἐξαίφνης qua ‘eternal of the 
soul’. 
  Albeit its being is outside of time, the activity of the soul unfolds in time288, while the 
preceding (intellective) levels of reality have both their beings and their activities in 
 
279 PROCLUS, In Alc, 227.2-228.7 
280 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, I 19 93.7-12: Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχικὴ διακόσμησις ἀεὶ 
κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἑστῶσαν κεκτῆσθαι, καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγεται, πάντῃ γάρ ἐστιν ἀπαθὴς 
κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας εἰς χρόνον παρεκτεινομένας ἔχει καί, ὥς φησιν ὁ ἐν 
Φαίδρῳ Σωκράτης, ἄλλοτε ἄλλα νοεῖ νοητὰ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλοις εἴδεσιν γίνεται 
περιπορευομένη τὸν νοῦν. See also: Elements of Theology, §76, §193. On Proclus and the 
substantial impassivity of the soul, see: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul 
in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 46-47, p. 
69-73 
281 PLATO, Phaedrus, 245c-d (see: c7-8 and d7), Laws, X 894c-d. See: J. OPSOMER, “The 
Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and 
Divisibility”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of 
Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 191-192, p. 190, n.7 
282 PROCLUS, In Eucl, 18.22-24, In Parm, VII 1157.2-28 
283 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, I 14 63.10-14 
284 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §46 
285 PROCLUS, In Tim, I 10.13-11.20, II 25.6-23, 139.17-30. On this level, see: Ch. HELMIG, 
“Die atmende Form in der Materie. Einige Überlegungen zum ἔνυλον εἶδος in der 
Philosophie des Proklos”, in M. PERKAMS, R. M. PICCIONE (eds.), Proklos. Methode, 
Seelenlehre, Metaphysik, Brill, 2006, p. 259-278 and J. OPSOMER, “The Integration of 
Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and Divisibility”, in R. 
CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek 
Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 210-213. Sometimes, Proclus ascribes a lesser kind of self-
motion to Nature, see: In Tim, I 12.20-25. On the other hand, sometimes, the enmattered 
forms are just described as other-moved, see: Platonic Theology, IV 19 55.26-56.3 
286 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, I 14 62.1-12 
287 Perfectly seen by Opsomer: J. OPSOMER, “The Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a 
Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and Divisibility”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. 
TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, 
p. 213 
288 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §191, In Tim, II 128.18-19, Platonic Theology, I 14 
66.21-22 
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eternity289, and while the following levels of reality, namely the physical ones, have their 
being and their activities in time290. By this way, the soul expresses very well its 
intermediary nature consisting to be both a being and a becoming291. That has never been 
remarked that the Proclean distinction between the eternal ὄν of the soul and its temporal 
γένεσις has a ‘family-likeness’ with the Leibnizian distinction between vis and actio292. 
Of course, there is a great difference however, namely the fact that Leibniz integrates a 
principle of equivalence between full cause and entire effect within his dynamics, while 
Proclus respects the classic Neoplatonic doctrine of causation according to which the 
effect is always weaker than its cause293. 
  What means the distinction between force and action? This innovation of the years 1689-
1690 constitutes the final step of Leibniz’s analysis of motion. Before, at least since the 
dynamic turn of De Concursu corporum294 that succeed to the writing of the Pacidius 
Philalethi, Leibniz was focused on the force acting on the bodies rather than on their 
motions understood kinematically (viz. as trajectories analysed in geometrical or 
topological fashions). From then on, these corporeal motions are confined to the level of 
appearance, losing their status of genuine being, in such a way that the ‘true’ science of 
motion becomes dynamics, lowering kinematics at a lesser scientific rank. That Leibniz’s 
move is highly Platonizing is blindingly obvious295. Yet, there is more. Indeed, the 
difference between force and action overlaps the Proclean differentiation between the 
being of the soul and its temporal activity. This final step of Leibniz’s dynamics appears 
 
289 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §104, §106, §169, Platonic Theology, I 14 66.23-26 
290 PROCLUS, In Parm, III 795.25-796.11 
291 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §50, §107 
292 On the difference and its metaphysical implications, see. A. ROBINET, Architectonique 
disjonctive, automates systémiques et idéalité transcendantale dans l’Œuvre de G. W. 
Leibniz, Vrin, 1986, p. 253-283, p. 357-360 
293 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §7, §27. See: E. R. DODDS (ed.), Proclus. The 
Elements of Theology, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 193-194 and A. C. LLOYD, “The 
Principle That the Cause Is Greater than Its Effect”, in Phronesis, 21-2, 1976, p. 146-156 
294 G. W. LEIBNIZ, De Concursu corporum (written in 1678 and edited in: M. FICHANT 
(ed.), G. W. Leibniz. La réforme de la dynamique. De corporum concursu (1678) et autres 
textes inédits, Vrin, 1994, p. 69-337). See: A. ROBINET, Architectonique disjonctive, 
automates systémiques et idéalité transcendantale dans l’Œuvre de G. W. Leibniz, Vrin, 
1986, p. 211-225. Some aspects of this work – in particular, the principle of equivalence 
between full cause and entire effect – have already been anticipated in the proto-dynamical 
De Arcanis Motus of 1676: G. W. LEIBNIZ, De Arcanis motus et Mechanica ad puram 
Geometriam reducendam (written in spring 1676 and edited in: H.-J. HESS, “Die 
unveröffentlichten naturwissenschafttlichen und technischen Arbeiten von G. W. Leibniz 
aus der Zeit seines Parisaufenthaltes”, in Leibniz à Paris (1671-1676), Studia Leibnitiana 
Suppl. 17, Wiesbaden, 1978, p. 202-205). See: A. ROBINET, Architectonique disjonctive, 
automates systémiques et idéalité transcendantale dans l’Œuvre de G. W. Leibniz, Vrin, 
1986, p. 201-204 
295 Chiaradonna had already remarked that Plotinus’ physics seems highly proto-leibnizian, 
or, likely, Leibniz seems very Platonizing: R. CHIARADONNA, “Energeia et kinesis chez 
Plotin et Aristote (Enn. VI 1, [42], 16, 4-19)”, in M. CRUBELLIER, A. JAULIN, D. 
LEFEBVRE, P.-M. MOREL (eds.), Dunamis. Autour de la puissance chez Aristote, Peeters, 
2008, p. 485 n. 33. On Leibniz and Platonism, see: P. SCHRECKER, “Leibniz and the 
Timaeus”, in The Review of Metaphysics, 4-4, 1951, p. 495-505; Y. BELAVAL, “Note sur 
Leibniz et Platon”, in Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses, 1, 1975, p. 49-54; Th. 
LEINKAUF, “Leibniz und Plato”, in Zeitsprünge. Forschungen zur Frühen Neuzeit, Bd. 13, 
2009, Heft 1/2, p. 23-45 and Ch. MERCER, Leibniz’s Metaphysics. Its Origins and 
Development, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 173-252 
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to be fully grown from the Essay in Dynamics (around 1700)296 in which Leibniz describes 
the action as being both the exercise of the force over time, and the product of the formal 
effect of motion and the velocity297. 
  Such differentiation between force and action is, of course, present only in a very 
inchoative way in Proclus. Insofar as the soul contains the causes of physical changes298, 
and deploys its activity over time, albeit his being is eternal, a parallel can be drawn, on 
the one hand, between vis and οὐσία, and, on the other, between actio and ἐνέργεια. In 
this way, the psychic οὐσία can be understood as the dynamic timeless kernel which 
stretches itself over time by its activity299. In fact, for Leibniz, in the first instance, only 
the action is estimated as a function of the length travelled by the moving body, while the 
observable force300 is estimated as a function of the receptivity of the body on which the 
force acts and of the manifest strength of its influence, but could be estimated by an 
omniscient mind as the result of the composition of all the individual psychic strengths. 
That is such individual primitive dynamic power that I overlap with Proclean souls. Thus, 
in a certain fashion, Leibniz was a Proclus’ follower rather than a Plotinus’ one, despite 
the harshness of his judgment about the philosophical ability of the Neoplatonist301. 
 
296 G. W. LEIBNIZ, Essay de dynamique sur les loix du mouvement, ou il est monstré, qu’il 
ne se conserve pas la même quantité de mouvement, mais la même force absolue, ou bien la 
même quantité de l’action motrice, GM VI 215-231 
297 GM VI 222. According to the demonstration and the notation of the Dynamica de 
Potentia et Legibus Naturae Corporeae (written in 1689-1690, GM VI 281-514), the 
definitions are as follows (GM VI 425-426): 
mass m 
time t 
velocity v 
length travelled l = v.t 
formal effect f = m.l = m.v.t 
force p = m.v2 
action a = f.v = m.l.v = m.v2.t = p.t 
 
298 PROCLUS, In Parm, VII 1157.26-28 
299 PROCLUS, In Tim, II 131.17-23: οὐκ ἄρα ἐξαρκεῖ τὸ λέγειν γενητὴν αὐτὴν τῷ μεριστῶς 
ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὁρᾶν, πῶς καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶναι τοῦτο προϋπάρχει τῆς ψυχῆς· ὁρᾶν, πῶς καὶ ἐν τῷ 
εἶναι τοῦτο προϋπάρχει τῆς ψυχῆς· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐνέργεια κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν 
προλαβοῦσαν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐνεργείας, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς κατὰ χρόνον ζωῆς ἐν τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ προείληφε τὸ σπέρμα πάσης οὔσης ψυχῆς κοινῆς· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ γίνεσθαι αὐτήν, οὐκ 
εἶναι μόνον.   
300 viz. the vis viva/impetus that is one of the two constituents of the vis derivativa 
activa/nisus (as another part, the vis mortua/conatus). Actio is estimated, in second instance, 
as being this vis viva deployed over time. The vis primitativa activa cannot be estimated in 
itself, because in the Corporeal World the influence of each vis primitativa is limited by the 
others. This taxonomy is perfectly and clearly explained by Leibniz in the Specimen 
Dynamicum pro admirandis Naturae Legibus circa corporum vires et mutuas actiones 
detegendis et ad suas causas revocandis (written in 1695, GM VI 234-254), see: GM VI 
236-239. On the classification of the dynamic levels in Leibniz, see: A. ROBINET, 
Architectonique disjonctive, automates systémiques et idéalité transcendantale dans 
l’Œuvre de G. W. Leibniz, Vrin, 1986, p. 253-283. Of course, laying aside these Leibnizian 
subtleties, I argue only that there is a ‘family-resemblance’ between the psychic οὐσία and 
the vis which should be understood as a vis primitativa activa, in other words, I make an 
ontological comparison. 
301 G. W. LEIBNIZ, Specimina Initiis Scientiae generalis addenda, GP VII 147-148 (piece 
also called ‘Ad constitutionem scientiae generalis: Contemplatio de historia literaria 
statuque praesenti eruditionis’, Akademie-Ausgabe, series 6, vol. 4a, Berlin, 1999, p. 479.4-
480.17), De Primae Philosophiae Emendatione, et de Notione Substantiae, GP IV 468, New 
Essays on Human Understanding, IV 2 §12 (Akademie-Ausgabe, series 6, vol. 6, Berlin, 
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  How such a parallel with Leibniz’ dynamics can to lighten the psychic ἐξαίφνης? Firstly, 
this parallel highlights the dynamic meaning of the psychic ‘sudden’. Secondly, that 
explains in what sense the soul by means of its acts is linked to kinematics. Indeed, to a 
certain extent, the action which is determined by a time-variable and the length travelled 
makes the connection of the new science of dynamics with the kinematics – given that the 
action can be estimated as a function of the force302 as well as a function of the quantity 
of motion303 which is soluble into the abstract kinematics of Cartesian Mechanics –, 
contrary to the force which is independent of time and belongs absolutely to dynamics304. 
  Someone could object that the activity of the soul takes place in a non-physical time, 
namely in a higher time proper to the psychic diacosm, in such a way that the activity of 
the soul does not share anything with the corporeal motions. Such an objection is actually 
very Plotinian, given that Plotinus strongly distinguishes between a non-quantitative 
psychic time and the physical time in which occur the motions of bodies305. Proclus, for 
 
1962, p. 371.20-21). In passing, Leibniz – who had read Proclus for the first time towards 
1661 under the supervision of Scherzer and Thomasius (first allusions to Proclus in Letter 
to Peter Lambeck, 22th November 1668, Akademie-Ausgabe, series 1, vol. 1, Berlin, 1986, 
p. 14.3 and Letter to Antoine Arnauld, November 1671, Akademie-Ausgabe, series 2, vol. 
1, Berlin, 2006, p. 282.29) – had an epistolary exchange with the librarians Mathurin 
Veyssière la Croze and Jean-Paul Bignon about the Latin manuscripts of the Tria opuscula 
and the Elements of Theology in AD 1712: Letter to Jean-Paul Bignon, 13th February 1712 
(Akademie-Ausgabe, series 1, Transkriptionen 1712, Berlin, forthcoming, p. 78.4-14), 4th 
June 1712 (Ibid. p. 221.11-24), 13th August 1712 (Ibid. p. 310.5-25), Letter to Mathurin 
Veyssière la Croze 17th March 1712 (Ibid. p. 128.2-14), 30th May 1712 (Ibid. p. 210.26-27). 
Some of these letters are also available in: L. DUTENS (ed.), Gothofredi Guillelmi Leibnitii. 
Opera Omnia, Geneva, 1768, vol. 5, p. 501-503. On Leibniz’s appreciation of Greek and 
Italian Platonisms, especially the Platonism of Marsilio Ficino, see: B. PINCHARD, “Mira 
et Mystica ou la raison hantée. Leibniz juge de la Renaissance”, in D. BERLIOZ, F. NEF 
(eds), L’actualité de Leibniz: les deux labyrinthes. Décade de Cerisy la Salle, 15-22 juin 
1995, Studia Leibnitiana Suppl. 34, Stuttgart, 1999, p. 119-151 
302 a = p.t = m.v2.t 
303 a = m.v.l 
304 In fact, even m.v2 is soluble in non-Cartesian kinematics. For instance, Huygens, who 
had always forcefully rejected all dynamic consideration, had replaced m.v by m.v2 in his 
atomist mechanics from 1669: Ch. HUYGENS, De Motu Corporum ex Percussione, prop. 
11, in Œuvres complètes, Martinus Nijhoff, vol. 16, 1929, p. 72-77 (on the edition of this 
posthumous treatise and the editorial problems of the Œuvres complètes, see: J. G. YODER, 
“Christiaan Huygens' Great Treasure”, in Tractrix, 3, 1991, p. 1-13, “The archives of 
Christiaan Huygens and his Editors”, I, M. HUNTER (ed.), Archives of the Scientific 
Revolution: The Formation and Exchange of Ideas in Seventeenth-Century Europe, Boydell 
Press, 1998, p. 91-107, A Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Christiaan Huygens including a 
concordance with his Œuvres complètes, Brill, 2013 and M. G. MORMINO, “Sur quelques 
problèmes éditoriaux concernant l'œuvre de Christiaan Huygens”, in Revue d’histoire des 
sciences, 56-1, 2003, p. 145-151). On Huygens’ kinematics, see: A. E. BELL, Christian 
Huygens and the Development of Science in the Seventeenth Century, Edward Arnold & Co, 
1947, p. 109-116 and F. CHAREIX, “La découverte des lois du choc par Christiaan 
Huygens”, in Revue d’histoire des sciences, 56-1, 2003, p. 15-58. On the influence of 
Huygens’ understanding of m.v2 in the later debates between Leibnizian and Newtonian 
physicists, see: P. M. HARMAN, “Dynamics and Intelligibility: Bernouilli and MacLaurin”, 
in R. S WOOLHOUSE (ed.), Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries. Essays in honour of Gerd Buchdahl, Kluwer Academic, 1988, p. 213-
225 
305 R. CHIARADONNA, “Il tempo misura del movimento? Plotino e Aristotele (Enn. III 7 
[45])”, in M. BONAZZI, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Platone e la tradizione platonica. Studi di 
filosofia antica, Cisalpino, 2003, p. 221-250 and “Energeia et kinesis chez Plotin et Aristote 
(Enn. VI 1, [42], 16, 4-19)”, in M. CRUBELLIER, A. JAULIN, D. LEFEBVRE, P.-M. MOREL 
(eds.), Dunamis. Autour de la puissance chez Aristote, Peeters, 2008, p. 486-487 
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his part, is very clear on the fact that the time of psychic activity is the same of the one of 
corporeal motions306. Furthermore, this common time is twofold: souls and bodies are 
enfolded both by the hypercosmic and the encosmic times307. Thus, as long as the division 
into the soul between eternal being and temporal activity is genuinely Platonic308, by 
denying own time for the soul309, Proclus introduces a tension between dynamics and 
kinematics inside the soul itself. If so, there is also an internal tension in Proclus’ 
understanding of ἐξαίφνης. 
  Before suggesting a solution for this, that seems useful to sum up the views of Proclus 
set forth above: 
  1. Proclus always employs the word ἐξαίφνης with a kinematic meaning, namely a 
durationless switch that imitates the eternity of some beings. Consequently, Proclus 
considers such a suddenness as a property of non-sensible items – especially the Forms 
and the souls –, insofar as they come into the sensible world and leave from the sensible 
world without any duration. 
  2. The logical status of the ‘sudden’ is also transferred to the nature of the soul. The 
‘sudden’ is not only durationless but now outside of time (since it is the eternal of the soul, 
so its being), and consequently its function ceases to be kinematic to become dynamic: as 
an element of the psychic nature, the ‘sudden’ is closely linked to the psychic self-motion, 
especially as the flow of becoming occurs from and around it. However, on the one hand, 
Proclus’ understanding of αὐτοκίνησις qua reversion involves a kind of self-passivity, and 
on the other, αὐτοκίνησις qua psychic activity occurs in time and, consequently, can be 
compared with the physical motions. In other words, Proclus’ theory of motion entails 
that, to some extent, self-motion can be studied by kinematics, in the same way that 
qualitative and topologic changes are studied by the same theory in Aristotle’s physics310. 
Moreover, according to the anti-Plotinian doctrine of the inseparability of the soul from 
 
306 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 21.6-24.30, 54.18-55.1, 58.23-59.14, Elements of Theology, §198-
200 
307 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 25.11-32.16, 53.6-59.14 
308 PLOTINUS, Enneads, IV 4 [28], 15-17. Plotinus claims that only the affections and the 
<corporeal> outputs of the soul (viz. the physical process of the bodies) are enfolded by the 
physical time. See IV 4 [28], 15.16-17: ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάθη αὐτῶν 
ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ποιήματα, and IV 4 [28], 16.4-9: Ἢ ἐν τοῖς ποιουμένοις τὸ πρότερον καὶ 
παρεληλυθός, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ οὐδὲν παρεληλυθός, ἀλλὰ πάντες οἱ λόγοι ἅμα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. Ἐν 
δὲ τοῖς ποιουμένοις τὸ οὐχ ἅμα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ὁμοῦ, καίτοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὸ ὁμοῦ, οἷον 
χεῖρες καὶ πόδες οἱ ἐν λόγῳ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς χωρίς. The activity of the soul, for its part, 
takes place in a more logical ‘time’ that Plotinus describes with a lot of metaphors in IV 4 
[28], 16.9-31. 
309 Proclus alludes to a ‘psychic time’ only in two short passages: PROCLUS, In Tim, II 
129.6-9, III 25.1. But, in the first, Proclus had surely in mind only the temporal aspect of the 
soul which permits to distinguish the soul from the higher levels of being; and, in the second, 
Proclus refutes a concurrent exegesis that links together the ‘psychic time’ and the Circle of 
the Other. His rejection of a genuine ‘psychic time’ is, of course, due to the fact that he 
closely follows Iamblichus’ anti-Plotinian reaction. Contrary to Plotinus who had 
established the ‘primary time’ at the level of World-Soul (see: III 7 [45], 11-13), Iamblichus 
had elevated the ‘primary time’ from the level of the Soul to that of the Intellect (see: 
SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 792.20-795.3). Simplicius was perfectly aware that Proclus had just 
followed Iamblichus (In Phys, 795.4-26). This Neoplatonic history is efficiently summarized 
in: P. DUHEM, Le Système du Monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à 
Copernic, Hermann, vol. 1, 1913, p. 246-263 and S. SAMBURSKY, S. PINES (eds.), The 
Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism. Texts with Translation, Introduction and Notes, 
Jerusalem, 1971, p. 11-17 
310 ARISTOTLE, Phys, 7.4 
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its primary ὄχημα311, which has both figure (σχῆμα) and magnitude (μέγεθος)312, such a 
spiritual kinematics is directly ‘translated’ into the sensible world by the motions of its 
congenital vehicle, and therefore becomes susceptible of a geometrical examination313. 
  The puzzle immediately arises: these two understandings of the ἐξαίφνης are simply not 
compatible. Even more, these two conceptions hardly reconcilable are both present in the 
same writing, namely into In Parm (view 1 in IV 844.2-11, view 2 in Proclus’ commentary 
on the Third Hypothesis), the conflict is just barely dodged by the fact that the kinematic 
one does not explain the embodiment of the souls but solely the coming of the Forms into 
the sensible realm. Additionally, the passage of the Sixteenth Dissertation in which 
Proclus refers to the Third Hypothesis clearly supports the view 1, while the Third 
Hypothesis should bear the view 2. Admittedly and in spite of the lack of chronological 
precision, the fact remains that the Sixteenth Dissertation dedicated to the Myth of Er 
surely was written before In Parm (given that Proclus never alludes to In Parm, except in 
the Platonic Theology314, in such a way that In Parm had probably been written around 
AD 470-475315). That is maybe enough for supporting the view according to which Proclus 
would have modified his interpretation of the ἐξαίφνης between the two redactions. For 
instance, while he was commenting on the Third Hypothesis, the exegetical and post-
Plotinian pressure which imposes to connect the text with the nature of the soul would 
have led him for transferring the ‘sudden’ from kinematics to dynamics to link together 
more closely the αὐτοκίνητον and the ἐξαίφνης. Indeed, the fact that Proclus alludes very 
explicitly to a precise passage of the Parmenides without mentioning his own teaching on 
this dialogue should likely be interpreted as the fact that, when he was writing these lines 
and the Sixteenth Dissertation, he did not still comment the Parmenides316. But, any 
 
311 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §196 
312 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §209-210 
313 On the doctrine of the vehicle and its link with geometry, see: A. LERNOULD, “Le statut 
ontologique des objets géométriques dans l’In Euclidem de Proclus”, in P. D’HOINE, A. 
MICHALEWSKI (eds.), Etudes platoniciennes, 7, 2011, p. 119-144, “Imagination and 
Psychic Body: Apparitions of the Divine and Geometric Imagination according to Proclus”, 
in K. CORRIGAN, T. RASIMUS (eds.), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World. 
Essays in Honour of John D. Turner, Brill, 2013, p. 595-607. For a geometrical illustration 
of the ‘psychic locomotion’, see: In Tim, II 242.24-246.11 
314 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, I 10 41.7-9, 22-23, I 13 59.2-5, II 10 61.13-18, III 23 83.6-
10, VI 24 110.13-15, 113.4-6, 114.19-22. See: C. LUNA, A.-Ph. SEGONDS (eds.), Proclus. 
Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, vol. 1, Les Belles Lettres, 2007, p. xxxii-xxxiv 
315 See: C. LUNA, A.-Ph. SEGONDS (eds.), Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de 
Platon, vol. 1, Les Belles Lettres, 2007, p. xiv-xix 
316 The only sure fact is that the Sixteenth Dissertation had been written after In Tim, since 
Proclus refers twice to In Tim (In Remp, II 220.9-11, 335.19-20). Following Marinus’ 
testimony (MARINUS, Life of Proclus, 13.14-17), Proclus would had written a first version 
of In Tim at the age of twenty-seven, so in AD 439 (H. D. SAFFREY, A.-Ph. SEGONDS, C. 
LUNA (eds.), Marinus. Proclus ou sur le bonheur, Les Belles Lettres, 2001, p. 16 n.12). In 
Tim is itself anterior to In Parm (given that In Parm refers many times to In Tim: In Parm, 
III 802.2-5, 812.21-27, 819.30-31, IV 925.9-20, VII 1235.29-36, and C. LUNA, A.-Ph. 
SEGONDS (eds.), Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, vol. 1, Les Belles 
Lettres, 2007, p. xx-xxiii). Therefore, the Sixteenth Dissertation should be written between 
AD 439 and 470. That is, of course, a very extended period. To reduce it, that is possible to 
follow Lamberton who has suggested that the Athenian School had got away from the 
Iamblichean curriculum of Platonic dialogues that every Platonic scholar should follow, 
notably by introducing the commentary of the Myth of Er, see: R. LAMBERTON (ed.), 
Proclus the Successor on Poetics and the Homeric Poems. Essays 5 and 6 of His 
Commentary on the Republic of Plato, Society of Biblical Literature, 2012, p. xv (on the 
Iamblichean curriculum, see: Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, 26.13-44, 
M. DUNN, “Iamblichus, Thrasyllus, and the Reading Order of the Platonic Dialogues”, in 
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chronological consideration, whatever its subtlety, is not enough for deducing by itself a 
doctrinal evolution. It is highly preferable not to resort to such an expedient, and to try, as 
far as possible, to dissolve the supposed incompatibility by finding a mean of harmonizing 
the two views. 
  Another very deflationist – but also unsatisfying – solution would consist in sur-
interpreting the lexical substitution of ἐξαίφνης in IV 844.6 by τῷ νῦν in IV 873.24 as the 
fact that Proclus had two concepts of ἐξαίφνης, namely the physical/kinematic and the 
psychic/dynamic. But, as I have argued, Proclus was both too Aristotelian and too 
Iamblichean for strongly separating the two realms, as the orthodox Platonisms did. 
  I argue that the best way to reconcile these two meanings of ἐξαίφνης is as follows: 
beyond the exegetical temptation to close together the ἐξαίφνης and the nature of the soul, 
Proclus considers that the logical neutrality of the ‘sudden’ and the fact that it is 
durationless can explain that, beyond the variety of the psychic acts occurring in time, the 
οὐσία of the soul remains the one and the same. Indeed, in the course of its activities, the 
eternal being of the soul is not present for a limited period but always, as if the being of 
the soul appears always ‘suddenly’ through the psychic activity317. For instance, if the 
activity of the soul as thinking corresponds to a ‘linear locomotion’ from a theorem to 
another318, then claiming that the soul remains one and the same in its being at each step 
 
R. BAINE HARRIS (ed.), The Signifiance of Neoplatonism, SUNY Press, 1976, p. 59-80; A.-
J. FESTUGIÈRE, “L’ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux V-VIe siècles”, Museum 
Helveticum, 26, 1969, p. 281-296; P. GOLITSIS, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et 
Philopon d’Aristote. Tradition et innovation, de Gruyter, 2008, p. 14-15 and L. G. 
WESTERINK, J. TROUILLARD, A.-Ph. SEGONDS (eds.), Prolégomènes à la philosophie de 
Platon, Les Belles Lettres, 1990, p. lxvii-lxxiii). If so, the lessons on the eschatological myth 
certainly would take place into the ‘theological’ step of the curriculum, namely between the 
lessons on Phaedrus-Symposium (Anonym. Proleg, 26.32-33) and the lesson on the Philebus 
(Anonym. Proleg, 26.21-23). But his argument for claiming that the Republic was 
scholastically taught in Proclus’ circle is only based on the fact that the Sixteenth essay 
consists of a sentence-by-sentence exegesis, contrary to the others. That is surely not enough 
to assert that Syrianus or Proclus had deviated from the Iamblichean model by including the 
study of the Myth of Er. Indeed, this section of the Republic had a long exegetical history, 
and Neoplatonic libraries held a lot of Middle-Platonist commentaries on it (a possible list: 
Derkyllides, Gaius, Albinus, Maximus of Nicea, Harpocration, Euclides, Clemens, Cronius, 
Taurus), in such a way that, more modestly, Proclus might have just in mind, beyond the 
inherent interests of Plato’s text, to continue the tradition, or to challenge the previous 
readings in the course of the always unsatisfied quenching of his thirst for Platonic 
knowledge. So, the only subsistence of an extended commentary of the Myth of Er is not 
enough to put us in mind that Proclus had perpetrated a kind of modification of the schedule 
in the course of his teaching. Moreover, a passage of the In Alc seems to indicate that Proclus 
scrupulously had followed Iamblichean curriculum (In Alc, 11.14-21). I think the mean 
objection against Lamberton’s conjecture remains the fact that the Iamblichean curriculum 
is only focused on the Platonic dialogues, whereas Proclus considers that it is not strictly 
speaking the literary form of the Republic and of the Laws (Anonym. Proleg, 26.5-9), in such 
a way that incorporating the Republic in the Iamblichean canon of Plato’s dialogues is just 
meaningless. Nevertheless, Proclus had surely taught the Myth of Er to his pupils, by virtue 
of its Platonic importance, but the form of such a teaching would have oscillated between 
very various ways. Thus, the weak accuracy of the chronology seems to be unavoidable. 
317 As Proclus would have said according to DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 262.12-13, 17-18 (= 
W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 29.5-6, 12-14) : καί πως πανταχοῦ κατ’ αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖ ἡ ψυχή; … 
Πρὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον, ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία πάρεστιν αἰώνιος οὖσα καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
ἐσχάτοις 
318 PROCLUS, In Parm, VII 1157.2-28 in which Proclus said that thinking is a ‘psychic 
locomotion’, and In Tim, II, 243.17-28 in which he said that this ‘psychic locomotion’ is 
like a geometric line (of course, an unextended one, see: In Tim, II 245.14-23). On the 
spiritual kinematics, see also: In Tim, II 124.17-19, 129.5-9 and J. OPSOMER, “The 
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of the process must mean that the soul is essentially neither identical to the departure 
theorem nor the arrival one, and that the soul is able to be both the one and the other, albeit 
successively.  That way, the being of the soul can be said, firstly, anterior to these theorems 
(ἢ ὡς πρὸ ἀμφοῖν319), in such a way that the soul appears to comprehend the whole of both 
(πάλιν ἀμφότερα δοκοῦσαν περιέχειν320), and, secondly, not receiving their nature into its 
being (οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένην τὸν τῶν ἄκρων λόγον321) but only in its self-‘generated’ acts 
which occur from and around its unchangeable οὐσία-ὕπαρξις (ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γοῦν καὶ περὶ 
αὐτοῦ ἡ γένεσις322). Such a position involves that what appears at each step of the thinking-
process is what is logically neutral in the soul, namely its being. And it appears in each 
period of the process, as small as this period is, in such a way that the duration of its 
coming must be smaller than any duration that can be given. Such an infinitesimal, smaller 
than any duration that can be assigned, can be said durationless. Precisely, this is what the 
ἐξαίφνης is323. Thus, one the one hand, the logical features of the soul and of the ‘sudden’ 
are highly similar, and, on the other, the coming of the being of the soul in each of its acts 
should be durationless, in such a way that the ‘sudden’ wonderfully expresses the co-
presence of the being of the soul with its activity throughout it, as varied as this activity 
is. In this way, the ἐξαίφνης keeps its kinematic meaning without losing all traces of 
dynamic overtone. Moreover, the suddenness of the self-coming of the soul imitates its 
eternity, in the same way that the sudden coming of the Forms into the sensible world 
imitates their eternal beings324. There is a great difference however. Indeed, the Forms 
have neither the same logical feature of the ‘sudden’, nor a similar natural ‘weirdness’. 
That is why the being of the soul is alone of which Proclus said that its eternal is the 
‘sudden’, because the soul shares much more with the ἐξαίφνης than the Forms. Hence 
such a denomination appears to be a metonymy rather than an identification. 
  At any rate, all this explanation of Proclus’ understanding of the ‘suddenness’ of the soul 
is compatible with Damascius’ laconic evidence: 
 
In Parm, 262.14-17325: Πῶς δὲ τὸ ἐξαίφνης 
ὁρᾶται καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, εἰ μόνη ἐστὶν ἡ 
οὐσία κατ’ αὐτὸν αἰώνιος; ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο 
εἴποι τις ἂν ὅτι εἴδωλον τοῦτο ἐκείνου εἰς τὰς 
<ιστὰς> ἐνεργείας πρόεισιν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰωνίου· 
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τὸ νῦν εἴδωλον αἰῶνος. 
How can the sudden also be in the activities, if, 
according to Proclus, only the being of the soul 
is eternal? To that, we can answer that the 
sudden proceeds in the activities from the 
eternal, as its image; indeed, in the bodies also 
the now is an image of eternity. 
 
  According to Damascius, Proclus would have distinguished between the psychic 
ἐξαίφνης and the physical νῦν. But the case of the coming of the Forms into the sensible 
world shows that he was not very rigorous with such a distinction. More probably, here, 
that is just a clarification: inasmuch as the ἐξαίφνης – used as a substantive and not as an 
 
Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and 
Divisibility”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of 
Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 227-228. 
319 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 262.10 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 29.4) 
320 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 215.20-21 
321 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 215.20 
322 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 262.10-11 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 29.4-5) 
323 In this way, Proclus’ conception of the ‘sudden’ would be in agreement with Cherniss 
who interprets the ἐξαίφνης as a kind of infinitesimal: H. F. CHERNISS, “Parmenides and 
the Parmenides of Plato”, in The American Journal of Philology, 53-2, 1932, p. 132 n. 25. 
Maybe, here, Proclus might be under the influence of Aristotle’s brief definition of the 
adverb ‘suddenly’, see: ARISTOTLE, Phys, 4.13 222b15-222b26 
324 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 844.10-12, 873.24-25 
325 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 29.8-12 
F. Marion – The ἐξαίφνης in the Platonic Tradition: from Kinematics to Dynamics 
 
50 
adverb – is understood as ‘what is coming suddenly’, the ‘sudden’ has the same relation 
of μίμησις with ‘what is eternal <in the soul>’ than the ‘now’ has with the ‘eternity’. 
 what	is	coming	suddenlywhat	is	eternal = 	 noweternity 
 
   This conception is in fine just a variation on Timaeus, 37d5-7 in which Plato defines 
time as the moving likeness of eternity. 
  To conclude, Proclus reconciles the two meanings of ἐξαίφνης, namely the terminus 
technicus and the terminus mysticus in a novel fashion. On the one hand, the suddenness 
of the coming is kept for the superior entities of its unbelievable theology, in such a way 
that the ‘sudden’ retains an irreducible mystical overtone326. On the other, despite a 
confusion – very little Platonic – between kinematics’ and dynamics’ realms which 
happens in the Psychic and Natural diacosms, the ‘sudden’ is rather a kinematic stuff, than 
a dynamic one, in such a way that the very meaning of the Third Hypothesis is not 
completely lost. The fact that the exegesis of the Third Hypothesis as focused on the nature 
of the soul does not entail a transfer of the ‘sudden’ from kinematics to dynamics must 
ultimately be explained, beyond the psychic blend of kinematics and dynamics, by the fact 
that Proclus distinguishes the temporal activity of the soul from its eternal being, and so 
must justify the co-presence of the soul with itself in the course of its activities. Such a 
requirement is specific to Syrianus’ students – as Hermias327 and Proclus –, by virtue of 
their rejection of any substantial change for the soul that entails a very peculiar 
understanding of αὐτοκίνησις. Therefore, his understanding of the ἐξαίφνης cannot be 
extended to his predecessors – as Iamblichus and Hierocles of Alexandria –  or to his 
successors – as Simplicius/Priscianus and Damascius –, inasmuch as they sustain the 
reverse Iamblichean thesis of the changing being of the souls328. 
 
  3.2.2. Damascius and the Dynamic ἐξαίφνης 
  Albeit Damascius has dedicated almost all his commentary on the Third Hypothesis to 
the nature of the ‘sudden’329, the word ἐξαίφνης rarely appears in his other works. 
Furthermore, Damascius always uses it as an adverb with a high mystical tone (sometimes 
with an obvious reference to the Seventh Letter), for instance: the sudden lighting of 
intelligible truth (i.e. the intellection of the Forms that necessarily occurs miraculously 
and suddenly by virtue of the limitation and the helplessness of the discursive 
investigation)330, the suddenness of the activity of some Intelligible-Intellective Gods331 
 
326 By the way, such a mystical overtone is highly corroborated by the Life of Proclus in 
which Marinus uses the word ἐξαίφηνς for the miraculous recoveries caused by Proclus 
(those of Telesphorus in §7 and Asklepigenia in §29). See also: §30 and §32 
327 HERMIAS, In Phaedr, 122.7-10. See: I. HADOT (ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur le 
Manuel d’Epictète, Brill, 1996, p. 107 
328 On this point, see: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later 
Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, especially p. 52-69 
(Iamblichus), p. 93-119 (Damascius), p. 142-154 (Priscianus). For Hierocles, see: I. HADOT 
(ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète, Brill, 1996, p. 83-107. See also, 
for the earlier Augustine: AUGUSTINE, De immortalitate animae, 6.12, Contra Secundinum, 
§15, De musica, VI 11.33, 13.40 
329 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 246.1-273.11 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 1.1-50.4) 
330 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 54.14-18 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1986, p. 82.3-9), 305.3-14 (= W&C, 
vol. 3, 1991, p. 141.3-19). On the limitation of the discursive thought in Damascius, see: C. 
METRY-TRESSON, L’aporie ou l’expérience des limites de la pensée dans le Péri Archôn 
de Damaskios, Brill, 2012 
331 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 95.12-15 (= W&C, vol. 2, 1997, p. 47.5-10) 
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(namely the Iynges of the Chaldean Oracles332 who correspond to the supracelestial place 
of Phaedrus, 243c3, at least since the exegesis of Proclus333). Damascius also follows 
Proclus on the suddenness of the coming of the Forms into the sensible world (after a 
durative overcoming of the material barriers that could prevent its reception), but, 
additionally, he compares such a suddenness to a magic trick334. Moreover, in the Vita 
Isidori, ἐξαίφνης is often employed for marking the surprise or the mysterious way by 
means of which an event happens335. In all these occurrences, Damascius has a kinematic 
understanding of the ‘sudden’ as a durationless switch. But, when he employs the word 
ἐξαίφνης as a substantive and not as an adverb in his commentary on the Third Hypothesis, 
the meaning of the ‘sudden’ changes radically. 
  In relation to Proclus, Damascius makes at once a return to Iamblichus and a return to 
Platonic orthodoxy: on the one hand, along Iamblichus, he maintains that the essence of 
the soul is neither outside of time nor immutable but, on the contrary, that the soul is 
subject to substantial change in the course of its procession and conversion336; on the other 
hand, it reacts against the Proclean kinetics by drawing a strong opposition between 
entities belonging to dynamics and those belonging to kinematics, taking Plato’s and 
Plotinus’ kinetics up again. 
  Indeed, Damascius supports the heavy lines of Platonic dynamics in his ‘archaeology’, 
namely the distinction between intellective immobility (τὸ ἀκίνητον), the causative 
process of psychic self-mover (τὸ αὐτοκίνητον)337, and the sensible and extended process 
of the other-moved (τὸ ἑτεροκίνητον)338, that is to say the ‘classic’ Neoplatonic scheme 
that Proclus had already supported in his Elements of Theology339. However, Damascius 
introduces several degrees of self-motion in accordance with the variety of the degree of 
separability from the body (under the influence of Phys, 8.5), in such a way that, for him, 
the irrational soul is only an ‘apparent self-mover’ while the rational soul is a ‘real self-
mover’340. In other words, the irrational soul is the formal cause of physical motions (by 
virtue of the ἐμψυχία, viz. the transmission of being alive341)  while the rational is their 
 
332 On the Iynges, see: H. LEWY, Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy. Mystic Magic and 
Platonism in the Later Roman Empire, Le Caire, 1956, p. 449-251 and R. MAJERCIK (ed.), 
The Chaldean Oracles. Text, Translation, and Commentary, Brill, 1989, p. 9-10 
333 H. LEWY, Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy. Mystic Magic and Platonism in the Later 
Roman Empire, Le Caire, 1956, p. 481-485 
334 DAMASCIUS, In Phil, 135.1-136.4 
335 DAMASCIUS, Vita Isidori, in PHOTIUS, Bibliotheca, cod. 242, 116.5 and 203.8 
336 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 252.6-257.2 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 11.20-19.21). On this 
Iamblichean point in Damascius and his followers, see: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A 
Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 
1978, p. 90-116 and I. HADOT (ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète, 
Brill, 1996, p. 70-113 
337 On the identity of mover and moved into the self-mover, see: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 
263.8-10 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 30.22-26) 
338 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 29.25-37.2, 261.15-267.8 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1986, p. 42.9-53.28; 
vol. 3, 1991, p. 70.1-78.24) 
339 PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §14, §20 
340 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 28.25-35.6 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1986, p. 42.9-51.14). See: I. 
HADOT, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Etudes 
Augustiniennes, 1978, p. 174-181 
341 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 32.23-33.16 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1986, p. 47.20-49.4), In Phaed, 
I, §177, 1 and II, §2, 17-18 (=L. G. WESTERINK (ed.), The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s 
Phaedo. Vol. II Damascius, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1977, p. 106-107; p. 288-
289). On the ἐμψυχία in Proclus, see: In Tim, III 285.3, 287.10, 324.29, In Remp, II 90.11-
14 
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efficient cause342. To some extent, such a division appears to cross-check the Proclean 
distinction between the soul (self-mover and self-moved) and the enmattered entities 
(mover and moved)343. But by conflating the two kinds of self-motion and the twofold 
causality, Damascius seems to escape the confusion between kinematics and dynamics, 
inasmuch as, strictly speaking, the formal causation is not a genuine motive force acting 
upon an item, therefore, does not involve a dynamic causation. Anyway, an ‘apparent self-
mover’ is in fine just a moved item of which the active-mover seems to be internal, while 
the ‘apparent other-moved’ seems to have an external mover344, but they actually belong 
together to the set of the ‘real other-moved’ of which kinematics studies the extended and 
quantifiable motions. 
  Damascius favours the model of alteration for understanding the self-motion of the soul, 
to the detriment of the model of locomotion. Conceiving the genuine self-motion as a self-
alteration (or self-modification)345 provides at least two benefits: first, to a certain extent, 
this model is less physical and more chemical, in such a way that it takes better the fact 
that the soul results from a mixture346 into account; and, second, such a model allows him 
to put aside the influence of the kinematic reasoning of Aristotle’s Phys, 8.5 in which the 
locomotion looks like a paradigm for all kinds of motions. In doing so, Damascius 
distances himself from Proclus who had a tendency to understand self-motion as a self-
locomotion (albeit, strictly speaking, Proclus had sustained that the soul experiences both 
locomotion and alteration in the course of its self-motion, of course in a spiritual 
fashion347). 
 
 
342 On the distinction between the efficient (ὑφ’ οὗ/ποιητική that must be understood in an 
Empedoclean way rather than in an Aristotelian one) and the formal (καθ’ ὅ/ὁριστική) 
causes that goes back to the teaching of Porphyry, see: SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 10.35-11.3 
and PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, II 9. Understanding the soul as the formal cause of the 
‘being alive’ for bodies can, of course, be found in Simplicius/Priscianus of Lydia: (Ps.-) 
SIMPLICIUS, In DA, 4.12-20 (on this passage, see: I. HADOT, Le problème du 
néoplatonisme alexandrine: Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978, p. 197-
198, n. 23), 51.28-52.10, 56.35-59.14, 87.9-35 (in which Priscianus distinguishes between a 
transcendent part of the soul that is the efficient cause of physical motions, and the soul qua 
entelechy which is their formal cause), 301.30-304.7, etc. On the disputation about the 
authorship of the commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima that goes back at least to Francesco 
Piccolomini (Francisci Piccolomini Senensis commentarii in libros Aristotelis De coelo, 
ortu et interitu; adiuncta lucidissima expositione, in tres libros eiusdem de anima, nunc 
recens in lucem prodeunt, Moguntia, 1608, p. 1001f), see: F. BOSSIER, C. STEEL, 
“Priscianus Lydus en de ‘In De Anima’ van Pseudo (?)-Simplicius”, in Tijdschrift voor 
filosofie, 34, 1972, p. 761-822; J. O. URMSON, P. LAUTNER (eds.), Simplicius. On Aristotle, 
On the Soul 1.1-2.4, Bloomsbury, 1995, p. 2-4; I. HADOT, “Simplicius or Priscianus? On 
the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’ (CAG XI): A Methodological 
Study”, in Mnemosyne, 55-2, 2002, p. 159-199 and M. PERKAMS, “Priscian of Lydia, 
commentator on the De Anima in the Tradition of Iamblichus”, in Mnemosyne, 58-4, 2005, 
p. 510-530, etc. 
343 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, I 14 
344 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 33.16-35.6 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1986, p. 49.5-51.14). On the 
difference between the ‘apparent’ and the ‘real’ for the self-movers and immobiles, see also: 
De Princ, I 262.23-266.17 (= W&C, vol. 3, 1991, p. 72.3-77.18) 
345 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 253.19-21, 254.24-25, 255.11-13, 15-16, 23-30, 270.19-
271.272.3, 272.18-22 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 14.7-10, 16.7-8, 17.8-10, 13-15, 18.2-8, 
45.1-47.14, 48.12-18) 
346 PLATO, Timaeus, 35a-37c, 41e-42a. According to Aristotle’s GC I 10 & II 7, the mixture 
results from the mutual alteration of the components. 
347 PROCLUS, In Parm, VII 1157.2-28 
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In Parm, 253.19-21348: Τί οὖν κωλύει, πῶς δὲ 
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν, 
ἀλλοιοῦσάν τε καὶ ἀλλοιουμένην ἑαυτήν καὶ 
ὑφ’ ἑαυτῆς οὕτως, ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω 
μεθίστασθαι; 
What, then, is preventing or, rather, how is it 
not necessary that our soul, both modifying 
and modified itself and by itself, also moves up 
and down? 
 
  The self-alteration consists for the soul to modify the quality of its essence (τοιόνδε τῆς 
οὐσίας), namely its essential participation (οὐσιώδης μέθεξις)349, especially on the 
occasion of its ascent or of its descent throughout the scale of being. Modifying its own 
essence, the soul is said self-moved (αὐτοκίνητον), self-changed (αὐτομετάβλητον) and 
self-generated (αὐτογένητον) at once350. Here, perhaps, Damascius’ terminology is linked 
to a late Dionysian classification of motions that might go back to a Neoplatonic 
teaching351. This classification, entailing a threefold subdivision of qualitative change into 
alteration (ἀλλοίωσις), otheration (ἑτεροίωσις) and transformation (τροπή)352, maintains 
that alteration is characterized by the fact that, unlike transformation, a kind of substantial 
permanence is involved353. In agreement with such a distinction, for Damascius, there 
 
348 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 14.7-10 
349 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 254.20-257.2 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 16.21-19.21) 
350 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 263.12-14, 265.12-18 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 30.27-31.4, 
34.12-14) 
351 Some scholars have tried to support the identification of Ps.-Dionysius with Damascius, 
see: C. M. MAZZUCCHI, “Damascio, autore del Corpus Dionysiacum, e il dialogo Περὶ 
πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης”, in Aevum, 80-2, 2006, p. 299-334. Mazzucchi’s reasoning has been 
dismissed in: E. FIORI, “Review of Mazzucchi”, in Adamantius, 14, 2008, p. 670-673. On 
the authorship of the Corpus Dionysiacum, see: R. F. HATHAWAY, Hierarchy and the 
Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius. A Study in the Form and Meaning 
of the Pseudo-Dionysian Writings, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, p. 3-31 (p. 30, Hathaway reports 
that A. Kojève shares his own conviction that Damascius was the author of, at least, some 
Dionysian Letters). Anyway, the only assured fact is that Ps.-Dionysius is very influenced 
by Proclus and Damascius from whom he sometimes borrows extended quotations. On 
Damascius and Ps.-Dionysius, see also: S. LILLA, “Pseudo-Denys l’Aréopagite, Porphyre 
et Damascius”, in Y. DE ANDIA (ed.), Denys l’Aréopagite et sa postérité en Orient et en 
Occident, Institut d’Etudes Augustiniennes, 1997, p. 135-152. On the ‘crypto-pagan 
hypothesis’ for explaining the Corpus Areopagiticum, see: T. LANKILA, “The Corpus 
Areopagiticum as a Crypto-Pagan Project”, in Journal of Late Antique Religion and Culture, 
5, 2011, p. 14-40 
352 Ps.-DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE, Div. Nom. IX 6.9; MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR, 
Scholia in librum De Divinis Nominibus, PG 3, col. 381a-d; BASIL OF CAESAREA (‘the 
Minor’), In Gregorii Nazianzeni orationem 38 (in Parisianus Coisl. 240, f. 9v-10r and 
Parisianus Graecus 573, f. 8v-9r); CALLISTUS ANGELICUDES, Refutatio Thomae Aquinae, 
in S. G. PAPADOPOULOS (ed.), Καλλίστου Ἀγγελικούδη κατὰ Θωμᾶ Ἀκινάτου, Athens, 1970, 
p. 103.1-10, p. 187.13-22 and SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 691.23-693.2. See also for the Islamic 
reception of this classification (notably in a treatise of ‘Abdallah ibn al-Faḍl al-Anṭākī): M. 
RASHED, “La classification des lignes simples selon Proclus et sa transmission au monde 
islamique”, in C. D’ANCONA, G. SERRA (eds.), Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella 
tradizione araba. Atti del colloquio ‘La ricezione arabe ed ebraica della filosofia e della 
scienza greche’ (Padova, 14-15 maggio 1999), Padoue, 2002, p. 257-279 
353 Maximus the Confessor, commenting Ps.-Dionysius, rambles on the distinction between 
alteration and transformation by quoting Aristotle’s GC I 4 319b10-18 and introducing into 
the quotation the word τροπή next to the Aristotelian words γένεσις and φθορά. The 
distinction between ἀλλοίωσις and ἑτεροίωσις constitutes a gloss on Phys, 4.9 217b24-27 
(the ἑτεροίωσις of 217b26 is a hapax in Aristotle). To a certain extent, the distinction 
between τροπή and ἀλλοίωσις can be found in: PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §27, (Ps.-
)SIMPLICIUS, In DA, 19.1-3, 169.31-36, and J. PHILOPONUS, De aeternitate mundi contra 
Proclum, 137.18-21, 203.20-25, 396.3-8, 415.11-15, 421.10-15, In DA, 441.6-11, etc. The 
three-way split between τροπή, ἀλλοίωσις and ἑτεροίωσις can also be found in: THEON OF 
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always remains something into the soul that is not subject to modification through the 
journey of the soul from the summit to the lower levels of being354. Actually, that is a 
genuine property of the self-motion that the self-mover keep its own identity throughout 
its odyssey355. This psychic invariant is the psychic kernel that Damascius calls εἶδος τῆς 
ὑπάρξεως (by contrast with its changing εἶδος τῆς οὐσιώδους μεθέξεως)356, or τὸ 
προαιρετικόν (‘the faculty of decision’)357, or τὸ προσεκτικόν (‘the faculty of 
awareness’)358, and also, sometimes, ὑποκείμενον359. Albeit Damascius employs 
elsewhere the expression τῆς ψυχικῆς τροπῆς360, that would surely be – as Van Riel has 
suggested361 –  a cutting remark against the Proclean thesis of the soul qua ἄτρεπτον362 
rather than the sign of a deep evolution of his thought. At any rate, in his commentary on 
the Third Hypothesis, Damascius only draws a parallel between self-motion and 
ἀλλοίωσις. More precisely, the psychic self-modification is conceived on the Aristotelian 
model of the sensory alteration363, especially on the model of the sight, which implies, on 
the one hand, that the perceptive faculty keeps its numerical identity and, on the other, its 
modification though the change of the perceived objects364. By the way, the rejection of 
the psychic τροπή in favour of the psychic ἀλλοίωσις constitutes the central theme of the 
five conundrums that close his commentary on the Third Hypothesis365. 
  The law of the essential participation-modification is as follows: the more the soul is 
illuminated by the divine light radiating from the higher levels of being, the more the soul 
is unified, concentrated, and dynamically powerful. Conversely, the more the soul moves 
away from this divine light, the more it is darkened, plural and scattered, hence the loss of 
its self-motive effectiveness366. Thus, the law of the substantial modification of the soul is 
directly linked to a law of dynamics, given that the variable dynamic strength of the soul 
is proportional to its variable illumination (ἔλλαμψις) that should be understood as its 
 
SMYRNA, Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato, III, §22 (= J. DUPUIS (ed.), 
Hachette, 1892, p. 244-245; = J. DUPUIS, R. & D. LAWLOR (eds.), Wizards Bookshelf, 
1979, p. 98) and SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, AM, 8.456 
354 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 271.3-21 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 45.21-46.22) 
355 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 254.1-4 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 14.20-23) 
356 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 271.28-29 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 47.6-7) 
357 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 256.6-7 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 18.15-17) 
358 DAMASCIUS, In Phaed, I §269, §271, II §19, §21. On this point, see: S. AHBEL-RAPPE 
(ed.), Damascius. Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles, Oxford University 
Press, 2010, p. 29-34; “Damascius on the Third Hypothesis of the Parmenides”, in J. D. 
TURNER, K. CORRIGAN (eds.), Plato’s Parmenides and its heritage, vol. 2: Its Reception 
in Neoplatonic, Jewish and Christian Texts, Society of Biblical Literature, 2010, p. 148-156 
(especially, p. 153-154) 
359 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 249.21-24 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 7.15-19) 
360 DAMASCIUS, In Phil, 126.8-9 (see also: In Phaed, I §71.4, §276.1). Some editors, as 
Westerink (following the example of the editors of Plotinus, namely Henry-Schwyzer), had 
replaced τροπῆς by ῥοπῆς. On this point, see: G. VAN RIEL (ed.), Damascius. Commentaire 
sur le Philèbe de Platon, Les Belles Lettres, 2008, p. 39, n.6 (p. 133) 
361 G. VAN RIEL (ed.), Damascius. Commentaire sur le Philèbe de Platon, Les Belles 
Lettres, 2008, p. 39, n. 6 (p. 133) 
362 PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, I 19 92.5-16 
363 ARISTOTLE, DA, II 5 417b2-27 
364 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 255.11-15, 269.27-270.2 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 17.8-13, 
43.16-22) 
365 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 268.20-273.11 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 41.1-50.4). On this 
point, see: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: 
Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 102-116 
366 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 256.6-17, 270.6-19 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 18.18-19.6, 44.7-
25) 
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distance from the Intellect367 (in the same way as the moon is variably altered and 
illuminated according to its variable distance from the sun368). By the way, the fall of the 
soul into the sensible world entails the differentiation of the essential participation into 
several kinds, which correspond to the various psychic faculties-forms acquired by the 
soul in the course of its degradation and as soon as the bodily influence grows: intellective 
modification, dianoetic modification, doxastic and sensitive modification369. The loss of 
Damascius’ commentaries on the Myth of Er, on the Decree of Adrastee, or on the end of 
the Timaeus is highly regrettable, because his heterodox and Iamblichean thesis according 
to which the being of the soul is changeable and his law of essential modification have 
very interesting ethical consequences, and have surely profoundly revised the details of 
the understanding of the Platonic eschatological belief of cyclical reincarnation, therefore 
of the Neoplatonic Theodicy370. 
  However, it must be remarked that self-motion is not always vertical, but can be 
horizontal, for instance when the soul first thinks of one intelligible form and then another, 
the modification of its essence does not always progress from the worst to the best, or vice 
versa371. Thus, in the course of his process of thinking, the soul alters itself in agreement 
with the distinctive features of the thought form without modifying its own dignity, 
namely its degree of unity372. 
  Regarding the logical status of the soul, which is a mixture and an intermediary item onto 
the scale of beings, Damascius says that its logical status is to be neither celestial nor 
terrestrial, and both celestial and terrestrial373, and in the same way for all predicates to be 
neither A nor ¬A, and both A and ¬A374. Thus, in a sense, for Damascius, the soul ‘puts 
away’ or ‘destroys-and-preserves’ both the contrary states in a very ‘proto-Hegelian’ 
fashion375. 
  More precisely, the soul has in itself at once the affirmative and negative predicates such 
as they are possessed by the divine inhabitants of the Intelligible realm, namely in a 
paradigmatic way that involves their anteriority from the flowing encosmic time, while 
the negations involved by the ‘sudden’ seem to be only effective into the γένεσις-realm, 
so for the sensible and temporal entities: 
 
367 On the other meanings of ἔλλαμψις in Damascius, see: DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 256.18-
261.14 (= W&C, vol. 3, 1991, p. 62.14-69.22) 
368 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 270.19-27 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 45.1-12). On the heavenly 
bodies and their substantial changes, see: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul 
in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 108-109 
369 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 272.27-273.11 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 49.7-50.4) 
370 However, Damascius’ Theodicy can be found in the works of his pupil Simplicius, 
notably in Simplicius’ commentary on Epictetus, see in particular: SIMPLICIUS, In Epict. 
Ench, 35.245-273, 38.738-746 and I. HADOT (ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel 
d’Epictète, Brill, 1996, p. 83-107. For the Neoplatonic Theodicy and the future of the souls, 
see the following summary: I. HADOT (ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel 
d’Epictète. Chapitres I-XXIX, Les Belles Lettres, 2001, p. cxxix-clxii (for Proclus’ 
Theodicy, see: R. CHLUP, Proclus. An Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 
201-233 and J. PHILLIPS, Order From Disorder. Proclus’ Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in 
Ancient Platonism, Brill, 2007) 
371 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 256.20-23 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 19.9-13). See also: 265.3-
10, 272.27-273.11 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 34.1-11, 49.7-50.4) 
372 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 270.27-271.2, 272.24-26 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 45.13-20, 
49.3-6) 
373 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 250.20-23 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 9.4-9) 
374 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 248.20-249.1, 249.21-24, 263.14-18, 266.10-25 (= W&C, vol. 
4, 2003, p. 5.19-6.11, 7.15-19, 31.5-9, 36.3-37.4) 
375 The fact that, for Damascius, the soul is an Aufhebung-item has been well seen by Wahl, 
see: J. WAHL, Etude sur le Parménide de Platon, F. Rieder, 1926, p. 172 
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In Parm, 250.25-251.5376: Πάντα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ 
τὰ πρὸ αὐτῆς, ἃ διεῖλεν εἰς τὸ ἔγχρονον καὶ τὸ 
ἄχρονον ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ 
μεθ’ ἑαυτήν, ἃ διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων 
ἐνδείκνυται. Οὕτω γὰρ τὸ οὐχ ἓν καὶ οὐ πολλὰ 
καὶ οὐχ ὂν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐννοοῦμεν. Καὶ μηδεὶς 
οἰέσθω τὰς [διὰ] τοῦ ἐξαίφνης ἀποφάσεις τὰ 
χείρω εἰσάγειν· αὗται γὰρ καὶ τὰ κρείττω ὁμοῦ 
τοῖς χείροσιν εἰσηγοῦνται. Πρὸ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ 
χρόνου μετοχῆς, ἐν τῷ ἀχρόνῳ τε καὶ 
ἐξαίφνης, ἕν τέ ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ἓν καὶ πολλά <καὶ 
οὐ πολλά>. Διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπάγει τὸ 
χρόνου μετέχειν, ὡσὰν ἐκείνων πρὸ πολλά. 
Διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπάγει τὸ χρόνου μετέχειν, 
ὡσὰν ἐκείνων πρὸ χρόνου ὄντων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. 
Αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἐξαίφνης ἀποφάσεις τὰς κατὰ 
γένεσιν ἀνῄρουν καταφάσεις τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ 
χρόνου προελθούσας, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ 
καὶ τὸ εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὰς τούτοις ἀντικειμένας 
ἀποφάσεις, τὸ οὐχ ἓν καὶ οὐ πολλὰ καὶ οὐκ ὄν, 
ἃς δὴ ταύτας φημὶ προλείψεις εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων 
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, <ὧν> ὡς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῶν 
ἐν αὐτῇ ἀποτιθέμεθα τὰ παραδείγματα.  
The soul contains all the predicates which are 
before it and which Parmenides has divided 
into the temporal and the timeless, and the soul 
also contains all those that are posterior and 
which he indicates by the negations. That is 
how we conceive in the soul the non-one, the 
no-many, and the no-being. And let no one 
believe that the negations of the sudden 
introduce the worst predicates, because they 
also introduce the best at the same time as the 
worst ones. In fact, before the participation 
with time, in the timeless and the sudden, there 
is one and non-one, many <and no-many>. 
This is why [Parmenides] introduces the 
predicate ‘participating with time’ after these 
predicates, insofar as they are in the soul before 
time. The negations of the sudden destroy – 
that is well known – the assertions which 
concern the becoming and which proceeded of 
time, but they do not destroy the one, the many, 
the being, nor the negations which are opposed 
to them, the non-one, the no-many, and the 
non-being – these negations, I say, which are 
in the soul as the anticipation of the sensible 
ones, whose they are the paradigms, insofar as 
they are divided in the bodies. 
 
  The essential negativity of the ‘soul’ is therefore not strictly the same as the negativity 
of the ‘sudden’. In this text, Damascius plays with several kinds of negations, as the 
quotation of the Sophist few lines above makes obvious377. Indeed, following Proclus378, 
Damascius strongly distinguishes three kinds of negation, from the hypernegation that 
concerns only the higher levels of reality and that can be found in the First Hypothesis to 
the privation that concerns the sensible world379. While hypernegation is the generative 
 
376 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 9.11-28 
377 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 249.24-29 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 7.19-8.3) 
378 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 1072.18-1077.17, Platonic Theology, I 12 57.21-24, II 5 38.18-
25, II 10 63.8-20 (see also the scholium at In Remp, I 265.26 available in G. KROLL (ed.), 
Procli Diadochi. In Platonis Rem Publicam commentarii, Teubner, vol. 2, 1965, p. 375.5-
8). See: W. BEIERWALTES, Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, Frankfurt, 1965, p. 
341-343 and J. N. MARTIN, “Existence, Negation and Abstraction in the Neoplatonic 
Hierarchy”, in History and Philosophy of Logic, 16, 1995, p. 169-196, “Proclus and the 
Neoplatonic Syllogistic”, in Journal of Philosophical Logic, 30-3, 2001, p. 194-210. 
Unfortunately for my purpose, in the course of his formalized reconstruction of Proclus’ 
logic, Martin is only focused on the hypernegation and the privation. By the way, as Martin 
(amongst others) remarks, Hegel will remember the Neoplatonic hypernegation in drawing 
the triadic sequence of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. 
379 I do not agree with Metry-Tresson when she argues that ὑπεραποφάσεσις necessarily 
refers to a linguistic item and that Damascius would draw a clear distinction between 
(ὑπερ)αποφάσεσις and ἀναίρεσις (given that the ἀναίρεσις of the One is strictly equivalent 
to the παντελὸς ἀπόφασις by which the Ineffable is glimpsed): C. METRY-TRESSON, 
L’aporie ou l’expérience des limites de la pensée dans le Péri Archôn de Damaskios, Brill, 
2012, p. 190-234. By the way, to some extent, excepted J. N. Martin, when the modern 
scholars quarrel with each other about the via negationis or the status of negation in Proclus 
and Damascius, they should avoid accumulating the worst fallacies and sophisms on the 
‘nothing’, the ‘all’, the ‘being’ or the ‘other’, and remember the words of W. V. O. Quine 
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principle of both assertions and negations, namely is beyond the predication itself, anterior 
and superior to all predicates, there remains two kinds of genuine negations: the first – 
exegetically sustained by the analysis of the Sophist about the non-being qua other380 – is 
a negative predicate that is neither inferior nor superior to its affirmative twin (given that, 
here, the negative predicate is nothing less than the reflection of the assertive, in such a 
way that they are mutually mirrored in the same fashion as truthness and falseness are381), 
and the second is a negative predicate that is inferior to the assertion inasmuch as this 
negative predicate is nothing more than the privation – or the lack – of the affirmative one. 
The real negative predicates seem to belong to the realm of the Forms, that is to say to the 
timeless level of Intelligible within which they share the same properties as the affirmative 
predicates and cohabit with them, whereas the privative predicates must be applied only 
to the γένεσις-realm that experiences duration and flow. 
  Thus, saying that the soul is essentially both A and ¬A means that the negative predicate 
¬A belongs to the first category, namely its ‘ontic’ dignity is the equal to the dignity of 
the assertive predicate A382, in such a way that, beyond the discursive oddity, ¬A can 
cohabit with A in the same <non-physical> place. Such cohabitation occurs in the soul in 
which the opposite predicates should be understood as anterior and paradigms of the 
sensible assertions and privations383. Its logical structure explains why the soul is the only 
entity that travels throughout the multi-layered ontic hierarchy: being in itself all the 
predicates, the soul wants to successively take part in each of them, in such a way that the 
Parmenides can be read as the tale of the psychic odyssey384. Damascius clarifies such a 
cohabitation by explaining that these opposite predicates are not juxtaposed as two 
separate layers into the soul, but are blended together to constitute a unique ‘amphibious 
nature’ which clearly is an Aufhebung-item that anticipates the opposite predicates such 
as they alternately appear in the sensible world385. The metaphor of the mixture does not 
 
available in Word and Object, §27, §53. On the via negationis, see the fundamental study: 
R. MORTLEY, From Word to Silence, Hanstein, 2 vol., 1986 (especially, for Neoplatonism: 
vol. 2, p. 85-127) 
380 Especially: PLATO, Sophist, 240a4-c2 and 258b1-2. On Proclus’ quotation of this last 
passage of the Sophist, see: H. D. SAFFREY, L. G. WESTERINK (eds.), Proclus. Théologie 
platonicienne, Les Belles Lettres, vol. 2, 1974, p. 39, n. 1 (p. 99-100) 
381 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 249.24-29 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 7.19-8.3) 
382 Sometimes, however, Damascius suggests that the soul is more adequately defined by its 
negative predicates insofar as they express its better nature, namely its eternal being, while 
the assertive predicates show its temporal becoming. I guess the reason of why he says that 
is as follows: the negation may be interpreted as hypernegation, in such a way that the soul 
would have a ‘family-resemblance’ with the higher levels of being: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 
263.18-19, 266.5-7 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 31.9-11, 35.17-19) 
383 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 251.15-18 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 10.14-18) 
384 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 271.8-10 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 46.3-6). See also: In Parm, 
255.26-30. Trouillard has particularly emphasized this point: J. TROUILLARD, “L’âme du 
Timée et l’Un du Parménide dans la perspective néoplatonicienne”, in Revue Internationale 
de Philosophie, 92-2, 1970, p. 236-251, “Le Parménide de Platon et son interpretation 
néoplatonicienne”, in Revue de Philosophie et de Théologie, 23, 1973, p. 83-100. See also: 
S. AHBEL-RAPPE, “Damascius on the Third Hypothesis of the Parmenides”, in J. D. 
TURNER, K. CORRIGAN (eds.), Plato’s Parmenides and its heritage, vol. 2: Its Reception 
in Neoplatonic, Jewish and Christian Texts, Society of Biblical Literature, 2010, p. 153-156 
and J. COMBÈS, “Damascius, lecteur du Parménide”, in Etudes Néoplatoniciennes, J. 
Millon 1996, p. 87, p. 95-99, “Négativité et procession des principes chez Damascius”, in 
Etudes Néoplatoniciennes, J. Millon 1996, p. 126-129 
385 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 251.19-252.6, 262.29-263.28 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 10.19-
11.19, 30.10-31.23). For another meaning of the way that a higher level anticipates κατ’ 
ἰδιότητα (but not κατ’ ὑπόστασιν) the properties of the lower levels which proceed from it, 
see: De Princ, I 268.3-26 (= W&C, vol. 3, 1991, p. 80.6-81.22) 
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mean that the soul is a compound being, but rather emphasizes the fact that the soul is an 
intermediary being within which the opposite properties cannot actually be separated, 
albeit their opposite ‘powers’ are both-together present386. Indeed, according to the 
Neoplatonic Principle of Continuity, between the level of assertive predicates – the Second 
Hypothesis –, and the level of the purely negative ones – the Fifth Hypothesis –, there 
should be a level in which assertive and negative predicates are combined with an equal 
strength, in such a way that they really are indistinguishable387. The mixture is therefore 
only a metaphor by means of which the identity of the opposites into the soul can be 
indicated or approximated. For instance, such an image can illustrate very well the 
uncatchable nature of the αὐτοκίνητον that is intermediary between the ἀκίνητον and the 
ἑτεροκίνητον388. As Proclus389, Damascius is perfectly aware that understanding the 
intermediate nature exceeds our discursive arsenal and needs the use of literary tools. 
Thus, both, on the one hand, the distinction between several kinds of negations and, on 
the other, the use of metaphor as a means for the asymptotic method of ἔνδειξις that aims 
at approximating the stuff discursively inaccessible390, allow to temper the ‘proto-
Hegelian’ overtone and its threat on the law of Contradiction. 
  By contrast with the soul, the ‘sudden’ is said to be neither A nor ¬A, because in itself 
sensible assertions and their privations are equally denied. The soul is said to be neither A 
nor ¬A in the same way. Thus, it appears that the negativity of the soul is more complex 
and rich than the negativity of the ἐξαίφνης, albeit its negativity integrates the negativity 
of the ‘sudden’. 
  Furthermore, by virtue of its logical neutrality, the ‘sudden’ is a kind of keyhole by means 
of which the timeless predicates within the psychic kernel can be glimpsed, beyond the 
superficial alternation of the temporal predicates of the soul391. By contrast, the logical 
determining of the stretches of time, namely the phases between which the sudden switch 
happens, that directly results from the Bivalence and the Excluded Middle, partially hides 
the psychic kernel either behind the temporal assertions or behind their privations. This 
recovering of the psychic core by the rapid change of sensible attributions involves the 
modification of the essential participation of the soul, in such a way that, although the soul 
always and at once bears the opposites within itself, the one or other property can 
alternately prevail (and it is this prevailing variable attribution which is expressed by the 
sensible waltz), and the soul can become more and less what it is without thereby losing 
 
386 The model of the psychic mixture in Neoplatonism is far to be clear-cut, insofar as it 
seems to oscillate between the Aristotelian and the Stoic paradigms. Here, Damascius likely 
follows the Aristotelian model of GC I 10 & II 7 to which Alexander of Aphrodisias had 
devoted a full treatise. For instance, Damascius, as Aristotle, firstly rejects the combination 
understood as juxtaposition (atomism) in favour of fusion (continuism), and secondly 
considers that in the mixture the components keep their ‘powers’ (327b22-31). Moreover, 
Aristotle explicitly describes the mixture as an intermediary between the strengths of its 
components: Ὅταν δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἰσάζῃ πως, τότε μεταβάλλει μὲν ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ 
κρατοῦν ἐκ τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως, οὐ γίνεται δὲ θάτερον, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ καὶ κοινόν (328a28-31, 
see also: GC II 7 334b2-20). But, albeit Damascius seems rather to follow Aristotle, some 
properties of Chrysippus’ κρᾶσις would have seduced the Neoplatonists. 
387 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 248.15-20 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 5.12-18) 
388 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 263.8-10 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 30.22-26) 
389 PROCLUS, In Tim, III 25.19-24 
390 On the link between ἔνδειξις and the Euclidean algorithm of continual and alternated 
subtraction, see: V. BÉGUIN, “Ineffable et indicible chez Damascius”, in Les Etudes 
philosophiques, 4, 2013, p. 561, n. 37 
391 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 249.10-18, 251.11-14 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 6.23-7.10, 10.8-
12) 
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its self392. If so, the soul, in the course of its ascent and descent throughout the scale of 
being, experiences the indivisibility in varying degrees, from the genuine unity to almost 
worst scattering393. Once again, the metaphor of the mixture can illustrate (better, I think, 
than the curious metaphor of the sponge394) such a prevailing, given that one or another 
ingredient can predominate, insofar as its strength is intensified, without wiping out the 
blended unity. Such differentiation within the soul between – as it were – an invariant core 
and a modifiable surface is corroborated by Simplicius, insofar as the pupil of Damascius 
supports that although the οὐσία is not in itself able of more and less, such a relativity is 
involved by the variation of its οὐσιώδης μέθεξις395. That way, Damascius rejects both the 
theory of Plotinus that the higher part of the soul remains above, viz. in the intelligible 
world, because this theory breaks the psychic unity396, and the Heraclitean theory that the 
soul falls entirely in the γένεσις-realm wherein the soul runs the risk of losing quite 
identity397. 
  Damascius’ idea can be depicted by a kind of truth-tree in which the specific kind of 
negation that can cohabit with its opposite assertion is indicated by ~, and the sensible 
privation by ¬. That is a Neoplatonic common belief that all possibilities can be exhausted 
somewhere into the multi-layered whole398. According to both the Principles of Continuity 
and of Plenitude, if the ‘blended’ opposite predicates within the soul are in a way the 
paradigms of the posteriors happening into the sensible world, then the 
unrealization/privation as well as the realization/assertion should happen somewhere399. 
 
  Here, the rank of the deployment/breakdown can show the ‘distance’ from the psychic 
kernel. Inasmuch as x Î E, it falls in the step of ¬(Aa(x)Ú¬Aa(x)), and, if so, it is ‘closer’ 
to the εἶδος of the soul, which is expressed by (Aa(x)Ù~ Aa(x)), than the durative phase x 
Î X for which the step is either Aa(x) or ¬ Aa(x). 
 
392 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 263.14-18, 263.29-264.9, 271.3-21, 272.3-14 (= W&C, vol. 4, 
2003, p. 31.5-9, 32.1-15, 45.21-46.22, 47.15-48.8) 
393 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 251.29-252.6, 255.4-30 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 11.9-19, 16.21-
18.9) 
394 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 255.5-8 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 16.23-17.4) 
395 SIMPLICIUS, In Cat, 288.34-289.4: ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἔνυλον οἶμια δεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ 
ἧττον λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἐπείσακτον καὶ ἧττον οὐσιῶδες. καὶ γὰρ ἡ μὲν οὐσία κατ’ 
αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ λέγεται θεωρουμένη οὐκ ἔχει τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ἡ δὲ ποιότης κατὰ 
τὴν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ μέθεξιν ὑφεστῶσα εἰκότως ἐπιδέχεται τοῦτο, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἧττον 
οὐσιώδεσιν, ἧττον δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὐσιωδεστέροις, ὣσπερ ἐν τοῖς σχήμασιν.  
396 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 254.3-19. On this passage, see: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A 
Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 
1978, p. 49-50 and I. HADOT (ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète, Brill, 
1996, p. 76-77 
397 This alternative appears in a very clear-cut way in Simplicius, see: (Ps.-)SIMPLICIUS, In 
DA, 5.38-6.17 
398 See for instance: SIMPLICIUS, In Epict. Ench, 35.253-273. On the Neoplatonic Principle 
of Plenitude, see: A. O. LOVEJOY, The Great Chain of Beings, Harvard University Press, 
1936, p. 61-66 and T. KUKKONEN, “Proclus on Plenitude”, in Dionysius, 18, 2000, p. 103-
128 (for an opposite opinion: A. SUMI, “The Psyche, The Forms and the Creative One: 
Toward Reconstruction of Neoplatonic Metaphysics”, in R. BAINE HARRIS (ed.), 
Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought. Part One, SUNY Press, 2002 p. 239-241) 
399 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 266.1-9 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 35.11-22) 
◊(Aa(x)Ú¬Aa(x)) Þ (Aa(x)Ù~Aa(x)) 
Aa(x)Ú¬Aa(x)
Aa(x)
¬Aa(x)
¬(Aa(x)Ú¬Aa(x))
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  Of course, if time is conceived in such a way that it is always possible to mark whenever 
a durationless boundary, Damascius’ conception remains, to some extent, very close to 
Proclus’, even though Damascius forcefully criticizes it400. But, precisely, that is not the 
case for the last diadochus for whom time, as well as motion, is constituted by components 
that are genuinely extended and uncuttable. 
  Indeed, Damascius had challenged Zeno’s and Aristotle’s401 paradoxes by saying that the 
flux of motion and time cannot be continuous compounds of sizeless entities that are limits 
(viz. cannot be composed out of dimensionless components)402. That is undoubtedly the 
most original and best-known point of Damascius’ kinematics403. Following Aristotle, 
Damascius supports the view according to which a continuous magnitude cannot be 
composed out of discrete and non-extended units. Consequently, if motion and time were 
extended and continuous, then they must be composed of extended components. Insofar 
as, from a Neoplatonist point of view, the encosmic world above all is characterized by its 
infinite divisibility that forcefully contrasts with the indivisibility of the inhabitants of the 
higher diacosms, the continuity highly befits time and, at least, corporeal motion. They 
therefore must be composed out of extended components and not of sizeless elements. 
These components are understood by Damascius as demiurgic extended cuts404 (called 
‘sections/διαστήματα’, ‘leaps/ἅλματα’ or ‘jerks/πηδήματα’) of a whole-time – which is a 
kind of aeviternity present in the World-Soul405 – and of a whole-becoming (viz. the flux 
 
400 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 262.8-29 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 29.1-30.0) 
401 ARISTOTLE, Phys, 4.10 217b29-218a30 
402 Damascius has expounded his kinematics in several of his writings, namely in his 
commentaries on the Parmenides, on the Timaeus, and in an independent treatise entitled 
On Number, Space and Time. Extracts of these kinematical accounts can be found in: 
DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 236.2-238.12, 240.23-242.30, 243.18-20 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 
182.10-185.24, p. 189.13-192.29, p. 194.5-7), in SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 774.28-800.21. On 
this theory, see: M. CHASE, “Whitehead and Damascius on Time”, in J. M. ZAMORA 
CALVO (ed.), Neoplatonic Questions, Verlag, 2014, p. 131-149, M.-C. GALPERINE, “Le 
temps intégral selon Damascius”, in Les Etudes philosophiques, 3, 1980, p. 325-341; P. 
DUHEM, Le Système du Monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, 
Hermann, vol. 1, 1913, p. 263-271; Ph. HOFFMANN, “Παράτασις. De la description 
aspectuelle des verbes grecs à une définition du temps dans le néoplatonisme tardif”, in 
Revue des Etudes Grecques, t. 96, fasc. 455-459, 1983, p. 1-26; S. SAMBURSKY, “The 
Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism”, in Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Science 
and Humanities, II 8, 1966, p. 153-165; S. SAMBURSKY, S. PINES (eds.), The Concept of 
Time in Late Neoplatonism. Texts with Translation, Introduction and Notes, Jerusalem, 
1971, p. 18-20 and R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 52-
63, p. 361-362, p. 380 
403 Some ‘Diodorean’ aspects of Damascius’ kinematics are examined in the last part of 
“Diodorus Kronus on Motion against Aristotle’s Kinematics: a crypto-defence of Plato’s 
Dynamics?”, 2017 
404 On the demiurgic sections in Damascius’ thought, see: DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 198.19-
23 (= W&C, vol. 2, 1989, p. 178.1-5), In Parm, 56.5-7, 83.5-7, 242.9-21 (= W&C, vol. 1, 
1997, p. 89.4-6, vol. 2, 1997, p. 26.16-20, vol. 3, 2001, p. 192.1-17) 
405 P. GOLITSIS, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. 
Tradition et innovation, de Gruyter, 2008, p. 171-174 and C. STEEL, “The Neoplatonic 
Doctrine of Time and Eternity and its Influence on Medieval Philosophy”, in P. PORRO 
(ed.), The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in 
Early Modern Philosophy, Brill, 2001, p. 12-16. For Damascius, time is one of the four 
‘gathering measures’ by means of which the Demiurge puts the sensible realm in order, more 
precisely time “measures the extension (διάστασις) of the activity deployed in motion (κατὰ 
τὴν ἐν κινήσει ἐνέργειαν)” (SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 625.28-29, see also: 735.17-736.1). On 
the four ‘gathering measures’ (viz. number, place, time and magnitude), see: SIMPLICIUS, 
In Phys, 625.4-32, 634.13-24, 636.34-637.21, 640.26-641.10, 645.15-19, 773.20-775.31 and 
P. GOLITSIS, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. 
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of existence/τὴν ῥοὴν τοῦ εἶναι)406. In doing so, Damascius guarantees their reality, or, at 
least, the fact that they are not just some arbitrary stretches resulting from the 
discriminating activity of the human mind that is very contingent and idiosyncratic407. In 
 
Tradition et innovation, de Gruyter, 2008, p. 160-163. For the Demiurge qua source of time 
(χρόνος πηγαῖος), see: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 235.6-17 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 181.7-22) 
406 The fluent γένεσις (also called ‘flux of existence/τὴν ῥοὴν τοῦ εἶναι’ or 
‘duration/παράτασις’) is a universal and underlying first-order process, whereas the 
categorical and transient motions (and rests) of particular items – for instance the heavenly 
revolutions – are second-order processes that supervene upon the flux of becoming by 
implementing their patterns on it. Indeed, for harmonizing Aristotle’s and Plato’s kinetics, 
the Neoplatonist thinkers hold that there are two kinds of motions, namely the four-
categorical ones (in fact, there are more than four categorical motions, since Simplicius 
argue that relational change is also a motion per se), and the ‘motion’ of the becoming 
considered as a whole called duration or flux of existence. The unicity of time is involved 
and guarantee precisely by the fact that time is actually the measure of duration (παράτασις) 
of beings beyond the variety of their categorical or second-order processes. By virtue of this 
twofold kinetic level, the second-order processes, as are the celestial kinetic rotations (which 
belong to a subset of the categorical motions, viz. the local ones), cannot cut or break the 
first-order process in actuality, but only potentially (see the footnote below). The demiurgic 
quanta are the components of the first-order process, the fluent becoming, while the 
components of the second-order processes are kinetic leaps that are quantitatively equivalent 
to some divisions of the demiurgic quanta (either a rational or an irrational section) and 
therefore can be measured by them. On the fluent becoming as an underlying first-order 
process of which time is the measure, see: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 238.1-12, 240.23-241.8, 
241.20-242.30 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 185.9-24, p. 189.13-190.8, p. 191.1-192.29); 
SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 720.34-721.26, 731.7-20, 744.10-31, 767.23-25, 787.29-788.5. See 
also: S. WATERLOW, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford Clarendon 
Press, 1982, p. 107-108. On the division of second-order processes into motions and rests, 
see: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 241.20-242.9 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 191.1-26). This last 
thesis reinforces the consistency of Platonic kinematics, insofar as the change from rest to 
motion – both understood as second-order processes – is not a special case of change 
anymore, and, consequently, the case of moving/resting at an instant either (against 
ARISTOTLE, Phys, 6.3. 234a24-b9, 8 239a10-b4 and R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the 
continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 409-415). Likely, Plato already had in mind this twofold 
kinetic level, and, for this reason, he was perfectly allowed to treat the transition from motion 
to rest in the same way as the other changes (Parm, 156a-c, 156e-157b). 
407 For Damascius, dividing time into past, present and future is relative to the observatory 
reference frame, while time in itself is a single being. This relativistic claim means that the 
present now, viz. the indexical νῦν, is egocentric insofar as it results from a psychic cut. 
Moreover, egocentric divisions and now have only potential existence, inasmuch as they 
divide the flux of becoming and of time only in thought. This relativity of time is emphasized 
by some modern commentators as Duhem, but at the risk of making Damascius’ kinematics 
inconsistent. Indeed, this thesis seems to break the compatibility between Damascius’ and 
Simplicius’ testimonies. On the one hand, in his commentary on the end of the Second 
Hypothesis, Damascius claims first, that motion and time are constituted of real and actual 
‘demiurgic’ leaps and, second, that the νῦν is such a demiurgic leap (In Parm, 236.2-238.12, 
240.23-242.30, 243.18-20), whereas, on the other, Simplicius’ testimony depicts the νῦν as 
egocentric and merely potential (In Phys, 798.8-799.8). The apparent contradiction is 
connected to Simplicius’ dilemma in regard of his master’s position. Simplicius points that 
time is made up either of a segmented series of adjacent time-quanta (in agreement with 
Simplicius’ previous description of Damascius’ position: In Phys, 796.27-797.26), or of a 
continuous flowing item, but cannot be both (In Phys, 797.27.36). I argue that both 
evidences are compatible, even more are two different corollaries of Damascius’ physics. In 
fact, if all psychic cuts are activity of thought, there is a radical difference between a 
demiurgic activity of cutting and a non-demiurgic one. Unlike the activities of sensible 
beings, whether superlunary or sublunary, which live into the world produced under the 
demiurgic supervision without producing it in regard of the emanative multi-layered 
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fact, the lower souls only imitate the demiurgic cutting that grounds the composition of 
the various physical continua, but their cuts do not have the same ontological weight as 
those of the νοῦς δημιουργικός who products time and becoming by the welding of several 
extended νῦν and of several portions of γένεσις. These demiurgic ‘leaps’ allow Damascius 
to claim that motion and time proceed in extended sections that are not further cuttable, in 
other words they proceed by quanta408. That way, the metrical puzzle of the composition 
of continuum is resolved. Nevertheless, in a sense, each part of motion is both indivisible 
(ἀμέριστον) and divisible (μεριστόν), namely abstractly divisible because extended and 
indivisible because it is a concrete component of every motion, in such a way that, as its 
parts, continuous motion is also divisible and indivisible: for example, walk is concretely 
composed of a finite number of steps, and abstractly by miles or other units of length 
which are infinitely dividable in thought. 
  However, it must be remarked, for the first time I believe409, that the infinite division of 
the demiurgic quanta by human minds is the consequence of the phase difference between 
the perfect activity of the Demiurge and the imperfect activities of the lower souls which 
are, to some degree, corrupted by their – voluntary – company with the bodily infraworld 
and its disorderly agitation (occasioned, in a Proclean way, by the coalescence of the 
inchoate forms with matter410). The divine and perfect souls of the seven planets and of 
the fixed stars which are described by the Second Hypothesis are in phase with the 
demiurgic cutting, hence the fact that the celestial bodies move by stellar ‘leaps’ which 
can serve as clocks for the encosmic world. They indicate the true segmentation of time 
that ordinates and measures the fluent becoming, insofar as their ticks mark off the rhythm 
of the becoming in agreement with the demiurgic activity. Unlike them, the activities of 
the sublunary souls and the activities of the sublunary bodies play the role of additional 
and accidental clocks which are often out of phase with the heavenly clocks and, for this 
reason, break the rhythm of the becoming by putting their own divisions. Since the 
activities and the motions of these lower entities are very contingent and can take any 
 
constitution of the whole reality, the demiurgic activity has an ontological weight, precisely 
because the Demiurgic Intellect (νοῦς δημιουργικός) is the entity who produces and puts the 
sensible realm in order (with the collaboration of the Vivifying Intellect (νοῦς ζωογόνος) 
called Hecate-Rhea however). Therefore, in regard of the first-order products, only the 
demiurgic cut is actual, while a non-demiurgic cut is merely potential, in such a way that 
the flux of becoming and the flowing time are composed out of actual and indivisible 
demiurgic quanta, but also potentially infinitely dividable in thought (in perfect accordance 
with In Parm, 242.9-21 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 192.1-17)). The twofold kinetic level 
results directly from the difference between the demiurgic activity of cutting and the non-
demiurgic one, a difference that clears up Simplicius’ suspicion in regard of the consistency 
of Damascius’ position. 
408 S. SAMBURSKY, S. PINES (eds.), The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism. Texts with 
Translation, Introduction and Notes, Jerusalem, 1971, p. 18-20 and M. J. WHITE, The 
Continuous and the Discrete. Ancient Physical Theories from a Contemporary Perspective, 
Oxford Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 314-315, p. 317-319 
409 Nevertheless, Sorabji was close to do this claim: R. SORABJI, Time, creation and the 
continuum, Duckworth, 1983, p. 55-56. I have presented this point in Los Angeles: 
“Damascius’ Theodicy: Psychic Input of Disorder and Evil into the World”, 16th Annual 
ISNS (International Society for Neoplatonic Studies) Conference, Loyola Marymount 
University, 14th June 2018 
410 Such a mixture of inchoate and mutually disturbing forms with matter corresponds to the 
third substrate called ὁρατόν, see: PROCLUS, De malorum subsistentia, §34. On Proclus’ 
differentiation between matter and proto-corporeal substrate, see: G. VAN RIEL, “Proclus 
on Matter and Physical Necessity”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics 
and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 231-257 
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possible pace, the demiurgic quanta can be infinitely divided in an abstract or in a fictional 
way411, but without threating the ontic weight and unity specific to the demiurgic products. 
  The phase difference, in addition, introduces the geometrical incommensurability in the 
world, while it is absent from the higher levels of the ontic hierarchy. Indeed, the 
discovering of the irrational magnitude had deeply embarrassed the Pythagoreans412, and 
Plato had tried to restrain it into the sensible place or, more precisely, to explain it by the 
dyadic ‘gap’ that occurs between the ontic layers413. Damascius is in position to explain 
the coming of the incommensurability – and, consequently, of the disorder and of the 
evil414 – into a novel and coherent Platonistic framework, namely by the phase difference 
between the activities of the higher and of the lower inhabitants of the ontic scale415. By 
virtue of this, the infinite divisibility of the continuum is not, axiologically, a neutral point, 
but directly results from the imperfection of the sublunary souls, insofar as the higher and 
divine souls do not experience the fall into the divisibility, and therefore into the unceasing 
divisibility of the γένεσις-realm. The activities of lower souls and the sublunary bodily 
motions (and rests) are often out of phase with the real and demiurgic rhythm of the 
ceaseless becoming, and for this reason, they are able to cut – of course, only abstractly 
and not concretely – indefinitely the continuum into infinitely varying pseudo-quanta416. 
 
411 S. AHBEL-RAPPE, “Damascius on the Third Hypothesis of the Parmenides”, in J. D. 
TURNER, K. CORRIGAN (eds.), Plato’s Parmenides and its heritage, vol. 2: Its Reception 
in Neoplatonic, Jewish and Christian Texts, Society of Biblical Literature, 2010, p. 155 
412 M. CAVEING, L’irrationalité dans les mathématiques grecques jusqu’à Euclide: la 
constitution u type mathématique de l’idéalité dans la pensée grecque, Septentrion, 1998, p. 
320-331 
413 PLATO, Timaeus, 48e-52c, 57d-58c, Laws, X 893c-894a; Ps-PLATO, Epinomis, 990c-
991b and ARISTOTLE, Met, A 9 992a10-14, M 9 1085a9-12. See: J. VUILLEMIN, “La 
section de la ligne dans la République (VI, 509d26-28)”, in R. RASHED (ed.), 
Mathématiques et philosophie de l’Antiquité à l’Âge classique. Etudes en hommage à Jules 
Vuillemin, éditions du C.N.R.S., 1991, p. 1-20 and J. WINZENRIETH, “Après les nombres, 
après les idées: le statut des grandeurs au sein du platonisme”, in Les Etudes philosophiques, 
1, 2018, p. 67-89 (especially p. 83-86) 
414 This idea according to which irrationality, phase difference and theodicy are intimately 
linked can also be found in another context, namely the discussion about the Great Year 
(Avicenna, Averroes, Nicole Oresme, Leibniz), see: M. RASHED, “Théodicée et 
Approximation: Avicenne”, in Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 10, 2000, p. 223-257. On 
the Great Year, see: G. DE CALLATAŸ, Annus Platonicus. A Study of World Cycles in 
Greek, Latin and Arabic Sources, Peeters, 1996 
415 The conflation between a disordered motion and irrationality to explain the presence of 
evil into the encosmic world is a commonplace of Neoplatonism. This doctrine takes root in 
Plato’s description of the χῶρα (Timaeus, 30a, 49b-50a, 52d-53b, 57d-58c, see also: Phaedo, 
110a-114a). For instance, in Proclus, see: PROCLUS, De malorum subsistentia, §29, §34, 
§35, In Tim, I 283.27-284.23, 325.30-328.9, 367.30-368.11, 382.20-389.16, 294.22-395.10, 
404.22-31, 417.27-32, 419.26-420.2, II 153.25-154.1, In Parm, IV 844.11-848.20 and J. 
PHILLIPS, Order From Disorder. Proclus’ Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in Ancient 
Platonism, Brill, 2007, p. 93-150. But the instantiation of this doctrine by means of the phase 
difference cannot be found elsewhere than in Damascius’ kinematics. In his commentary on 
the Parmenides, Damascius alludes to his earlier commentary on the Timaeus in which he 
had also expounded his kinematics (In Parm, 236.13-15 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 183.1-3)). 
Indeed, his quantum kinematics indubitably is very helpful for interpreting the demiurgy of 
the Timaeus, in particular, I think (without any evidence however), the harmonic constitution 
of the heavens, the intrinsic disordered motion of the χῶρα, and the constitution of the 
threefold mortal soul. 
416 Here, Damascius’ idea seems to be very close to the construction of irrational numbers 
by Dedekind-cut: R. DEDEKIND, “Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen” (1872), in Gesammelte 
mathematische Werke, Band 3, p. 315-334. Yet, from a mathematical point of view, while 
the celestial revolutions can divide the demiurgic sections only in a rational way, in such a 
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This intimacy between the irrationality and the infinite divisibility is a well-known 
element of Greek Mathematics – the famous Theaetetus’ algorithm, viz. the ἀνθυφαίρεσις, 
of Euclid X 2417 –, and its importance for Plato’s thought is also well documented418, given 
that it seems to be an arcane key of his metaphysics419. That is once more a sign of 
Damascius’ originality to implement this mathematical theorem into his unusual 
kinematics420 in order to support his Theodicy by highlighting the responsibility of the 
self-moved souls whereby the evil by-product421 infiltrates the universe. 
 
way that the set of all their possible cuts can only constitute the set of rational positive 
magnitudes (Q+), the sublunary beings can also cut the demiurgic sections in an irrational 
way and, in doing so, the set of all their possible cuts is the set of irrational positive 
magnitudes (R+). To borrow Poincaré’s distinction between several orders of continua (H. 
POINCARÉ, “Le continu mathématique”, in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1, 1893, 
p. 26-34), the set of heavenly pseudo-quanta could form a continuum of the first order with 
a countable cardinality (À0), whereas the set of sublunary pseudo-quanta is a continuum of 
the second order and has an uncountable or super-denumerable cardinality (À1). Both are 
dense, but only the sublunary set satisfies the Cantor-Dedekind axiom. Moreover, given that 
the number of celestial beings actually is limited, the set of heavenly pseudo-quanta is finite 
too (insofar as it depends on the number of different heavenly motions), hence the fact that 
the unceasing divisibility is a flavour specific to the sublunary realm. 
417 EUCLID, Elements, X 2. See: Th. L. HEATH, A History of Greek Mathematics, Oxford 
Clarendon Press, vol. 1, 1921, p. 206-207; P.-H. MICHEL, De Pythagore à Euclide. 
Contribution à l’histoire des mathématiques préeuclidiennes, Les Belles Lettres, 1950, p. 
466-470 and I. TOTH, “Le problème de la mesure dans la perspective de l’être et du non-
être. Zénon et Platon, Eudoxe et Dedekind: une généalogie philosophico-mathématique”, in 
R. RASHED (ed.), Mathématiques et philosophie de l’Antiquité à l’Âge classique. Etudes en 
hommage à Jules Vuillemin, éditions du C.N.R.S., 1991, p. 21-99 
418 D. H. FOWLER, The Mathematics of Plato’s Academy, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1999, 
p. 30-64 and J. VUILLEMIN, Mathématiques pythagoriciennes et platoniciennes, Blanchard, 
2001, p. 122-143. For instance, Plato alludes explicitly to the ἀνθυφαίρεσις in Theaetetus, 
147d4-8, see: H.-G. ZEUTHEN, “Sur les livres arithmétiques des Eléments d’Euclide”, in 
Oversigt over det kongelige danske Videnskabernes Selskabs forhandlinger, 1910, p. 395-
435 and “Sur l’origine historique de la connaissance des quantités irrationnelles”, in 
Oversigt over det kongelige danske Videnskabernes Selskabs forhandlinger, 1915, p. 333-
362 
419 Th. AUFFRET, “Un témoignage négligé de Théophraste sur la théorie platonicienne des 
lignes (Métaph, 6a24-6b16)”, in A. JAULIN, D. LEFEBVRE (éds.), La Métaphysique de 
Théophraste. Principes et apories, Peeters, 2015, p. 27; M. RASHED, “Platon et les 
mathématiques”, in M. DIXSAUT, A. CASTEL-BOUCHOUCHI, G. KÉVORKIAN (eds.), 
Lectures de Platon, Ellipses, 2013, p. 220-226, I. BULMER-THOMAS, “Plato’s Theory of 
Number”, in The Classical Quarterly, 33-2, 1983, p. 375-384 and A. E. TAYLOR, “Review 
of J. Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles, Leipzig, 1924”, in Gnomon, 2, 
1926, p. 396-405, “Forms and Numbers. A Study in Platonic Metaphysics. I.”, in Mind, 35, 
1926, p. 419-440, “Forms and Numbers. A Study in Platonic Metaphysics. II.”, in Mind, 36, 
1927, p. 12-33 
420 On another possible use of the Euclidean algorithm of continual and alternated 
subtraction in Damascius’ thought, see: V. BÉGUIN, “Ineffable et indicible chez 
Damascius”, in Les Etudes philosophiques, 4, 2013, p. 561, n. 37 
421 The general scheme of Neoplatonic Theodicy depicts evil as a παρυπόστασις, viz. a 
parasitic existence that is produced derivatively in the course of the runoff of goodness from 
the Good itself. This parasitic and adventitious by-product is due to the limited receptivity 
of some beings that fail to fill up all the divine light and its goodness, and that are produced 
despite their essential deficiency in accordance with the universal validity of the Principle 
of Plenitude. God thereby wants neither imperfection nor evil, even more insofar as they 
appear surreptitiously during the production of last diacosms, they participate in spite of 
themselves to the total goodness of this production (in such a way that evil only exists from 
the perspective of parts, but not that of the whole). Thus, to borrow the neologism of Plato 
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  Anyway, Damascius’ kinematics is very different from Proclus’, notably because only 
the lower souls are able to mark whenever a durationless boundary in the time-continuum, 
and their cuts are far from having an ontic basis as the demiurgic quanta are. Thus, the 
‘sudden’, understood as a real durationless switch, can only occur between two demiurgic 
quanta that are not in themselves composed out of a dense set of sizeless instants422. As a 
kinematic stuff, for Damascius, the ἐξαίφνης appears just at the junction between the 
demiurgic ‘leaps’, in such a way that Damascius cannot understand it in similar fashion 
as Proclus. 
  The ἐξαίφνης therefore is apart from time in the literal sense, inasmuch as it is situated 
between two temporal phases of durative processes which can be either some kind of 
durative motion or some kind of durative rest423. Strictly speaking, the ‘sudden’ does not 
belong to any phase of motion, insofar as it appears only at the durationless weld between 
two uncuttable periods, whether demiurgic or not. 
  However, as is often the case, Damascius makes the notion of ἐξαίφνης more complex 
by proceeding to a bifurcation between, on the one hand, the psychic ἐξαίφνης which is a 
 
(Theaetetus, 176a4-8, on this passage, see: V. ILIEVSKI, “Traces of the Platonic Theory of 
Evil in the Theaetetus”, in Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 11-1, 2017, p. 66-98) and to 
escape all Manichean temptation, evil is not in itself a genuine contrary to the good, but only 
its subcontrary (ὑπεναντίον which is, for Proclus, halfway between contrary and privation, 
see: PROCLUS, De mal. subs, 52.1-7, 54.16-31 and Parisianus Graecus 1918, fol. 145-146 
in M. RASHED, “Proclus, commentaire perdu sur la Palinodie du Phèdre: vestiges 
byzantins”, in L’héritage aristotélicien. Textes inédits de l’Antiquité, Les Belles Lettres, 
2016, p. 486-493, manuscript also edited in: C. J. LARRAIN, “Macarius Magnes, 
᾽Αποκριτικὸς πρὸς ῞Ελληνας ein bislang unbeachtetes Exzerpt”, in Traditio, 57, 2002, p. 
85-127, “Das Exzerpt aus Macarius Magnes’ Apocriticus”, in Traditio, 59, 2004, p. 383-
396) whose subsistence depends on that of the good. As it were, evil is a kind of legal 
loophole occurring during the very ordered distribution of goodness, that is to say an 
unintentional production of the best legislation possible. On the word παρυπόστασις in 
Neoplatonism, see: SYRIANUS, In Met, 91.31, 105.25-32, 107.9; PROCLUS, Theol. Plat, 
I.18 84.22, In Alc, 118.18-23, In Tim, I 375.15, 18, 381.7, 11, III 303.19, In Remp, I 38.6, 
11, 22, 40.25, 78.12, 117.6, 12, In Eucl, 26.18, De mal. subs, 49.11, 50.1-57, 54.11, 22, De 
decem dub, 30.20, In Parm, III 829.26, IV 923.13, V 987.5; SIMPLICIUS, In Epict. Ench, 
14.340-395, 35.184-204, 242-244, 498 (see also: In Phys, 250.9-23 in which Simplicius 
makes an analogy between the pairs good/evil and form/matter by describing first privation 
as a subcontrary of the form (here Simplicius has surely in mind the incomplete privation 
rather than the complete one) and, second, matter as being a parasitic existence deriving 
from the form); Ps.-DIONYSIUS, Div. Nom. IV 20 720d, 27 728d, 31 732c, 32 732d and A. 
C. LLOYD, “Parhypostasis in Proclus”, in G. BOSS, G. SEEL (eds.), Proclus et son influence, 
Grand-Midi, 1987, p. 145-157 
422 S. SAMBURSKY, S. PINES (eds.), The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism. Texts with 
Translation, Introduction and Notes, Jerusalem, 1971, p. 19 
423 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 261.1-262.8 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 26.21-28.23), especially 
for the ‘sudden’: 261.10, 25-26 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 27.5-6, 28.8-9) 
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demiurgic and vivifying form424, and, on the other, the physical νῦν425 which is an unreal 
halfway stage between past and future that mirrors the true ‘sudden’ only present into the 
soul426. In doing so, Damascius supports a twofold understanding of the ἐξαίφνης, insofar 
as the psychic ‘sudden’ is rather dynamic – given that it is the key of the psychic 
causation427 – while the physical is kinematic. The psychic ‘sudden’ in fine belongs to the 
οὐσία of the soul428, while the kinematic ‘sudden’ – that imitates it – is only present in its 
activities (ἐνέργειαι)429, namely in the processes produced by the soul qua efficient cause. 
  The bifurcation of the ‘sudden’ into two highly separated meanings seems to be briefly 
lightened as follows430: 
 
In Parm, 264.21-265.3431:  Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ πρὸς 
τὸ ἑνδέκατον τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐξαίφνης ἀμερές 
ἐστι τῇ ἰδιότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρονον, ἐκεῖνο 
δὲ χρόνου μέτρον ἦν καὶ διάστημα ὡς 
ἐδείκνυμεν, καὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἐκάλει νῦν, ἵνα τὸν 
ἐνεστῶτα δηλώσῃ χρόνον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐξαίφνης 
ὠνόμασεν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ ἐξῃρημένων 
αἰτίων ἧκον εἰς τὴν ψυχήν. Εἰ δὲ ἄρα καὶ ἐκεῖ 
τὸ νῦν ἀμερῶς ἀκούοιμεν, εἴη ἂν καὶ αὐτὸ 
σωματικὸν ἐξαίφνης, τοῦτο δὲ ψυχικόν· καὶ 
διὰ τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐξαίφνης, ὅτι νοητὸν 
τρόπον τινὰ καὶ αἰώνιον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ νῦν, ὡς 
χρόνου πέρας τοῦ μετροῦντος τὴν σωματοειδῆ 
γένεσιν. 
This sudden is partless by its character and 
therefore timeless, but that [viz. the now] was 
a measure and an interval of time as we 
showed, and that is what [Parmenides] called 
‘now’ in order to designate the present time, 
whereas he called this the ‘sudden’ because it 
came from unseen and transcendent causes 
into the soul. If we understood the ‘now’ there 
as partless, then it would itself be a somatic 
sudden, that is psychic. And so this is a sudden, 
because it is in a way intelligible and eternal, 
whereas that is now, since it is the limit of time 
that measures corporeal coming to be.432 
 
  The important points for distinguishing between the psychic and the corporeal ‘sudden’ 
seems to be first the fact that they result from very different causes, and the second their 
respective kinds of indivisibility. The psychic ‘sudden’, which is a demiurgic and 
 
424 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 241.23-27, 242.9-15 (= W&C, vol. 3, 1991, p. 38.2-8, p. 38.23-
39.8), In Parm, 155.6-7, 235.6-17, 267.21-22 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 43.19-20, p. 181.7-
22, vol. 4, 2003, p. 39.1-2). On the vivifying’s aspect of the soul, see: In Parm, 261.28-262.3 
(= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 28.11-16). On the vivifying goddess called ‘Rhea’ by the Orphics 
and ‘Hecate’ by the Chaldaics who vivifies the demiurgic productions, see: In Parm, 149.19-
169.5 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 34.5-68.16). On Hecate and the ‘sudden’, see: J. COMBÈS, 
“L’un humain selon Damascius”, in Etudes Néoplatoniciennes, J. Millon 1996, p. 195. On 
the importance of the myth of Hecate for the Neoplatonism, see: A. LERNOULD, “De la 
Lune et d’Hécate dans le mythe du De facie de Plutarque et dans le Néoplatonisme tardif”, 
in A. LERNOULD (ed.), Plutarque. Le visage qui apparait dans le disque de la Lune (De 
facie quae in orbe lunae apparet). Texte grec, traduction, notes et trois études de synthèse, 
Septentrion, 2013, p. 117-134 
425 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 264.21-265.4 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 33.10-20) 
426 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 263.28-30, 264.9-16 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 31.24-32.2, 32.17-
33.4) 
427 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 267.12-30 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 38.9-39.13) 
428 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 263.29-264.9 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 32.1-15) 
429 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 263.29 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 31.25-32.1) 
430 See also: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 267.19-22 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 38.20-39.2) 
431 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 33.10-20 
432 English translation (modified): S. AHBEL-RAPPE, “Damascius on the Third Hypothesis 
of the Parmenides”, in J. D. TURNER, K. CORRIGAN (eds.), Plato’s Parmenides and its 
heritage, vol. 2: Its Reception in Neoplatonic, Jewish and Christian Texts, Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2010, p. 152 
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vivifying form that gets its dynamism from Hecate-Rhea (viz. the νοῦς ζωογόνος)433, is 
caused by the ‘unseen and transcendent causes’, namely it comes into the soul from the 
Ones of the First and Second Hypotheses434, while the physical ‘sudden’ called νῦν comes 
from the demiurgic cutting of the complete and integral time (ὁ σύμπας χρόνος)435 that 
subsists into World-Soul and encloses altogether all past, present and future periods as a 
whole 436. That way, the psychic ‘sudden’ is produced both by the hypernegations of the 
First One and by the assertions of the Second (namely the three diacosms of the 
Intelligible, Intelligible-Intellective and Intellective)437. If so its production appears to be 
the same as the constitution of the Third One – the human soul – of which the essential 
characteristics are so much gifts from the various levels of gods438. Furthermore, 
Damascius employs a formal criterion to separate the two ‘sudden’. Indeed, on the one 
hand, the psychic ‘sudden’ is truly indivisible, then it is durationless and, by virtue of this, 
timeless, whereas, on the other, the physical ‘now’ is not really indivisible but only 
uncuttable, given that it must have a genuine duration, in such a way that it is only a time-
atom but not a partless and sizeless item. 
  But, in this text, the νῦν is a stretch of time (viz. a time-quantum) rather than a 
durationless switch between two durative phases as seems to be the physical image 
(εἴδωλον) of the psychic ‘sudden’ in the γένεσις-realm. The usual obscurity of Damascius 
about such a physical image can be to some extent lightened by considering that this image 
is itself an intermediary between the durative νῦν and the timeless ἐξαίφνης. With the first, 
the image shares the fact of being in time and the fact to be a limit, in other words to 
belong to the becoming, while, with the second, the image shares indivisibility – or at least 
it has some duration smaller than any duration that can be assigned – and logical neutrality. 
If it be so, the physical image of the psychic ‘sudden’ is the kinematic image of the 
dynamic ‘sudden’, in such a way that such an image fills a requisite of the consistency of 
Damascius’ kinematics that the atomic νῦν would leave unsatisfied – namely, the puzzle 
of the weld between two durative ‘leaps’. Moreover, it is only when the dynamic ‘sudden’ 
is reflected by its kinematic image that the encosmic assertions and privations are fully 
and equally denied. 
  Now, let focus on the dynamic facet of the ‘sudden’. The fact that the psychic ἐξαίφνης 
must be understood as dynamic rather than kinematic does not only follow from the 
conflation between the ‘sudden’ and the soul (since I have argued that it was not sufficient 
for Proclus). Actually, few passages of Damascius show us that Damascius has rather in 
mind the amalgam of the ‘sudden’ with the dynamic core that remains the same throughout 
the self-modification of the soul. When he was challenging with the idea of self-motion, 
Damascius first describes the ‘weird’ nature of the αὐτοκίνητον as the intermediary 
 
433 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 241.23-27, 242.9-15 (= W&C, vol. 3, 1991, p. 38.2-8, p. 38.23-
39.8), In Parm, 155.6-7, 235.6-17, 267.21-22 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 43.19-20, p. 181.7-
22, vol. 4, 2003, p. 39.1-2) 
434 L. G. WESTERINK, J. COMBÈS (eds.), Damascius. Commentaire sur le Parménide de 
Platon, Les Belles Lettres, vol. 4, 2003, p. 33, n. 9 (p. 165-166) 
435 SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 775.31-785.11, 798.2-14 
436 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 252.18-253.2 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 12.13-13.6). On the 
‘Whole Time’, see: P. DUHEM, Le Système du Monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques 
de Platon à Copernic, Hermann, vol. 1, 1913, p. 263-267; M.-C. GALPERINE, “Le temps 
intégral selon Damascius”, in Les Etudes philosophiques, 3, 1980, p. 325-341; P. GOLITSIS, 
Les Commentaires de Simplicius et Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. Tradition et 
innovation, de Gruyter, 2008, p. 171-174 and C. STEEL, “The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time 
and Eternity and its Influence on Medieval Philosophy”, in P. PORRO (ed.), The Medieval 
Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern 
Philosophy, Brill, 2001, p. 12-16 
437 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 266.1-9 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 35.11-22) 
438 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 260.1-30 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 25.1-26.20) 
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between the ἀκίνητον and the ἑτεροκίνητον, and, second, identifies the ‘sudden’ with the 
immobile-part of the self-mover: 
 
In Parm, 263.8-10439: ὥστε καὶ ἀκίνητον κατὰ 
τὸ αἰώνιον, καὶ ἑτεροκίνητον κατὰ τὸ 
ἔγχρονον, καὶ αὐτοκίνητον ἄρα κατὰ τὸ 
σύγκρατον. ᾟ γὰρ κινοῦν, ἀκίνητον, καὶ ᾗ 
κινούμενον, ἑτεροκίνητον, ᾗ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμφω, 
αὐτοκίνητον. 
 
In Parm, 265.15-17440: Ἔτι δὲ τὸ τρίτον κατὰ 
μὲν τὴν ἰδιότητα τοῦ ἐξαίφνης ἀκίνητός ἐστιν, 
κατὰ δὲ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοκίνητος· κατὰ δὲ τὸ 
σύγκρατον εἶδος, ἀκίνητον ἔχει τὸ 
αὐτοκίνητον, ὡς καὶ τὸ γενητὸν ἀγένητον. 
 
 
In Parm, 267.17-19441: τὸ δὲ “ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου 
μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον”, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος 
προϊόντος τοῦ γιγνομένου, καὶ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ 
ἀειαμεταβλήτου τῆς μεταβολῆς γιγνομένης. 
Ἅμα γὰρ ἀμετάβλητος ἡμῶν ἡ οὐσία καὶ 
μεταβλητή· 
So that [the soul] is immobile for its eternity 
and other-moved for its temporality, and thus 
self-mover according to the mixture of the two. 
Indeed, as a mover, it is immobile; as a moved, 
it is other-moved; and as it is both in its 
identity, it is self-mover. 
 
Moreover, thirdly, the soul is immobile 
according to the property of its sudden, it is 
self-mover according to the becoming, and its 
faculty of self-motion is immobile in its mixed 
form, just as what is generated in it is also 
ungenerated. 
 
As for the sentence “from which there is a 
change in one direction or the other”442, it is 
explained by the fact that ‘what is becoming’ 
proceeds from the being and that change 
occurs from which is always immutable, 
because our essence is both immutable and 
changeable. 
  
  The manifold equivalence is blindingly obvious. Damascius makes the following 
identities: 
 
In Parm, 263.8-10 ἀκίνητον = αἰώνιον = κινοῦν » σύγκρατον 
In Parm, 265.15-17 ἀκίνητον = ἐξαίφνης » σύγκρατον εἶδος 
In Parm, 267.17-19 ἀμετάβλητον = ὄντος » οὐσία 
Thus: ἀκίνητον = ἀμετάβλητον = αἰώνιον = ὄντος = κινοῦν = ἐξαίφνης » σύγκρατον 
  As I have argued, the metaphor of mixture must be understood καθ’ἔνδειξιν as 
approximating the very specificity of intermediary predication in which the opposite 
strengths are balanced and unified. In the same way, breaking the soul into an invariant 
core and a changing surface is nothing but a construct of the mind. The only relevant 
distinction, that I shall analyse in detail further, is the usual Platonic dichotomy between 
ὕπαρξις and μέθεξις443. Taking account of this qualification, the psychic ‘sudden’ 
corresponds to the invariant kernel of the soul, namely its εἶδος τῆς ὑπάρξεως, that is to 
say its eternal mixed form that takes on the efficient causation upon the physical world 
(given that the soul is in itself a ‘real self-mover’ and not only an ‘apparent’ one444). Thus, 
the psychic ‘sudden’ is rightly the motive force acting upon the soul itself and its 
 
439 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 30.22-26 
440 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 34.17-20 
441 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 38.15-19 
442 PLATO, Parmenides, 156d3-4 
443 C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, 
Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 109-113. On the ὕπαρξις that Damascius 
distinguishes to some extent from the οὐσία, see: DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 310-313 (= 
W&C, vol. 3, 1991, p. 149.6-154.6) 
444 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 28.25-35.6 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1986, p. 42.9-51.14) 
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subordinated items, in such a way that the ‘sudden’ assumes the psychic causation445. In 
doing so, the temporal passage from a contrary to another proceeds from the ‘sudden’ that 
prevails over all the soul446. It is by means of its ‘sudden’ that the soul, which is in itself a 
mixture of the opposite predicates, produces the temporal fluctuation of presence and 
absence, assertion and privation447. 
  The identity of the ‘sudden’ and the psychic invariant kernel involves the following 
characteristics: in the same way as the intermingled opposite predicates within the psychic 
kernel are prior to the temporal assertions and privations448, the psychic ‘sudden’ in itself 
precedes them. Of course, the psychic core always remains co-present with itself in the 
course of the journey of the soul, likewise the ‘sudden’ is always present – evidently in an 
amphibious way – though the temporal alternation from a contrary to another; albeit the 
‘sudden’ can actually be glimpsed in all its splendour only at the durationless transition 
between two opposite phases, namely only when the psychic sudden is mirrored into the 
γένεσις-realm by its kinematic image449. 
  What is the dynamic causation of the psychic ‘sudden’ qua psychic kernel? 
 
In Parm, 267.19-30450: “ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη 
φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται”. Ἄτοπος μὲν ὅτι 
οὐσία γιγνομένη ἐστὶν ἅμα τε τὰ ἀντικείμενα 
<καὶ οὐδέτερα>451, φύσις δὲ ὅτι οὐ πέρας 
χρόνου, οὐδὲ πέρας τῆς γενέσεως, ἀλλά τι 
εἶδος δημιουργικὸν ἢ ζωογονικόν, ἐγκάθηται 
δὲ ὅτι τὸ μάλιστα ἱδρυμένον τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ 
σταθερὸν καὶ συνεκτικὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν· “καὶ εἰς 
ταύτην δὲ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης”, ὅτι ἀρχὴ μὲν τῆς 
προόδου, τέλος δὲ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς ἡ τοῦ 
ἐξαίφνης αὕτη ἰδιότης· 
  “καὶ τὸ ἓν δὴ εἴπερ ἕστηκέν τε καὶ κινεῖται, 
μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα· μόνως γὰρ ἂν 
οὕτως ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ.” Εἰ ἄρα κινεῖται, καὶ 
ἕστηκεν ἅμα ἀμφότερα· διότι ἔσχατόν ἐστιν 
ἕν, καὶ ποτὲ γιγνόμενον, ποτὲ ἀπολλύμενον, 
κατὰ μεταβολήν, δηλονότι τῆς ἐπικρατούσης 
ἕξεως ἢ μεριστῆς ἢ ἀμερίστου. Συνάγει δὲ 
ἑκάτερον τὸ ἐξαίφνης, καὶ τῇ μεταβολῇ τὸ 
ἀμετάβλητον ἐγκίρνησιν· 
  “But this sudden, as a weird nature, is  
[firmly] seated”452. “Weird”, because it is 
essence that becomes both opposites <and 
neither>; “nature”, because [unlike the 
durative νῦν] it is not a limit of time, nor a limit 
of becoming, but a certain demiurgic and 
vivifying form; and it is “[firmly] seated”, 
because it is the most solid, the most stable and 
cohesive foundation of the soul; and 
[Parmenides] adds: “it is the point arrival and 
the point of departure”453, because this 
property of the sudden is both the beginning of 
the procession and the end of the reversion. 
  “Then the one, if it is at rest and in motion, 
must change in each direction; for that is the 
only way in which it can do both”454. If, 
therefore, it is moving and resting, it is both at 
once; this is why it is the very last One [viz. the 
Third], sometimes nascent, sometimes 
perishing, obviously in agreement with the 
change of the foremost state, viz. of the 
divisible or the indivisible. The sudden gathers 
one and the other, and it mixes immutable with 
change. 
 
 
445 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 267.12-30 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 38.9-39.13). On this point, 
see: J. TROUILLARD, “La notion de δύναμις chez Damascios”, in Revue des Etudes 
Grecques, 85, fasc. 406-408, 1972, p. 353-363, especially, p. 360 and p. 363 
446 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 267.14-19 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 38.12-19) 
447 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 250.25-251.5 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 9.11-28) 
448 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 251.15-18 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 10.14-18) 
449 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 264.17-20 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 33.5-9) 
450 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 38.20-39.13 
451 L. G. WESTERINK, J. COMBÈS (eds.), Damascius. Commentaire sur le Parménide de 
Platon, Les Belles Lettres, vol. 4, 2003, p. 83, n. 7 (p. 168) 
452 PLATO, Parmenides, 156d6-7 
453 PLATO, Parmenides, 156e1 
454 PLATO, Parmenides, 156e3-5 
F. Marion – The ἐξαίφνης in the Platonic Tradition: from Kinematics to Dynamics 
 
70 
  The ‘sudden’ qua psychic kernel – namely the cohesive and vivifying principle of the 
soul – carries out reversion and procession455, inasmuch as it is the junction point between 
these alternated processes that alternatively unify or scatter the soul. In short, to use the 
Neoplatonic metaphor of the soul as a pilot of the bodily vessel456, the ‘sudden’ is the pilot 
in charge of the direction of the efficient power of the soul toward the higher or the lower 
levels of the ontic hierarchy457. In doing so, the ‘sudden’ is thereby in charge of the self-
modification of the soul458. Moreover, as the pilot of a ship, the ‘sudden’ within the soul 
also moves upwards and downwards with the ‘container’ that it steers and by which it is 
dragged away through the ontic spectrum. Thus, since the ‘sudden’ steers the soul, Abhel-
Rappe459 is right to close together the psychic kernel of the commentary on the Parmenides 
and the ‘faculty of awareness’ (τὸ προσεκτικόν) of the lectures on the Phaedo460. 
  The modalities of the psychic causation are exhibited as follows: 
 
In Parm, 271.8-24461: Αὐτὴ μέντοι ἄγει ἑαυτὴν 
πρὸς ἑκάστην ἀλλοίωσίν τε καὶ μέθεξιν· πάντα 
γὰρ οὖσα, πάντων βούλεται μετέχειν· καὶ ἡ 
μέν ἐστιν ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ ἀριθμόν, ἡ δὲ μετέχει 
ἄλλοτε ἀλλοία, ἀλλοιοῦσα δὲ ἑαυτὴν ἐνεργεῖ 
ἐνεργείας ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας προβαλλομένας, καὶ 
εἰς αὐτὴν ἀναστρεφούσας, τοῦτο μὲν ὅτι 
ἀλλοιώσει πως αὐτὴν πρὸς τάδε μᾶλλον ἢ τάδε 
ἀποκλίνουσαι, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ὡς ἀπὸ ἀμεταβλήτου 
μεταβαλλομένη. Μᾶλλον δὲ προβάλλονται 
μὲν ὡς ἀπὸ οὐσίας ἀμεταβλήτου, 
μεταβάλλονται δὲ ὡς ἀπὸ μεταβλητῆς. 
Ἔνδοθεν γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἄρχεται, καὶ κατὰ 
ταύτην αἱ μεταβαλλόμεναι συνίστανται 
ἐνέργειαι. Πάσχουσα γὰρ ἡ οὐσία τάδε 
τοιάσδε ἐνεργείας ἀφίησιν, καὶ πάλιν συν- 
αλλοιοῦται ταῖς ἐνεργείαις. Εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν 
ἐνεργειῶν ἀκίνητοι, εἰσὶν αἱ τῇ ἀναλλοιώτῳ 
οὐσίᾳ συμπεπηγυῖαι, αἱ γεννητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
τῷ ἄγοντι ἄνω ἢ κάτω τὴν ψυχήν. Πέφυκεν 
ἄρα δι’ ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἑνοῦσθαι, οἷον στομουμένη 
ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου φωτός, καὶ πληθύεσθαι 
ἀποβάλλουσα τὴν στόμωσιν, καὶ μένουσα ὃ ἦν 
καθ’ ἑαυτήν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάσχουσά τι καὶ ὑπὸ 
τοῦ χείρονος. Ἆρα οὖν τὸ μένον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ 
ἐξαίφνης, καταδεέστερον τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω 
γενέσεως; ἢ οὐ χωριστέον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀχρόνου· 
It is indeed the soul that drives itself towards 
every modification and participation. Being in 
itself everything, it wants to participate in 
everything; and, as it is, it remains numerically 
the same; insofar as it participates, it is 
sometimes modified in one way, sometimes in 
another. By modifying itself, it produces 
activities that are projected from its essence 
and that return to it: inasmuch as the activities 
modify the soul in some respects by making it 
incline towards these things rather than others; 
this, in such a way that the activities are 
changed as from the immutable. Or rather, its 
activities are projected as from an immutable 
essence, but they are changed as from a 
changing essence. Change begins, indeed, 
from within, and changing activities are 
formed in accordance with this change. In fact, 
essence produces activities of a certain kind 
because it undergoes affections of this kind, 
and, in turn, it is modified at the same time by 
these activities. But, among the activities, there 
are those that are immobile, namely those that 
are one with the immutable essence, those that 
generate other activities by driving the soul up 
or down. The soul is thus able by itself to unify 
(for example, by being hardened by the divine 
light) and to pluralize itself (by losing its 
 
455 See also: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 249.27-29 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 8.1-3) 
456 PLOTINUS, Enneads, III 4 [15], 6.48, IV 3 [27], 17.22-28, 21.3-11 
457 For the metaphor of the soul as ship moving from within, see: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 
253 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 14.17-19) in which the Neoplatonist alludes to Ps.-PLATO, 
Critias, 109c2 (on the authorship of this dialogue, see: Th. AUFFRET, M. RASHED, “On the 
Inauthenticity of the Critias”, in Phronesis, 62, 2017, p. 237-254.They propose to attribute 
the Critias to Speusippus or his circle in virtue of the parallel between Critias, 121a and 
THEOPHRASTUS, Metaphysics, 11a18-25) 
458 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 272.18-22 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 48.12-18) 
459 S. AHBEL-RAPPE, “Damascius on the Third Hypothesis of the Parmenides”, in J. D. 
TURNER, K. CORRIGAN (eds.), Plato’s Parmenides and its heritage, vol. 2: Its Reception 
in Neoplatonic, Jewish and Christian Texts, Society of Biblical Literature, 2010, p. 154-156 
460 DAMASCIUS, In Phaed, I §269, §271, II §19, §21 
461 = W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 46.3-47.1 
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καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ ἐξαίφνης ποτὲ μὲν ῥώννυται, 
ποτὲ δὲ ἀμυδροῦται. 
hardening and remaining what it is in itself, or 
rather undergoing some attack on the part of 
the inferior). Is it that what remains, viz. the 
sudden, is inferior to the ascending movement? 
We answer that we must not separate it from 
the timeless; indeed, the sudden, too, 
sometimes strengthens, sometimes weakens, 
because the soul, in its entirety, at the same 
time remains what it is and changes about as 
well. 
 
  The psychic activities predictably come from the psychic ‘sudden’ insofar as it is the 
most immutable and most timeless ‘part’ of the soul which has within itself all the 
temporal predicates, albeit only in gestation462 (given that it has within itself all the 
predicates, even both-together (συναμφότερον) the two predicates of each opposite pair, 
in a paradigmatic way). This text clarifies how varying activities can proceed from the 
same seed, and, reversely, how the various activities lead to the self-modification of the 
soul. Such reciprocity brings out the function of supervenience for the consistency of any 
Neoplatonic theory, notably because the supervenience guarantees the continuity of the 
vertical causal chain from the highest to the lowest levels of the ontic scale. 
  Beyond the self-modification, the mechanism of the psychic causation is as follows: the 
activities of the soul are directly reflected into the physical world by the changes of its 
primary vehicle which is a luminous body more or less warmly dressed463. Such a 
translation from the ‘psychic’ to the ‘vehicular’ explains the frequent use of the analogy 
between them in the course of Damascius’ explanation464. The psychic causation thereby 
is relayed from the dynamic kernel to the bodily diacosm by means of a chain that includes 
incorporeal and corporeal activities: 
 
  This scheme is obviously a common view of Later Neoplatonism. The innovation (or the 
renovation) of Damascius takes place only in his understanding of the link between the 
essence of the soul and its activity, namely in the fact that, unlike Syrianus’ students, 
Damascius claims the validity of the Law of Supervenience for the souls which peregrinate 
throughout the scale of beings, and sustains it by a very technical framework. Porphyry 
had been very close to making this move, but, unlike Iamblichus465, some scruple 
connected with the dignity of the soul had prevented it466. What is this Law of 
Supervenience? 
  The activity proceeds from the essence and, by virtue of this, the activity necessarily is 
similar to the substance from which it originates, in such a way that if the substance is φ, 
its activities will also be φ. Conversely, if the activities are of some determined kind, that 
is because its substance is such. In short, a thing cannot differ in respect to its activities 
 
462 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 272.3-14 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 47.15-48.8) 
463 On the various kinds of vehicles in the Later Neoplatonism, see: I. HADOT, Le problème 
du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978, p. 181-
187 
464 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 253.11-19, 255.8-15, 270.2-6 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 13.20-
14.7, 17.4-10, 43.22-44.6). C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later 
Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 96-97 
465 IAMBLICHUS, in (Ps.-)SIMPLICIUS, In DA, 89.33-35 (see also: PRISCIANUS, Metaphr, 
31.27-32) 
466 PORPHYRY, Against Boethus on the Soul, in EUSEBIUS, Praeparatio Evangelica, XI 
28.4-5. See: I. HADOT (ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète, Brill, 1996, 
p. 106-107 
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without differing with respect to its substance, given that the activities ontologically 
depend upon the substantial properties of which they are the expression. This Law of 
Supervenience according to which the activities supervene upon the substance is universal 
and plays at any level of the ontic hierarchy467, and therefore must be applied to the 
‘regional’ relation between the soul and its activities. That is precisely one of the main 
reasons for which Damascius deviates from Proclus and follows Iamblichus on the 
changing self, since the variation of the psychic οὐσιώδης μέθεξις can be inferred from 
the varying activities of the soul. 
  The relative likeness (ὁμοιότης) between the cause and its effects, expressed by the Law 
of Supervenience, ensures the connection of each diacosm with that which precedes it and 
that which follows it. By this, such a multi-layered likeness justifies the intellectual 
undertaking of rising to the Principles468, because from the empirical observation of certain 
properties at the encosmic level, it is possible to go up the scale of beings, step by step, 
until their most transcendent roots – including, by the use of hypernegation, beyond the 
discursive speech, until the Ineffable. In denying the validity of the supervenience for the 
‘regional’ relation between the soul and its activities, Proclus runs the risk of shaking the 
consistency of the Neoplatonic theory, and of breaking the continuity of the causal chain 
that brings together all diacosmic levels. Indeed, whether the Law of Supervenience were 
not universal, then how the Neoplatonists would justify their multi-layered theology of 
which the construction by procession highly depends on the relative likeness between the 
diacosms? To preserve the consistency of Neoplatonism, Damascius must therefore 
diverge from Proclus – who introduces a ‘regional’ gap into the processive continuum – 
and claim the universality of the Supervenience, in such a way that even the essence of 
the soul is changeable, insofar as the activities which proceed from it are variable. That 
way, the procession can be understood, without any trouble, as a continuum resulting from 
the interplay of similarity and dissimilarity between the causes and their effects, so, as a 
chain that unifies the ontic hierarchy from an absolute singular principle to a manifold of 
particulars. 
  The reciprocity involved by the supervenience is well depicted by the model of 
ἀλλοίωσις that Damascius favours for clarifying the self-motion469. Indeed, saying that the 
 
467 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 31.2-10 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1986, p. 45.5-14). On Damascius’ 
law of causality qua involving a kind of supervenience between causes and their effects, see: 
S. AHBEL-RAPPE, “Scepticism in the Sixth Century? Damascius’ Doubts and Solutions 
Concerning First Principles”, in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 36, 1998, p. 356-360 
and S. GERTZ, “Knowledge, Intellect and Being in Damascius’ Doubts and Solutions 
Concerning First Principles”, in Ancient Philosophy, 36-2, 2016, p. 479-494 
468 For instance, see: PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, §28-29, §32 
469 Here, I take the opposite view of Steel who thinks that Damascius’ use of terms which 
indicate qualitative change is an unfortunate consequence of the fact that Damascius is 
“limited by the conceptual apparatus provided him by his tradition” (C. STEEL, The 
Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and 
Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 116). Quite the reverse, I think the Neoplatonists are perfectly 
aware of the benefits provided by the Platonic porosity between the categories of substance 
and quality involved by the ‘categorial modulation’ occurring in the relation of participation. 
Yet, it seems that all Neoplatonist had forgotten the mediatory role of the μάθηματα in the 
‘categorial modulation’. On these intermediaries, see: ARISTOTLE, Met, A 6 987b14-33; Ph. 
MERLAN, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, p. 11-58 and M. 
RASHED, “Plato’s Five Worlds Hypothesis (Ti. 55cd), Mathematics and Universals”, in R. 
CHIARADONNA, G. GALLUZO (eds.), Universals in Ancient Philosophy, Edizioni della 
Normale, 2013, p. 87-112. Anyway, as Cook Wilson and – after him – Armstrong have 
lucidly remarked, the puzzle of how occurs the participation is condemned to remain 
insoluble, insofar such a nexus is in fine a primitive of the theory: D. M. ARMSTRONG, 
Universals and Scientific Realism. Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism, Cambridge University 
Press, 1978, p. 66-68, p. 104-105, Universals. An Opinionated Introduction, Westview 
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soul alters or modifies itself seems naturally to put us in mind the idea of a variation of 
the very being of the soul itself under the influence of its own activity. Besides, the well-
known porosity between qualitative change and substantial change470 allows to switch 
from the ἀλλοίωσις qua γένεσις τις to the γένεσις ἁπλῆ, or vice versa, without great 
trouble. This move is especially easy for a Platonist, insofar as such a confusion is already 
ascribed to Plato in the case of the Forms of which the sensible participates471. Indeed, 
Plato had supported the view according to which the μέθεξις involves a sort of ‘categorial 
modulation’ from the category of substance to the category of quality, namely from the 
Ideas in themselves (= substances/τοῦτο) to the Ideas as participated by the sensible items 
(= qualities/τοιοῦτον)472. Thus, the fact that Damascius claims that what is changing into 
the soul is its οὐσιώδης μέθεξις (i.e. its τοιόνδε τῆς οὐσίας473) is far to be a Platonistic 
coincidence474, insofar as it is not its least merit to justify the use of the lexicon of 
qualitative change. Of course, such a porosity might be highly tempered by the distinction 
between ἀλλοίωσις and τροπή presented above. However, inasmuch as the Neoplatonic 
substitution of the coming-to-be (γένεσις) by the transformation (τροπή) clearly 
corresponds to a transfer of the essential change from the category of substance to the 
category of quality475, this late distinction actually supports the view of Damascius. 
  Damascius thereby characterizes the products of the essential modifications as essential 
dispositions (διαθέσεις/ἔξεις) which determine the path toward the completion (τελείωσις) 
of the soul, viz. its unification476. The quality called δίαθεσις is very linked to the idea of 
 
Press, 1989, p. 108-110, p. 137 and J. COOK WILSON, Statement and Inference, Oxford 
University Press, 1926, p. 348 
470 ARISTOTLE, GC, I 3-4. In this text, ‘alteration’ means more generally ‘qualitative 
change’ rather than strictly ‘change in affections’ (as ἀλλοίωσις means in Cat, 14 15a15-33, 
Phys, 7.3 and Met, Δ 21 1022b15-20). Indeed, the examples of quality used by Aristotle are 
not, strictly speaking, πάθη (see: 319b12-14, 25-29, 33). On the porosity between qualitative 
change and substantial change in Aristotle, see: Met, Z 8 1033b21-24, 1034a5-8 and, above 
all, Meteor, 4.2 379b17-32. On this point, see: F. MARION, Etude sur les notions de δίαθεσις 
et d’ἕξις chez Aristote, Sorbonne University-Paris IV, 2015 (MPhil Thesis), chap. V, §20 
471 ARISTOTLE, Met, Z 6 1031b15-18, 13 1038b15-29, SE, 22 178b36-179a10. See: F. 
MARION, Etude sur les notions de δίαθεσις et d’ἕξις chez Aristote, Sorbonne University-
Paris IV, 2015 (MPhil Thesis), chap. V, §17 
472 PLATO, Timaeus, 49d-50b, 52e-53a (see: S. MENN, The Aim and The Argument of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Iβ4 (esp. Iβ4b), forthcoming). Besides, some Platonists, as Plotinus 
or Porphyry, had emphasized such a ‘categorial modulation’ with their theory of the 
individual qua συνδρομῇ ποιοτήτων that originates from Theaetetus, 157b-c, 209c and, as 
Lloyd has wonderfully seen, anticipates the sophisticated theory of individual of Quine’s 
Mathematical Logic, see: ALCINOUS, The Handbook of Platonism, 156.1-14; PLOTINUS, 
Enneads, VI 3 [44], 8; PORPHYRY, Isagoge, 7.20-26, In Cat, 129.8-11 and DEXIPPUS, In 
Cat, 30.20-26. On this point: R. CHIARADONNA, “La teoria dell’individuo in Porfirio e 
l’idiôs poion stoico”, in Elenchos, 21, 2000, p. 303-331; A.C. LLOYD, “Neoplatonic Logic 
and Aristotelian Logic II”, in Phronesis, 1-2, 1956, p. 158-159 and R. SORABJI, Self. Ancient 
and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death, Oxford Clarendon Press, 2006, p. 
137-142 
473 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 255.26 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 18.3-4) 
474 The loss of Damascius’ commentary on the First Part of the Parmenides is, of course, 
highly regrettable for our understanding of Damascius’ account on participation. However, 
there remains a brief analysis in the De Principiis, see: DAMASCIUS, De Princ, II 1.4-4.8 
(= W&C, vol. 3, 1991, p. 168.1-173.5) 
475 M. RASHED, “La classification des lignes simples selon Proclus et sa transmission au 
monde islamique”, in C. D’ANCONA, G. SERRA (eds.), Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia 
nella tradizione araba. Atti del colloquio ‘La ricezione arabe ed ebraica della filosofia e 
della scienza greche’ (Padova, 14-15 maggio 1999), Padoue, 2002, p. 257-279 
476 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 272.29-273.9 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 49.1-18) (see also: 272.6 
and, for ἕξις, 267.28). See: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later 
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mixture since its Hippocratic origin in which δίαθεσις means the healthy or sickly humoral 
balance477. That is in this meaning of ‘corporeal balance’ that, for instance, Aristotle 
sometimes uses it in his biological treatises478. This link between δίαθεσις and mixture is 
also present in Plato who sometimes speaks about the psychic mixture479. Anyway, in the 
book Δ of the Metaphysics, Aristotle defines the δίαθεσις as the ordered arrangement of 
that which has parts480, and such is any mixture. In making appeal to these qualities that 
implicitly allude to the mixture, Damascius highlights once more the unified being of the 
soul. More important, among the four kinds of qualities presented in Cat, 8, he chooses 
one of which the production is closest to substantial change. Indeed, in Phys, 7.3481, 
Aristotle has described the coming-to-be of the qualities that are not affective on the model 
of the γένεσις, namely on the model of a derivative production that succeeds some 
preparatory alterations (in the strict sense of affective change)482. This process is very 
similar to the coming of the Forms into the sensible world that follows a preliminary 
 
Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 113-114. For these 
notions, see also: ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, DA, 24.21-25.2. The proximity between 
the two loaded words δίαθεσις and τελείωσις is far from being a bland textual fact. It carries 
a high Alexander’s overtone (rather than an Aristotle’s one), insofar as δίαθεσις is often used 
as a metonymy of ἔξις, see for these notions and the function of such a metonymy in 
Aristotle: F. MARION, Etude sur les notions de δίαθεσις et d’ἕξις chez Aristote, Sorbonne 
University-Paris IV, 2015 (MPhil Thesis), and, for these in Alexander of Aphrodisias: C. 
CERAMI, “Changer pour rester le même. Forme, δύναμις et ἔξις chez Alexandre 
d’Aphrodise”, in A. BALANSARD, A. JAULIN (eds.), Alexandre d’Aphrodise et la 
métaphysique aristotélicienne, Peeters, 2018, p. 237-280. Simplicius follows his master by 
identifying the essential participation with the notion of ἔξις, see: SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 
1066.3-1067.2 and I. HADOT (ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète, 
Brill, 1996, p. 80-83 
477 Ps.-HIPPOCRATES, On Ancient Medecine, 6.2, 7.2, On the Eighth Month's Foetus, 12.1, 
On Aliment, 34 (see also for ἔξις: Regimen in Health, I 32.1, III 81.3, 82.3, On Regimen in 
Acute Diseases, 25.1, 43.1, Appendix, 6.1, 31.2, 57.1) and Ps.-GALEN, Introductio sive 
Medicus, 680.1-8. For a Neoplatonic text that refers to the Hippocratic use, see amongst 
others: SIMPLICIUS, In Epict. Ench, 14.332-335 
478 For example: ARISTOTLE, Phys, 7.3 246b4-6, GA, IV 2 767a32-33 
479 For example: PLATO, Philebus, 64c 
480 ARISTOTLE, Met, Δ 19 1022b1-3 
481 On this difficult and fascinating text (of which theory never explicitly appears elsewhere 
in the Corpus Aristotelicum, except in DC, 1.3 270a27-29), see: SIMPLICIUS, In Phys, 
1061.25-1081.30; S. MASO, C. NATALI, G. SEEL (eds.), Reading Aristotle Physics VII.3 
“What is Alteration?”, Parmenides Publishing, 2012 and R. WARDY, The Chain of Change. 
A Study of Aristotle’s Physics VII, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 152-238. Phys, 7.3 
is a key-text for the question of whether or not a kind of supervenience is admitted by 
Aristotle (debate initiated by R. WARDY, p. 202-207), see: V. CASTON, “Aristotle and 
Supervenience”, in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 31-2, 1993, p. 107-135, 
“Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern”, in The Philosophical Review, 106-3, 1997, p. 
309-363; H. GRANGER, “Aristotle and the Concept of Supervenience”, in The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, 31-2, 1993, p. 161-177; Ch. SCHIELDS, “Soul and Body in 
Aristotle”, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 6, 1988, p. 103-137, “The Generation 
of Form in Aristotle”, in History of Philosophy Quarterly, 7-4, 1990, p. 367-390 and I. 
KUPREEVA, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Soul as Form, University of Toronto, 1999 (PhD 
Thesis), p. 272-285 
482 There is in Aristotle a well-known porosity between a kind of γένεσις τις and γένεσις 
ἁπλῆ, namely between the change in respect to privation (or in respect to τελείωσις-ἔκστασις 
in the case of the dispositions, according to Phys, 7.3 246b1-3, 247a1-3) and the change in 
respect to contradiction (see: Phys, 1.7 189b30-190a31, Met, Z 7 1033a8-16, 8 1033a24-
b1), albeit only the last is a genuine substantial change (Phys, 1.7 190a21-b10, 5.1 225a12-
17, GC 1.2 317a17-3 317b35, 319a3-14). To some extent, such a conflation can be explained 
by the likeness of these two relations (Met, I 4 1055b3-9). 
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overcoming of the material barriers that might prevent its reception483. The parallel is 
blindingly obvious, and can legitimate the association of μέθεξις and δίαθεσις that puts 
the emphasis on the categorial porosity involved by the participation484. 
  Moreover, Damascius has surely in mind the Aristotelian definition of ἔξις according to 
which it means ‘a disposition according to which that which is disposed is either well or 
ill disposed, either in itself or with reference to something else’485, like are virtue and 
vice486. The ethical overtone of these sorts of qualities487 is highly relevant for 
characterizing the essence of the soul that undergoes change in the course of its purifying 
ascent toward the Intelligible, or quite the reverse in the course of its corrupting fall toward 
the matter488. So, the fact that Damascius precisely uses the term δίαθεσις for denoting the 
changing quality of the psychic essence is undoubtedly well thought out, insofar as, given 
its semantic wealth and its great power of evocation, it provides a satisfying clarification 
of his theory: modifying the intensity of one of the opposing predicates present within 
itself, the soul changes its predicative balance, namely its disposition, and, therefore, 
projects varying activity from itself towards itself and, by means of the ‘vehicular 
reflection’, from itself towards the physical world. That way, the soul modifies itself, 
given that its activity has the retrograde effect of changing its predicative balance again, 
and so on and so forth. For instance, when the soul plunges into the sensible world more 
deeply, its ‘one’ is relaxing while its ‘many’ is strengthening, in such a way that the 
balance between ‘one’ and ‘many’ changes in favour of the ‘many’. Since the soul is 
always active and in motion (ἀεικίνητος), it continuously modifies itself, in such a way 
that the soul is an ever-changing οὐσία (ἀειμετάβλητος, ἀειγένητος)489. Yet, the fact that 
the soul is essentially disposed (διατιθέμενον) differently at different times does not 
entirely shake its being to the extent that it would be no longer what it is. In spite of the 
increase and decrease of the various predicative strengths within itself, the soul keeps its 
identity throughout change. 
  Indeed, while the essence-οὐσία of the soul is changeable in respect to its variable 
οὐσιώδης μέθεξις, Damascius forcefully argues that it is not the case for its εἶδος τῆς 
ὑπάρξεως. Albeit the terms οὐσία and ὕπαρξις (and, sometimes, ὑπόστασις) are often 
interchangeable in Damascius, he had nevertheless distinguished their precise meanings 
and imposed a twist to the earlier Neoplatonic tradition490. In short, ὕπαρξις means the 
first principle of every determined being – principle which is anterior to all participation. 
The ὕπαρξις subsequently plays the role of the kernel around which the substance grows 
according to its essential participation. In other words, ὕπαρξις denotes the pure being that 
fulfils the henadic function of foundation for the whole structure of the essence, in such a 
way that the ούσία in fine results from the qualification of the ὕπαρξις by the diverse 
essential participation (it must be noted that such a constitution does not perfectly cross-
 
483 DAMASCIUS, In Phil, 135.1-136.4 
484 Furthermore, these two processes are both durationless (see: Phys, 6.5 236a5-7). 
485 ARISTOTLE, Met, Δ 20 1022b10-12 (that refers to Δ 14 1020b19-23 and NE, 2.4 
1105b25-28) 
486 On the virtue qua ἔξις, see: ARISTOTLE, EE, 2.2, NE, 2.4-6 
487 This ethical overtone of δίαθεσις and ἔξις is quite vivid in Aristotle. Almost the half of 
their occurrences are found in the ethical and political treatises of Aristotle (221/435), in 
such a way that the scholars have been focused on the ἔξις qua virtue. See: M. OELE, 
“Passive Dispositions: On the Relationship between πάθος and ἔξις in Aristotle”, in Ancient 
Philosophy, 32-2, 2013, p. 351-368 
488 For the virtue qua essential participation, see: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 256.4-25 (= W&C, 
vol. 4, 2003, p. 18-19). See also: SIMPLICIUS, In Epict. Ench, 1.332-342 
489 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 263.12-14, 265.12-18 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 30.27-31.4, 
34.12-14) 
490 On these notions in Damascius, see: J. COMBÈS, “Hyparxis et Hypostasis chez 
Damascius”, in Etudes Néoplatoniciennes, J. Millon 1996, p. 327-349 
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check the Chaldaic-triadic combination that products the ούσία qua nature which is, has 
some power and acts)491. 
  
  That way, the fact that the psychic οὐσιώδης μέθεξις varies over time is enough for 
claiming that the soul qua οὐσία undergoes change, and this without entirely denied its 
identity492. Moreover, the fact that the essence of the soul results from the conjunction of 
its ὕπαρξις and its οὐσιώδης μέθεξις emphasizes once more the porosity between 
substantial and qualitative change inherent in the ‘categorial modulation’, given that the 
essential participation is a genuine ‘component’ of the ούσία. Damascius’ subtle 
explanation of the modification of the soul by means of the distinction between ὕπαρξις 
and μέθεξις has also the merit to highlight the intermediary nature of the soul again493: 
 
 ὕπαρξις μέθεξις 
νοῦς unchangeable unchangeable 
ψυχή unchangeable changing 
σῶμα changing changing 
 
  As for the reason for why the psychic ὕπαρξις is really immutable, it must be found in 
its henadic function, that is to say its function of unification and of conservation of unity494. 
Indeed, inasmuch as the soul of the Third Hypothesis is the last One, namely the 
ἀνθρώπειον ἕν, its very being is determined by the structure of its unity. Consequently, 
whether this structure (εἶδος) can be lost, then the fact to be a soul can be lost too, and, 
therefore, the soul cannot travel along the ontic hierarchy and cannot express the 
virtualities of its intermediary being without vanishing. To escape such an unpleasant 
conclusion, the psychic structure of unity – and such is its εἶδος τῆς ὑπάρξεως – must be 
conceived as unchangeable. That way, the Platonic dogma of the immortality of the 
mediatory soul can be saved, whereas the freedom of the soul indicated by its varying 
 
491 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 106.18-25, 131.12-133.19, 135.19-22, 310.13-313.21 (= 
W&C, vol. 2, 1989, p. 33.4-12, p. 70.19-73.23, 76.22-77.1, vol. 3, 1991, p. 149.6-154.14). 
Above all, see: P. HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus, Etudes Augustiniennes, vol. 1, 1968, p. 
260-272 (especially, p. 267-270), p. 489, and afterwards: C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A 
Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 
1978, p. 113, n. 78; F. ROMANO (ed.), Proclo. Lezioni sul ‘Cratilo’ di Platone, Roma, 1989, 
p. 136 and L. G. WESTERINK, J. COMBÈS (eds.), Damascius. Traité des Premiers 
Principes, Les Belles Lettres, vol. 2, 1989, p. 33, n. 2 (p. 233-234). On the correspondance 
between the triads ὕπαρξις-δύναμις-ἐνέργεια/νοῦς and μονή-πρόοδος-ἐπιστροφή, see: 
DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 135.9-15 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 9.20-10.4) and P. HADOT, 
Porphyre et Victorinus, Etudes Augustiniennes, vol. 1, 1968, p. 272-330. On the Chaldaic-
triadic constitution of any genuine substance in Damascius, see in addition to Hadot: J. M. 
DILLON, “Some Aspects of Damascius’ Treatment of the Concept of Dynamis”, in F. 
ROMANO, R. LOREDANA CARDULLO (eds.), Dunamis nel Neoplatonismo. Atti del II 
Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo (6-8 October 1994), 
Nuova Italia Editrice, 1996, p. 139-148 
492 C. STEEL, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, 
Damascius and Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 109-113 
493 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 271.25-29 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 47.2-7). C. STEEL, The 
Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and 
Priscianus, Brussel, 1978, p. 111-112 
494 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 69.21-70.11 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1986, p. 104.21-105.20) 
οὐσία
ὕπαρξις
μέθεξις
οὐσία
ὕπαρξις-πατήρ μονή
δύναμις-ζωή πρόοδος
ἐνέργεια-νοῦς ἐπιστροφή
F. Marion – The ἐξαίφνης in the Platonic Tradition: from Kinematics to Dynamics 
 
77 
activity – and thereby its responsibility for its fall into the corrupted world495 – can be 
explained by its changing essential participation only, in accordance with the Law of 
Supervenience. 
  The ἐξαίφνης qua ὕπαρξις is therefore the radical foundation (θεμέλιον) of the soul, its 
principle of existence (ὑπόστασις), which inherits its dynamic power from the vivifying 
Intellect496 (Hecate-Rhea) from which the moving life (Hera) and the resting life (Hestia) 
originally proceed497. The ‘sudden’ shares some characteristics with the νοῦς ζωογόνος of 
the 2nd Order of the Intellective Diacosm, insofar as Hecate is the source of the psychic 
vivifying form. For instance, on the one hand, in the same way as Hecate is both-together 
in motion and at rest498, the psychic ‘sudden’ has within itself all opposite predicates; on 
the other, the vivifying Intellect499 and the ‘sudden’ are in their respective diacosms the 
analogous of the First Eternity of the Intelligible Life belonging to the 2nd Triad of the 
Intelligible Diacosm500. Furthermore, insofar as the ὕπαρξις is a gift of the Father (that of 
the Chaldaic Triad corresponding to the Intelligible Diacosm)501, the psychic ‘sudden’ 
keeps somewhat of the Fathered Act, namely its dynamism. Thus, it is qua ὕπαρξις that 
the psychic ‘sudden’ takes on the efficient causation of the soul upon itself and upon the 
physical world, given that its motive force is inherited from the higher diacosms. As a 
junction between the highest and the lowest levels of reality, the souls, by means of their 
intrinsic dynamism, are in charge of the transmission and of the conservation of the 
encosmic life, in doing so they take part in the organization of the sensible world qua 
assistants of the Vivifying Goddess and of the Demiurge502. 
  Damascius, the last ring of the golden chain503, surely was – of course after Plotinus – 
the most combative Platonizer, and did not hesitate to correct and amend the Aristotelean 
dregs of Proclus’ Henology in order to recover the true look of Platonism. His aim is 
clearly to offer a consistent Platonic worldview that, obviously, differs from Plato in many 
points. In his conceptual elaboration, Damascius thereby is very careful to ensure that the 
syntactic rules of Neoplatonism – as the Principles of Continuity, of Plenitude and the 
Law of Supervenience – are universally valid. In agreement with his inherited 
 
495 SIMPLICIUS, In Epict. Ench, 35.245-273, 38.738-746 
496 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 241.23-27, 242.9-15 (= W&C, vol. 3, 1991, p. 38.2-8, p. 38.23-
39.8), In Parm, 155.6-7, 235.6-17, 267.21-22 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 43.19-20, p. 181.7-
22, vol. 4, 2003, p. 39.1-2). The fact that Hecate-Rhea is the source of life and motion is 
platonically sustained by the fact that the Heraclitean doctrine of universal flux is introduced 
in the Cratylus by the etymology of Rhea: PLATO, Cratylus, 402a4-b2 
497 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 156.17-20, 164.17-22 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 45.27-46.9, p. 
60.1-6). See: J. COMBÈS, “L’un humain selon Damascius”, in Etudes Néoplatoniciennes, J. 
Millon 1996, p. 195. On Hera and Hestia qua generated by Hecate-Rhea, see: PROCLUS, In 
Crat, 79.5-80.6. By the way, the resting life of Hestia obviously refers to: PLATO, Phaedrus, 
246e4-247a1 
498 On this point, Damascius deviates from Proclus and follows Iamblichus and Syrianus, 
see: PROCLUS, Platonic Theology, V 38 142.1-143.3, 22-23 and DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 
153.17-154.1 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 41.1-17) 
499 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 235.17-22 (= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 181.22-182.3) 
500 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 17.8-10 (= W&C, vol. 1, 1997, p. 22.7-10) 
501 DAMASCIUS, De Princ, I 309.24-310.1, 312.26-29 (= W&C, vol. 3, 1991, p. 148.14-15, 
153.8-12) 
502 On the joint production of the hypercosmic and encosmic levels by the νοῦς ζωογόνος 
and the νοῦς δημιουργικός, see: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 155.10-157.10, 235.6-236.2 (= 
W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 44.3-47.12, 181.7-182.9). On the paradigmatic degrees of life and 
their respective traces into the encosmic level, see: DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 154.22-160.21 
(= W&C, vol. 3, 2001, p. 43.1-52.24) 
503 To borrow the title of the following paper: L. BRISSON, “Le dernier anneau de la chaîne 
d’or”, in Revue d’Etudes Grecques, 114, 2001, p. 269-282 
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Parmenides-focusing, he discovers in the ἐξαίφνης the means to explain the technical 
detail of the self-motion and, consequently, of the very intermediary and mixed being of 
the soul. Albeit he does this by transferring the ἐξαίφνης from kinematics to dynamics, he 
does not completely lose the kinematic meaning of the ‘sudden’ however, inasmuch as the 
dynamic and psychic ἐξαίφνης is mirrored by its kinematic and physical image – that, 
besides, fulfils a requirement of his quantum kinematics, namely the weld between two 
durative ‘leaps’– present in the processes produced by the soul qua efficient cause504. 
 
 
 CONCLUSION: BEYOND DAMASCIUS, TOWARDS THE FLORENTINE ACADEMY 
 
  Damascius’ transfer of the ‘sudden’ from kinematics to psychic dynamics shall go 
unheeded in the posterior Platonic Tradition. Indeed, neither his disciple Simplicius, nor 
Philoponus, nor Olympiodorus who are well informed of Damascius’ thought, borrow 
from his doctrine of the psychic ἐξαίφνης. Likewise, nowhere in the Byzantine Theology 
heavily inspired by Neoplatonism, a technical account of the ἐξαίφνης can be found. 
Beyond the fact that Christian theologians do not share the same Parmenides-focusing as 
the Neoplatonists, the main reason, I think, is that for them the word ἐξαίφνης refers above 
all to Malachias 3.1 wherein it is said that God enters suddenly the Temple505, in such a 
way that ‘suddenly’ keeps both its mystical and its kinematic meanings, but in a Christian 
rather than a Platonic way506. Moreover, the only Byzantine commentary on the 
Parmenides preserved, namely the sequel to Proclus’ commentary written by George 
Pachymeres (AD 13th-Century)507, comes back to a kinematic reading of the Third 
Hypothesis508, unsurprisingly less influenced by Neoplatonism than by Aristotle’s brief 
 
504 DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 263.29 (= W&C, vol. 4, 2003, p. 31.25-32.1) 
505 Malachi 3.1: ἐξαίφνης ἥξει εἰς τὸν ναὸν αὐτοῦ Κύριος ὃν ὑμεῖς ζητεῖτε (see also: Mark 
13.36; Luke 2.13, 9.36; Acts, 9.3, 22.6) 
506 For instance, in Gregory of Nyssa, see: GREGORY OF NYSSA, Orationes viii de 
beatitudinibus, in J.-P. MIGNE (ed.), Patrologiae cursus completus (series Graeca), 44, p. 
1216.49-51 and Ad imaginem dei et ad similitudinem, p. 1337.14-20. Gregory quotes 
Malachias’ Book in Testimonia adversus Judaeos (J.-P. MIGNE (ed.), Patrologiae cursus 
completus (series Graeca), 46, p. 201.2.3) and in De occurs domini (46, p. 1177.39-42). On 
the Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa, see: J. DANIÉLOU, “Grégoire de Nysse et le néo-
platonisme de l’Ecole d’Athènes”, in Revue des Etudes Grecques, 80, fasc. 379-383, 1967, 
p. 395-401 
507 On the editorial work of Pachymeres on Proclus’ manuscripts, see: C. STEEL, C. MACÉ, 
“Georges Pachymère philologue: le Commentaire de Proclus au Parménide dans le 
manuscrit Parisinus Gr. 1810”, in M. CACOUROS, M.-H. CONGOURDEAU (eds.), 
Philosophie et Sciences à Byzance de 1204 à 1453. Les textes, les doctrines et leur 
transmission, Peeters, 2006, p. 77-99. On the manuscript of Pachymeres, the Parisianus 
graecus 1810 (holding Proclus’ commentary and its continuation by Pachymeres), see: C. 
LUNA, A.-Ph. SEGONDS (eds.), Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, vol. 1, 
Les Belles Lettres, 2007, p. clvii-clxiii. On the ‘Aristotelian’ Pachymeres and Neoplatonism, 
see: Th. A. GADRA, S. M. HONEA, P. M. STINGER, G. UMHOLTZ, L. G. WESTERINK 
(eds.), George Pachymeres. Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides [Anonymous Sequel to 
Proclus’ Commentary], Vrin/Ousia, 1989, p. xii-xiv 
508 G. PACHYMERES, In Parm, 1290.26-1292.27, in Th. A. GADRA, S. M. HONEA, P. M. 
STINGER, G. UMHOLTZ, L. G. WESTERINK (eds.), George Pachymeres. Commentary on 
Plato’s Parmenides [Anonymous Sequel to Proclus’ Commentary], Vrin/Ousia, 1989, p. 38-
40, p. 98-99) 
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definition of the adverb ‘suddenly’ qua infinitesimal duration (viz. a duration smaller than 
any duration that can be given or perceived)509. 
  The oblivion of Damascius’ innovation could have been corrected later, namely in the 
Florentine Academy founded by the very erudite Marsilio Ficino. But, although Ficino 
had likely read – but no translated – Damascius’ In Parm, with the annotations of 
Bessarion510, nothing in his treatment of the Third Hypothesis can put us in mind that he 
was very influenced by the diadochus511. 
  Yet, Marsilio Ficino reconciles kinematics and mysticism in his understanding of the 
‘sudden’. But he does this by distancing himself from the Greek Neoplatonists in several 
points. Notably, he slightly deviates from them about the σκοπός of the Third Hypothesis. 
Indeed, albeit his interpretation of Proclus’ position is actually a mistake512, Ficino 
restrains the σκοπός to the ‘divine’ souls, namely those that have a great likeness with the 
intellective gods513. The Third Hypothesis is therefore not really devoted to the demonic 
and human souls (as it is for the successors of Syrianus514), but rather to the cosmic gods, 
viz. the souls of the greater spheres, of the stars and of the divinities which exercise 
providence within the spheres515. 
  Although Ficino admits that some changes occur within the soul516, whatever is its degree 
of perfection, he follows Proclus by denying that the soul itself undergoes essential 
change517. The psychic changes are only the varying activities unfolded by time that 
proceed from the ‘divine’ and eternal part of the soul, namely from its essence. And what 
is changing within the soul is only its disposition (habitus) or appearance which is firmly 
understood in a non-essential way518. Such a position is obviously very Proclean. Anyway, 
anything else, from Ficino, would have been astonishing519. Besides, Ficino illustrates this 
by the image of the sphere of which the centre remains immobile, while its surface 
undergoes change in the course of its revolution520, so by an image already employed by 
 
509 ARISTOTLE, Phys, 4.13 222b15-222b26. On another ‘infinitesimal’ reading of the 
‘sudden’, see: H. F. CHERNISS, “Parmenides and the Parmenides of Plato”, in The American 
Journal of Philology, 53-2, 1932, p. 132 n. 25 
510 See: L. G. WESTERINK, J. COMBÈS (eds.), Damascius. Traité des Premiers Principes, 
Les Belles Lettres, vol. 1, 1986, p. xxix 
511 However, Westerink, and after him, van Riel have shown that Ficino’ interpretation of 
the Philebus was, to some extent, dependent on Damascius’, see: L. G. WESTERINK, 
“Ficino’ Marginal Notes on Olympiodorus in Riccardi Greek MS 37”, in Traditio, 24, 1968, 
p. 354, p. 367-378 and G. VAN RIEL (ed.), Damascius. Commentaire sur le Philèbe de 
Platon, Les Belles Lettres, 2008, p. clxxxiv-clxxxviii 
512 Ficino misunderstands PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 1064.3-5 in which Proclus distinguishes 
between the souls that have a divine essence, and those that have not but are parented or 
similar to the Gods. 
513 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 52.3-4, 80.1, 96.1 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), Marsilio 
Ficino. Commentaries on Plato. Vol. 2. Parmenides, part. II, Harvard University Press, 
2012, p. 17-19, p. 179, p. 255-256 
514 PROCLUS, In Parm, VI 1063.5-1064.12, Platonic Theology, I 12 56.19-57.14 
515 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 96.1 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 254-255 
516 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 97.2-7 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 266-271 
517 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 96.4-6 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 258-261 
518 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 96.5-10, 97.4, 107.1-3 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 
258-263, p. 268-269, p. 320-323 
519 On the great Ficino’ indebtedness to Proclus, see: M. J. B. ALLEN, “Marsilio Ficino”, in 
S. GERSH (ed.), Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014, p. 353-379 
520 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 96.7 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 260-261 
F. Marion – The ἐξαίφνης in the Platonic Tradition: from Kinematics to Dynamics 
 
80 
Proclus for clarifying the way whereby the soul is both essentially unchangeable and 
intimately linked to the becoming521. 
  After having briefly summarized the main Aristotelian ideas on the nature of the 
continuum522, Ficino exhibits the puzzle of the weld or of the articulation between two 
durative phases and its Platonic answer523. To sustain the Platonic kinematics, Ficino 
draws a strong dichotomy between, on the one hand, the physical kinematics which is well 
theorized by Aristotle and his followers, and, on the other, the psychic kinematics of which 
the laws are somewhat different524. Notably, and here Ficino still follows Proclus525, while 
the physical world is characterized by its continuity and its divisibility ad infinitum, the 
spiritual world, quite the reverse, is rather characterized by its ‘atomism’ and its 
composition out of indivisible elements. In other words, while the corporeal diacosm can 
be studied geometrically, the higher diacosms are merely arithmetical. If so, between two 
psychic motions, there is not an interval of time – as some physicists had argued for the 
corporeal motions, most likely by conceiving such an interval as an infinitesimal 
magnitude –, but a real sizeless switch that is the ἐξαίφνης of the Third Hypothesis. 
  The puzzle of the ‘instant of change’ therefore works only for the durative activities of 
the soul, and not for the durative motions of the body. For Ficino, the ‘sudden’ belongs to 
the non-bodily diacosms wherein the geometric continuous is replaced by the arithmetic 
discrete. It is beyond time, in the sense of it is eternal, even super-eternal, insofar as it is 
undivided526. But Ficino’s reading of the ‘sudden’ is far to be a pure kinematic 
understanding. Indeed, the mystical tone is forcefully kept by Ficino, inasmuch as he 
brings the ‘sudden’ closer to the transcendence of the One which is beyond all opposites527, 
that seems to be a reminiscence of Plotinus, or, at least of the mystical meeting between 
the soul and the One-Beauty from Symposium, 210e2-211a2. 
  In fact, Ficino argues that the ἐξαίφνης, by virtue of its likeness with the One which is 
none of the opposites, is the punctual pivot whereby all the alternations between opposites 
are steered, so their transcendent and timeless seed that is neither the positive nor the 
negative side528. Here, the laconic comment of Ficino is very close to transferring the 
psychic ἐξαίφνης from kinematics towards dynamics. But, something holds him back, and 
he does not jump over the ford. Ficino actually supports a twofold view of the ‘sudden’: 
first, the pure kinematic and durationless transition from a phase to another which occurs 
in an undivided temporal instant529 and prevents the confusion of the two opposite phases, 
 
521 PROCLUS, In Tim, II 130.27-28, and in DAMASCIUS, In Parm, 247.12, 20-25 (= W&C, 
vol. 4, 2003, p. 29.5, 17-30.3) 
522 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 97.8-10 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 270-273 
523 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 97.11-98.8 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 272-283 
524 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 97.12, 98.7 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 272-275, p. 
280-281 
525 On the spiritual multiplicity and the physical continuity in Proclus, see: J. OPSOMER, 
“The Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and 
Divisibility”, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABATTONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of 
Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, Brill, 2009, p. 214-229 
526 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 97.7, 12 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 270-271, p. 
274-275 
527 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 97.12 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 274-275 
528 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 97.12, 98.5 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 274-275, p. 
278-279. The soul in itself is understood as a compound of the opposites, a mixture of 
negations and assertions, in agreement with the Timaeus: MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 
96.1 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 256-257 and In Tim, chap. 27-33, in A. FARNDELL (ed.), 
All Things Natural: Ficino on Plato’s Timaeus, Shepheard-Walwyn, 2010, p. 44-71 
529 Ficino lightens the reasoning of Parm, 156c-e by emphasizing the rejection of moving at 
an instant and of instantaneous velocity: MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 98.7-8 in M. 
VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 280-281 
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and second, the superior and more mystical ‘sudden’ that is super-eternal and transcendent 
in which the soul recovers its logical neutrality that mirrors the highest neutrality of the 
First One530. This last ‘sudden’ which Ficino calls divinum momentum corresponds to the 
connection of the soul with the highest and super-everlasting principle of Ficino’s 
Henology, namely the One which is above essence (super essentiam). None of these 
‘sudden’ are really dynamic, but only the first is purely kinematic, while the second is 
kinematic only to the extent that, from its transcendent point of view, it overlays the first. 
  All things considered, the most important point in Ficino’s exegesis of the Third 
Hypothesis is that the ‘sudden’, under pressure from the prevailing Aristotelian physics, 
belongs only to the psychic kinematics that challenges with discrete rather than continuous 
motions, in such a way that the aim of Plato – namely, answering the continuum-problem 
of the ‘instant of change’ – is completely lost. 
  Apart from Ficino, it is hard to discern an interest for the ἐξαίφνης in the Italian 
Platonism. For instance, Pico della Mirandola, who met and challenged Ficino531, had 
included Damascius in his philosophical curriculum532, but it is difficult to discover a great 
influence of Damascius on his syncretic thought. In spite of the renewed of interest for 
Damascius in the AD 15th and 16th Centuries533, at the current stage of research, it does not 
appear that his ‘psychology’ had a great effect upon the Platonic revival. Nevertheless, the 
studies on Patrizi’s Platonism are quite promising534. 
  Damascius’ one-shot in the Platonic Tradition shows us how the Platonists do not hesitate 
to radically twist the texts of Plato for hardening the consistency of the Platonic conceptual 
scheme. Albeit the ἐξαίφνης is a secondary or an outlying concept, the very various ways 
whereby Platonists had understood it indicate that every Plato’s follower is perfectly aware 
of the requirements imposed on him by his global conception of the aim and the argument 
of the Platonism (viz. by the particular universe he draws in accordance with the axiomatic 
core of the Platonic theory). A Platonist decides to emphasize the mystical facet of the 
‘sudden’ in order to sustain the nomological rupture between here and yonder, another the 
connection of the ‘sudden’ with the soul either to guarantee the validity of the bijection 
between the schedule of the Parmenides and the scale of beings, or for clarifying the 
blended and intermediary nature of the soul. Since ἐξαίφνης is a terminus technicus and a 
terminus mysticus at once, the various balance between its two facets sketches different 
Platonisms, in the same – but in a less prominent – way that the centre of gravity of the 
Corpus Platonicum they chose. That way, the great wealth of Plato’s Corpus, its 
unparallelled potentialities, is highlighted again. 
 
 
530 MARSILIO FICINO, In Parm, chap. 98.6-8 in M. VANHAELEN (ed.), p. 278-281 
531 U. I. AASDALEN, “The First Pico-Ficino Controversy”, in S. CLUCAS, P. J. FORSHAW, 
V. REES (eds.), Laus Platonici Philosophi. Marsilio Ficino and his Influence, Brill, 2011, 
p. 67-88 ; M. J. B. ALLEN, “The Second Ficino-Pico Controversy: Parmenidean Poetry, 
Eristic and the One”, in G. C. GARGAGNINI (ed.), Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. 
Studi e documenti, vol. 2, Firenze, 1986, p. 418-455 and M. VANHAELEN, “The Pico-Ficino 
Controversy: New Evidence in Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides”, in 
Rinascimento, 49, 2009, p. 301-339 
532 PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, Oratio de hominis dignitate, in N. BAUMGARTEN, A. 
BUCK (eds.), Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. De hominis dignitate/Über die Würde des 
Menschen, Verlag, 1990, p. 44-45 
533 C. E. RUELLE, Le philosophe Damascius. Etude sur sa vie et ses ouvrages suivie de neuf 
morceaux inédits, Paris, 1861, p. 37-57, Damascii Dubitationes et Solutiones, I, Berlin, 
1890, p. iii-xvii and L. G. WESTERINK (ed.), The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. 
Vol. II Damascius, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1977, p. 18 
534 Th. LEINKAUF, “Die Rezeption des Damaskios im Denken des Francesco Patrizi”, in 
Accademia, 13, 2011, p. 47-65 and “Francesco Patrizi”, in S. GERSH (ed.), Interpreting 
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